When Scipio received an account of the collection of so large an army, he felt convinced that he would not be a match for so great a multitude with the Roman legions only, without making a show at least of the auxiliary troops of the barbarians; at the same time that he did not think it right that they should form so large a portion of his force as to occasion important consequences if they should change sides, which had brought ruin upon his father and his uncle. Therefore, sending forward Silanus to Colca, who was sovereign of twenty-eight towns, to receive from him the infantry and cavalry, which he promised to enlist during the winter, he himself set out from Tarraco; and collecting small bodies of auxiliaries from his allies, who lay near his road as he proceeded, he came to Castulo. To this place Silanus led the auxiliaries, consisting of three thousand infantry and five hundred horse. Thence he advanced to the city of Baecula, with his entire army of countrymen and allies, foot and horse, amounting to forty-five thousand. Mago and Masinissa attacked them with the whole body of their cavalry while forming their camp, and would have dispersed those engaged in the works, had not a party of horse, concealed by Scipio behind an eminence conveniently situated for the purpose, unexpectedly charged them when rushing on to the attack, and, ere the battle was well begun, routed all the most forward, both those who had advanced nearest the rampart, and those who were foremost in charging the very workmen. With the rest of the troops who came up with their standards, and in order of march, the contest lasted longer, and was for a considerable time doubtful. But when first the light cohorts from the outposts, and then the troops withdrawn from the works and ordered to take arms, came up, being more numerous than those which had been engaged, and fresh while they were fatigued, and now a large body of armed troops rushed from the camp to the battle, the Carthaginians and Numidians at once turned their backs. At first they moved off in troops without breaking their ranks, through fear or precipitation; but afterwards, when the Romans pressed furiously upon their rear, and they were unable to bear the violence of their attack, then at length, utterly regardless of order, they fled precipitately in every direction, as suited each man's convenience. And although, in consequence of this battle, the spirits of the Romans were considerably raised, and those of the enemy depressed, yet, for several days following, the horsemen and light-armed troops never ceased from skirmishes.
14
After having made sufficient trial of their strength in these slight engagements, Hasdrubal first led out his forces for battle, and then the Romans also advanced. But both the armies stood drawn up before their ramparts; and as neither party began the attack, and the sun was now going down, the Carthaginian first, and then the Roman, led back his troops into the camp. The same occurred for several days. The Carthaginian was always the first to lead out his troops into the field, and the first to give the signal for retiring, when they were weary with standing. Neither party sallied from their posts, nor was a weapon discharged, or a word uttered. On one side the Romans occupied the centre, on the other, the Carthaginians and Africans together; the allies occupied the wings, which were composed of Spaniards on both sides. The elephants which stood before the Carthaginian line, appeared at a distance like castles. It was now commonly talked of in both camps, that they would fight in the order in which they had stood when drawn up, and that their centres, composed of Romans and Carthaginians, who were the principals in the war, would engage with equal courage and strength. When Scipio perceived that this was firmly believed, he studiously altered all his arrangements against the day on which he intended to fight. He issued orders through the camp at evening, that the men and horses should be refreshed and fed before daylight, and that the horsemen, armed themselves, should keep their horses bridled and saddled. When it was scarcely yet daylight, he sent all his cavalry, with the light troops, against the Carthaginian outposts, and then without delay advanced himself, at the head of the heavy body of the legions, having strengthened his wings with Roman soldiers, and placed the allies in the centre, contrary to the full anticipations of his own men and of the enemy. Hasdrubal, alarmed by the shout of the cavalry, sprang out of his tent, and, perceiving a tumult before the rampart, and his own troops in a state of hurry and confusion, the standards of the legions gleaming at a distance, and the plain filled with the enemy, immediately sent out the whole body of his cavalry against the horsemen of the enemy; marching himself out of the camp, at the head of the infantry, without departing at all from the usual arrangement in forming his line. The battle between the cavalry had continued for a long time doubtful; nor could they decide it themselves, because, when repulsed, which was the case in a manner alternately, they had a safe retreat upon the line of infantry. But when the armies were not more than five hundred paces distant from each other, Scipio, sounding a retreat and opening his files, received into the midst of them the whole body of his cavalry and light-armed troops; and dividing them into two parts, placed them in reserve behind the wings. After this, when it was now time to commence the battle, he ordered the Spaniards, who formed the centre, to advance at a slow pace; he himself sent a messenger from the right wing, for that he commanded, to Silanus and Marcius to extend the wing on the left in the same manner as they should see him extend that on the right, and engage the enemy with the light-armed of the horse and foot, before the two centres could meet. The wings being thus extended, they advanced against the enemy at a rapid pace, with three cohorts of infantry, and three troops of horse, each with the addition of skirmishers, the rest following them in an oblique line. There was a depression in the centre of the line, because the battalions of the Spaniards advanced slower than the rest, and the wings had already encountered the enemy, when the veteran Carthaginians and Africans had not yet come within distance to discharge their darts; nor dared they run in different directions to the wings to assist them when fighting, lest they should expose their centre to the enemy approaching over against them. The wings were hard pressed, by a twofold attack; the cavalry, the light-armed, and the skirmishers, wheeling round, charged their flanks, while the cohorts pressed them hard in front, in order to separate the wings from the rest of the line.
15
The battle was now extremely unequal in every part, both because an irregular band of Balearians and raw Spaniards were opposed to Roman and Latin soldiers, and further, because, as the day was now getting on, Hasdrubal's troops began to grow languid, having been dispirited by the alarm in the morning, and compelled to go out hastily into the field, without refreshing themselves with food. Scipio had designedly spun out the day, in order that the battle might take place at a late hour; for it was not until the seventh hour that the battalions of infantry charged the wings. It was considerably later before the battle reached the centres, so that the heat from the meridian sun, and the fatigue of standing under arms, together with hunger and thirst, enfeebled their bodies before they engaged the enemy. Thus they stood still, supporting themselves upon their shields. In addition to their other misfortunes, the elephants too, terrified at the tumultuous kind of attack of the cavalry, the skirmishers, and the light-armed, had transferred themselves from the wings to the centre. Fatigued therefore in mind and body, they gave ground, preserving their ranks, however, just as though the army were retreating entire at the command of their general. But when the victors, perceiving that the enemy had given way, charged them on all sides with increased vehemence on that very account, so that the shock could hardly be sustained, though Hasdrubal endeavoured to stop them and hinder them from retiring, vociferating, "that there were hills on their rear, and a safe refuge if they would retreat without precipitation;" yet, fear getting the better of their sense of shame, and all those who were nearest the enemy giving way, they immediately turned their backs, and all gave themselves up to disorderly flight. The first place they halted at was the foot of the hills, where they endeavoured to recall the soldiers to their ranks, the Romans hesitating to advance their line up the opposite steep; but afterwards, when they saw them push on briskly, renewing their flight, they were driven into their camp in extreme alarm. Nor were the Romans far from the rampart; and such was their impetuosity, that they would have taken their camp had not so violent a shower of rain suddenly poured down, while, as is usually the case, the solar rays darted with the greatest intensity between the clouds surcharged with water, that the victors with difficulty returned to their camp. Some were even deterred, by superstition, from making any further attempts that day. Though night and the rain invited the Carthaginians to take necessary rest, yet, as their fears and the danger would not allow them to delay, as it was expected that the enemy would assault their camp as soon as it was light, they raised their rampart by stones collected from the neighbouring valleys around them on all sides, with the determination to defend themselves by works, since there was but little protection in their arms. But the desertion of their allies made it appear safer to fly than stay. Attanes, prince of the Turdetani, began this revolt; he deserted at the head of a numerous band of his countrymen. Then two fortified towns, together with their garrisons, were delivered up by their praefects to the Romans. And, lest the evil should spread more widely, now that the disposition to revolt from the Carthaginians had evinced itself in one instance, Hasdrubal decamped during the silence of the ensuing night.
16
The troops in the outposts having brought word, as soon as it was light, that the enemy had departed, Scipio, despatching his cavalry in advance, ordered the army to move forward; and so rapidly were they led, that had they directly followed the track of the fugitives, they would certainly have overtaken them; but they trusted to the report of their guides, that there was a shorter cut to the river Baetis, where they might attack them while crossing it. Hasdrubal, being precluded from passing the river, turned his course to the ocean; and they now advanced in disorder and in the manner of fugitives, so that the Roman legions were left considerably behind. The cavalry and light-armed, attacking sometimes their rear, and sometimes their flank, harassed and delayed them; and as they were obliged to halt, in consequence of these frequent annoyances, and engaged sometimes the cavalry, at other times the skirmishers and the auxiliary infantry, the legions came up. After this it was no longer a fight, but a butchering as of cattle, till the general himself, who was the first to run away, made his escape to the neighbouring hills with about six thousand men half armed; the rest were slain or made prisoners. The Carthaginians hastily fortified an irregular camp on the highest eminence, and from thence they defended themselves without difficulty, the enemy failing in his attempt to get at them, from the difficulty of the ascent. But a siege in a place bare and affording no means of subsistence, was hardly to be supported, even for a few days; the troops therefore deserted to the enemy. At last the general himself, having procured some ships, for the sea was not at a great distance, left his army by night and effected his escape to Gades. Scipio, having heard of the flight of the general of the enemy, left ten thousand foot and one thousand cavalry for Silanus to carry on the siege of the camp, and returned to Tarraco with the rest of the troops, after a march of seventy days, during which he took cognizance of the causes of the petty princes and states, in order that rewards might be conferred according to a just estimate of their merits. After his departure, Masinissa, having held a private conference with Silanus, passed over into Africa with a few of his countrymen, in order that he might induce his nation also to acquiesce in his new designs. The cause of this sudden change was not so evident at the time, as the proof was convincing which was afforded by his subsequent fidelity, preserved to extreme old age, that he did not on this occasion act without reasonable grounds. Mago went to Gades in the ships which had been sent back by Hasdrubal. Of the rest of the troops thus abandoned by their generals, some deserted and others betook themselves to flight, and in this manner were dispersed through the neighbouring states. There was no body of them considerable either for numbers or strength. Such were, as near as possible, the circumstances under which the Carthaginians were driven out of Spain, under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio, in the thirteenth year from the commencement of the war, and the fifth from the time that Publius Scipio received the province and the army. Not long after, Silanus returned to Tarraco to Scipio, with information that the war was at an end.