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This affair was represented as more successful than the advantage gained in the battle could warrant; for people came, one after another, and calling out that the Romans were flying in a panic; so that, though reluctant and hesitating declaring it a rash proceeding, and that he liked not either place or the time, yet he was prevailed upon to draw out his whole force to battle. The Roman general did the same, induced by necessity, rather than by the favourableness of the occasion. Leaving the right wing as a reserve, having the elephants posted in front, he, with the left, and all the right infantry, advanced against the enemy; at the same time reminding his men, that "they were going to fight the same Macedonians whom they had fought in the passes of Epirus, fenced, as they were, with mountains and rivers, and whom, after conquering the natural difficulties of the ground, they had dislodged and vanquished; the same, whom they had before defeated under the command of Publius Sulpicius, when they opposed their passage to Eordaea. That the kingdom of Macedonia had been hitherto supported by its reputation, not by real strength; and that even that reputation had, at length, vanished." Quinctius soon reached his troops, who stood in the bottom of the valley; and they, on the arrival of their general and the army, renewed the fight, and, making a vigorous onset, compelled the enemy again to turn their backs. Philip, with the targeteers, and the right wing of infantry, (the main strength of the Macedonian army, called by them the phalanx,) advanced at a quick pace, having ordered Nicanor, one of his courtiers, to bring up the rest of his forces with all speed. At first, on reaching the top of the hill, from a few arms and bodies lying there, he perceived that there had been an engagement on the spot, and that the Romans had been repulsed from it. When he likewise saw the fight now going on close to the enemy's works, he was elated with excessive delight; but presently, observing his men flying back, and that the panic was on the other side, he was much embarrassed, and hesitated for some time, whether he should cause his troops to retire into the camp. Then, as the enemy approached, he was sensible that his party, besides the losses which they suffered as they fled, must be entirely lost, if not speedily succoured; and as, by this time, even a retreat would be unsafe, he found himself compelled to put all to hazard, before he was joined by the other division of his forces. He placed the cavalry and light infantry that had been engaged, on the right wing; and ordered the targeteers, and the phalanx of Macedonians, to lay aside their spears, which their great length rendered unserviceable, and to manage the business with their swords: at the same time, that his line might not be easily broken, he lessened the extent of the front one half, and doubled the files within so that it might be deeper than it was broad. He ordered them also to close their files, so that man might join with man and arms with arms.
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Quinctius, having received among the standards and ranks those who had been engaged with the enemy, gave the signal by sound of trumpet. It is said, that such a shout was raised, as was seldom heard at the beginning of any battle; for it happened, that both armies shouted at once; not only the troops then engaged, but also the reserves, and those who were just then coming into the field. The king, fighting from the higher ground, had the better on the right wing, by means chiefly of the advantage of situation. On the left, all was disorder and confusion; particularly when that division of the phalanx, which had marched in the rear, was coming up. The centre stood intent on the fight as on a spectacle which in no way concerned them. The phalanx, just arrived (a column rather than a line of battle, and fitter for a march than for a fight,) had scarcely mounted the top of the hill: before these could form, Quinctius, though he saw his men in the left wing giving way, charged the enemy furiously, first driving on the elephants against them, for he judged that one part being routed would draw the rest after. The affair was no longer doubtful. The Macedonians, repelled by the first shock of the elephants, instantly turned their backs; and the rest, as had been foreseen, followed them in their retreat. Then, one of the military tribunes, forming his design in the instant, took with him twenty companies of men; left that part of the army which was evidently victorious; and making a small circuit, fell on the rear of the enemy's right wing. Any army whatever, thus charged from the rear, must have been thrown into confusion. But to that confusion which under such circumstances would be common to all armies, there was in this case an additional cause. The phalanx of the Macedonians, being heavy, could not readily face about; nor would they have been suffered to do it by their adversaries in front, who, although they gave way to them a little before, on this new occasion pressed them vigorously. Besides, they lay under another inconvenience in respect of the ground; for, by pursuing the retreating enemy down the face of the hill, they had left the top to the party who came round on their rear. Thus attacked on both sides, they were exposed for some time to great slaughter, and then betook themselves to flight, most of them throwing away their arms.
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Philip, with a small party of horse and foot, ascended a hill somewhat higher than the rest, to take a view of the situation of his troops on the left. Then, when he saw them flying in confusion, and all the hills around glittering with Roman standards and arms, he withdrew from the field. Ouinctius, as he was pressing on the retreating enemy, observed the Macedonians suddenly raising up their spears, and not knowing what they meant thereby, he ordered the troops to halt. Then, on being told that this was the practice of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves prisoners, he was disposed to spare the vanquished; but the troops, not being apprized, either of the enemy having ceased fighting, or of the general's intention, made a charge on them, and the foremost having been cut down, the rest dispersed themselves and fled. Philip hastened in disorderly flight to Tempè, and there halted one day at Gonni, to pick up any who might have survived the battle. The victorious Romans rushed into the Macedonian camp with hopes of spoil, but found it, for the most part, plundered already by the Aetolians. Eight thousand of the enemy were killed on that day, five thousand taken. Of the victors, about seven hundred fell. If any credit is to be attached to Valerius Antias, who on every occasion exaggerates numbers enormously, the killed of the enemy on that day amounted to forty thousand; the prisoners taken, (in which article the deviation from truth is less extravagant,) to five thousand seven hundred, with two hundred and forty-nine military standards. Claudius also asserts that thirty-two thousand of the enemy were slain, and four thousand three hundred taken. We have not given entire credit, even to the smallest of those numbers, but have followed Polybius, a safe authority with respect to all the Roman affairs, but especially those which were transacted in Greece.
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