19 At the beginning of the following year, Lucius Æmilius Paullus and Caius Licinius, the consuls, having commenced their administration on the ides of March, the senators were impatient to hear what propositions were to be laid before them, particularly with respect to Macedonia, by the consul to whose lot that province had fallen; but Paullus said, that he had as yet nothing to propose to them, the commissioners not being returned: that “they were then at Brundusium, after having been twice driven back to Dyrrachium in attempting the passage: that he intended, shortly, to propose something to their consideration, when he should have obtained the information which was previously necessary, and which he expected within very few days.” He added, that, “in order that nothing should delay his setting out, the day before the ides of April had been fixed for the Latin festival; after finishing which solemnity, he and Cneius Octavius would begin their journey as soon as the senate should direct: that, in his absence, his colleague Caius Licinius would take care that every thing necessary to be provided, or sent for the war, should be provided and sent; and that, in the mean time, audience might be given to the embassies of foreign nations.” The first introduced were ambassadors from Alexandria, sent by king Ptolemy and queen Cleopatra. They came into the senate-house dressed in mourning, with their hair and beard neglected, holding in their hands branches of olive; there they prostrated themselves, and their discourse was even more piteous than their dress. Antiochus, king of Syria, who had formerly been a hostage at Rome, had lately, under the honourable pretext of restoring the elder Ptolemy to the throne, made war on his younger brother, who was then in possession of Alexandria; and having gained the victory in a sea-fight off Pelusium, and thrown a temporary bridge across the Nile, he led over his army, and was terrifying Alexandria itself, by laying siege to it; so that he seemed almost on the point of taking possession of that very opulent kingdom. The ambassadors, after complaining of these proceedings, besought the senate to succour those princes, the faithful friends of their empire. They said, that “such had been the kindness of the Roman people to Antiochus, such its influence over all kings and nations, that if they only sent ambassadors, to give him notice that the senate were displeased at war being made with princes in alliance with them, he would instantly retire from the walls of Alexandria, and lead his army home into Syria. But if they hesitated to do this Ptolemy and Cleopatra would soon come to Rome as exiles from their kingdom, which must excite some degree of shame in the Roman people, for not having brought them assistance in their extreme distress.” The senate, affected by the supplications of the Alexandrians, immediately sent Caius Popilius Lænas, Caius Decimius, and Caius Hostilius, ambassadors, to put an end to the dispute between those kings. Their instructions were, to go first to Antiochus, then to Ptolemy; and to acquaint them, that, unless hostilities were stopped, whichever party persisted, must expect to be considered by the senate as neither a friend nor an ally.
20 These ambassadors set out, within three days, in company with those of Alexandria; and, on the last day of the feast of Minerva, the commissioners arrived from Macedonia. Their coming had been so impatiently wished for, that, if it had not been very late in the day, the consuls would have assembled the senate immediately. Next day the senate met, and the commissioners had an audience. They stated, that “the army had been led through pathless and difficult wilds into Macedonia, with more risk than advantage: that Pieria, to which its march had been directed, was then possessed by the king; and the two camps so close to each other, as to be separated only by the river Enipeus: that the king offered no opportunity to fight, nor were our men strong enough to compel him; and, besides, that the winter had unexpectedly interrupted all military operations: that the soldiers were maintained in idleness, and had not corn sufficient for more than six days: that the force of the Macedonians was said to amount to thirty thousand effective men: that if Appius Claudius had a sufficient force at Lychnidus, the king might be perplexed by a twofold hostile array; but that, as the case stood, both Appius, and the troops under his command, were in the utmost danger, unless either a regular army were speedily sent thither, or they were removed thence. “From the camp,” they stated that “they had gone to the fleet; where they learned, that part of the seamen had perished by sickness; that others, particularly such as came from Sicily, had gone off to their own homes; and that the ships were in want of men, while those who were on board had neither received pay nor had clothing: that Eumenes and his fleet, as if driven thither by the wind, had both come and gone away, without any apparent reason; nor did the intentions of that king seem to be thoroughly settled.” While they reported every particular in the conduct of Eumenes as suspicious, they represented the fidelity of Attalus as stedfast in the highest degree.
21 After the commissioners were heard, Lucius Æmilius said, that he then proposed for consideration the business of the war: and the senate decreed, that “tribunes for eight legions should be appointed, half by the consuls, and half by the people; but that none should be named for that year who had not held some magisterial office: that, out of all the military tribunes, Lucius Æmilius should select such as he chose for the two legions that were to serve in Macedonia; and that, as soon as the Latin festival should be finished, the said consul, with the prætor Cneius Octavius, to whose lot the fleet had fallen, should repair to that province.” To these was added a third, Lucius Anicius, the prætor who had the foreign jurisdiction; for it was resolved that he should succeed Appius Claudius in the province of Illyria, near Lychnidus. The charge of raising recruits was laid on the consul Caius Licinius, who was ordered to enlist, of Roman citizens, seven thousand foot and two hundred horse, and to demand, from the Latin confederates, seven thousand foot and four hundred horse; and also to write to Cneius Servilius, governor of Gaul, to raise there six hundred horse. This force he was ordered to send, with all expedition, into Macedonia, to his colleague. It was resolved, that there should be no more than two legions in that province, but that their numbers should be filled up so as that each should contain six thousand foot and three hundred horse; and that the rest of the foot and horse should be placed in the different garrisons; that such men as were unfit for service should be discharged, and that the allies should be obliged to raise another body of ten thousand foot and eight hundred horse. These were assigned as a reinforcement to Anicius, in addition to the two legions which he was ordered to carry into Illyria, consisting each of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse; and five thousand seamen were raised for the fleet. The consul Licinius was ordered to employ two legions in the service of his province, and to add to them ten thousand foot and six hundred horse of the allies.
22 When the senate had passed these decrees, the consul Lucius Æmilius went out from the senate-house into the assembly of the people, whom he addressed in a discourse to this effect: “Romans, I think I have perceived that your congratulations, on my obtaining, by lot, the province of Macedonia, were warmer than either when I was saluted consul, or on the day when I entered on office; and that for no other reason, than your having conceived an opinion, that by me the war with Perseus, which has been long protracted, may be brought to a conclusion becoming the majesty of the Roman people. I trust that the gods also have favoured this disposal of the lots, and will give me their aid in the conduct of affairs. Some of these consequences I can prognosticate; others I can hope for. One thing I regard as certain, and venture to affirm; that I will endeavour, by every exertion in my power, that this hope which you have conceived of me may not be frustrated. Every thing necessary for the service, the senate has ordered; and as it has been resolved, that I am to go abroad immediately, and I do not wish to delay, my colleague, Caius Licinius, an admirable man, will make the preparations with as much zeal, as if he himself were to carry on that war. Do you give full credit to whatever I shall write to you, or to the senate; but do not by your credulity encourage mere rumours, of which no man shall appear as the responsible author. For, no man is so entirely regardless of reputation, as that his spirits cannot be damped; which I have observed has commonly occurred, especially in this war. In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass Macedonia should be entered; where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet. And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on his trial. These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own authority be diminished through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation. I am not one of those who think that commanders ought never to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who did every thing of his own single judgment. What then is my opinion? That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those, especially, who are skilled in the art of war, and who have been taught by experience; and next, by those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, embarked, as it were, in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia. He shall be furnished by me with a ship, a horse, a tent; and even with his travelling charges. But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot. The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking, and rest assured, that we shall be content with such councils as shall be framed within our camp.” Soon after this speech, the Latin festival having been celebrated on the day before the calends of April, and the sacrifice on the mount affording favourable omens, the consul, and Cneius Octavius, the prætor, set out directly for Macedonia. There is a tradition that the consul, at his departure, was escorted by multitudes unusually numerous; and that people, with confident hope, presaged a conclusion of the Macedonian war, and the speedy return of the consul, to a glorious triumph.
23 During these occurrences in Italy, Perseus, though he could not, at first, prevail on himself to complete the design which he had projected, of attaching to himself Gentius, king of Illyria, on account of the money which would be demanded for it; yet, when he found that the Romans had penetrated the passes, and that the final crisis of the war drew near, resolved to defer it no longer, and having, by his ambassador Hippias, consented to pay three thousand talents of silver,[90] provided hostages were given on both sides; he now sent Pantauchus, one of his most trusty friends, to conclude the business. Pantauchus met the Illyrian king at Meteo, in the province of Labeas, and there received from the king his oath and the hostages. Gentius likewise sent an ambassador, named Olympio, to require an oath and hostages from Perseus. Together with him, were sent persons to receive the money; and by the advice of Pantauchus, to go to Rhodes with ambassadors from Macedonia. Parmenio and Morcus were appointed. Their instructions were, first, to receive the king’s oath, the hostages, and money; and then to proceed to Rhodes; and it was hoped, that, by the name of the two kings, the Rhodians might be incited to a war against Rome, and that the union of that state, which alone at that time possessed naval glory, would leave the Romans no prospect of success, either on land or sea. As the Illyrians approached, Perseus marched with all his cavalry, from his camp on the Enipeus, and met them at Dium. There the articles agreed on were executed; a body of cavalry having been drawn up around, whom the king chose should be witness to the treaty of alliance made with Gentius, supposing that this event would add greatly to their confidence. The hostages were given and taken in the sight of all; those who were to receive the money were sent to Pella, where the king’s treasure lay; and the persons who were to go to Rhodes, with the Illyrian ambassadors, were ordered to take ship at Thessalonica. There was present one Metrodorus, who had lately come from Rhodes, and who, on the authority of Dinon and Polyaratus, two principal members of that state, affirmed, that the Rhodians were prepared for the war; he was appointed head of the joint embassy with the Illyrians.
24 At this time Perseus sent to Eumenes and Antiochus, a common message, which the state of affairs seemed to suggest that “a free state, and a king, were, in their natures, hostile to each other. That the Roman people were accustomed to attack kings singly; and, what was more shameful, to conquer them, by the power of other kings. Thus, his father was overpowered by the aid of Attalus; and by the assistance of Eumenes, and of his father Philip, in part, Antiochus had been vanquished; and now, both Eumenes and Prusias were armed against himself. If the regal power should be abolished in Macedonia, the next, in their way, would be Asia, which they had already rendered, in part, their own, under the pretence of liberating the states; and next to that Syria. Already Prusias was honoured by them, far beyond Eumenes; and already Antiochus, though victorious, was debarred from Egypt, the prize of his arms.” He desired that each of them, “considering these matters seriously, should see that he either compelled the Romans to make peace with him, or, if they should persist in such an unjust war, he should regard them as the common enemies of all kings.” The message to Antiochus was sent openly; the ambassador to Eumenes went under the pretence of ransoming prisoners. But some more secret business was transacted between them, which, in addition to the jealousy and distrust already conceived by the Romans against Eumenes, brought on him charges of a heavier nature. For they considered him as a traitor, and nearly as an enemy, while the two kings laboured to overreach each other in schemes of fraud and avarice. There was a Cretan, called Cydas, an intimate of Eumenes; this man had formerly conferred, at Amphipolis, with one Chimarus, a countryman of his own, serving in the army of Perseus; and he, afterwards, had had one interview with Menecrates, and another with Archidamus, officers of the king, at Demetrias, close under the wall of the town. Herophon, too, who was sent on that business, had, before that, executed two embassies to the same Eumenes. These furtive conferences and embassies were notorious; but what the subject of them was, or what agreement had taken place between the kings, remained a secret.
25 Now the truth of the matter was this: Eumenes neither wished success to Perseus nor intended to make war upon him; and his ill-will arose not so much from the enmity which they inherited from their fathers, as from the personal quarrels which had broken out between themselves. The jealousy of the two kings was not so moderate, that Eumenes could, with patience, have seen Perseus acquiring such vast power and glory as awaited him, if he conquered the Romans. Besides which, he saw that Perseus, from the commencement of the war, by every mean, sought a prospect of peace; and that every day, as the danger approached nearer, he was contriving and contemplating no other object. He considered too, that as the war had been protracted beyond the expectations of the Romans, their commanders and senate would not be averse from putting an end to a contest so inconvenient and difficult. Having discovered this inclination in both parties, he concluded, that, from the disgust of the stronger party, and the fears of the weaker, this might take place spontaneously; and therefore he the more wished, for the sake of conciliating favour to himself, to make his own efforts available in the business. He therefore, sometimes, laboured to stipulate for a consideration for not affording assistance to the Romans, either on sea or land; at other times, for bringing about a peace with them. He demanded for not interfering in the war, one thousand talents;[91] for effecting a peace, one thousand five hundred;[92] and for his sincerity in either case, he professed himself prepared, not only to make oath, but to give hostages also. Perseus, stimulated by his fears, showed the greatest readiness in the beginning of the negotiation, and treated without delay about receiving the hostages; when it was agreed, that, on their being received, they should be sent to Crete. But when they came to the mention of money, there he hesitated; remarking that, in the case of kings of their high character, a pecuniary consideration was mean and sordid, both with respect to the giver, and still more so with respect to the receiver. He preferred not to decline the payment in the hope of a peace with Rome, but said that he would pay the money when the business should be concluded; and that he would lodge it in the mean time in the temple of Samothrace. As that island was under his own dominion, Eumenes said, that it was all the same as if the money were at Pella; and he struggled hard to obtain some part of it at the present. Thus, having manœuvred with each other to no purpose, they gained nothing but disgrace.
26 This was not the only business which Perseus left unfinished from motives of avarice, since for a small sum of money he might have procured, through Eumenes, a secure peace, well purchased even with half of his kingdom; while, if defrauded, he might have exposed him to public view, as an enemy laden with his pelf, and made the Romans deservedly his enemies. Through this avaricious spirit the prompt alliance of king Gentius, with the assistance of a large army of Gauls, who had spread themselves through Illyria, and offered themselves to him, was lost. There came ten thousand horsemen, and the same number of footmen, who themselves kept pace with the horses, and in place of the riders who had fallen, took on the horses to the fight. They had stipulated that each horseman should receive in immediate payment, ten golden Philippics, each footman five, and their commander one thousand. Perseus went from his camp on the Enipeus with half of his forces to meet them as they approached; and issued orders through the towns and villages near the road, to prepare provisions, so that they might have plenty of corn, wine, and cattle. He brought with him some horses, trappings, and cloaks, for presents to the chiefs; and a small quantity of gold to be divided among a few; for the multitude, he supposed, might be amused with hopes. He advanced as far as the city of Almana, and encamped on the bank of the river Axius, at which time the army of the Gauls lay near Desudaba, in Mædica, waiting for the promised hire. Thither he sent Antigonus, one of his nobles, with directions, that the said army should remove their camp to Bylazor, a place in Pæonia, and that their chiefs should come to him in a body. They were at this time seventy-five miles distant from the river Axius and the king’s camp. Antigonus, in his message, told them what great plenty of every thing was provided on the road by the king’s directions, and what presents of apparel, money, and horses he intended for them on their arrival. They answered, that they would judge of those things when they saw them; at the same time asking him, whether, according to their stipulation for immediate payment, he had brought with him the gold which was to be distributed to each footman and horseman? When to this no direct answer was given, Clondicus, their prince, said, “Go back, then, and tell your king, that, unless they should have received the gold and the hostages, the Gauls would never move one step farther.” When this message was brought to the king, he called a council: and, as it was very plain what advice all the members would give; he, being a better guardian of his money than of his kingdom, began to descant on the perfidy and savage behaviour of the Gauls. “The disasters,” he said, “of many states demonstrated, that it would be dangerous to admit such a multitude into Macedonia, lest they might feel such allies more troublesome than their Roman enemies. Five thousand horsemen would be enough for them to employ in the war, and that number they need not be afraid to receive.”
27 It was sufficiently clear to all that what he feared was the paying of such a multitude, and nothing else; but as none had the courage to declare their opinion, when asked, Antigonus was sent again, with a message, that the king chose to employ only five thousand horsemen, but that he could not receive the rest of their number. When the barbarians heard this, they began to murmur, and show a great deal of anger at being brought so far from home for no purpose; but Clondicus again asked him, whether he would pay even the five thousand the hire agreed on. When he perceived that an evasive answer was given to this question also, the Gauls, dismissing the insidious envoy unhurt, which was what he himself had scarcely hoped could be his fate, returned home to the Danube, after utterly wasting such lands of Thrace as lay near their road. Now had this body of troops, while the king lay quiet on the Enipeus, been led against the Romans through the passes of Perrhæbia, into Thessaly, it might not only have stripped that country so bare, that the Romans could not expect supplies from thence; but might even have destroyed the cities themselves, while Perseus, by detaining his enemy at the Enipeus, would have put it out of their power to succour their allies. The Romans, indeed, would have been obliged to look out for their own safety, since they could neither stay where they were, after losing Thessaly, whence their army drew sustenance, nor move forward, as the camp of the Macedonians stood in their way. By this error, Perseus enlivened the hopes of the Romans, and damped not a little those of the Macedonians,[93] who had depended much on that project. Through the same avarice, he alienated from him king Gentius. When he paid, at Pella, three hundred talents to the persons sent by Gentius, he allowed them to seal up the money. He then ordered ten talents to be carried to Pantauchus, and these he desired should be given immediately to the king. He ordered his people, who were carrying the rest of the money, sealed with the seals of the Illyrians, to convey it by short journeys, and when they should come to the bounds of Macedonia, to halt there, and wait for a message from him. Gentius, having received this small portion of the money, and being incessantly urged by Pantauchus to provoke the Romans by some hostile act, threw into custody Marcus Perperna and Lucius Petilius, who happened to come at that time as ambassadors. Having heard this, Perseus, thinking that the Illyrian had now laid himself under a necessity of waging war with the Romans at least, sent to recall those who were conveying the money, as if for no other object, than that the greatest possible booty might be reserved for the Romans on his defeat. Herophon, too, returned from Eumenes, without any one knowing what had been secretly negotiated between them. The parties themselves had mentioned publicly that the business of the prisoners had been concluded, and Eumenes, for the sake of avoiding suspicion, acquainted the consul with it.
28 Upon the return of Herophon from Eumenes, Perseus, disappointed in his hope, sent Antenor and Callippus, the commanders of his fleet, with forty barks, to which were added five heavy galleys, to Tenedos, that they might protect the vessels sailing to Macedonia with corn, and scattered among the Cyclades. This squadron, setting sail from Cassandrea, steered, first, to the harbour at the foot of Mount Athos, and crossing over thence, with mild weather, to Tenedos, found lying in the harbour a number of Rhodian undecked ships, and their commander Eudamus; these they did not offer to molest, but, after having spoken them in a friendly manner, suffered them to pursue their course. Then, learning that, on the other side of the island, fifty transports of their own were shut up by a squadron of Eumenes, commanded by Damius, which lay in the mouth of the harbour, they sailed round with all haste; and the enemy’s ships retiring, through fear, they sent on the transports to Macedonia, ten barks having been appointed to accompany them, which were to return to Tenedos as soon as they had convoyed them to a place of safety. Accordingly, on the ninth day after, they rejoined the fleet, then lying at Sigeum. From thence they sailed over to Subota, an island between Elea and Athos. The next day after the fleet had reached Subota, it happened that thirty-five vessels, of the kind called horse-transports, sent by Eumenes to Attalus, and which had sailed from Elea, with Gallic horsemen and their horses, were steering towards Phanæ, a promontory of Chios, from whence they might cross over to Macedonia, A signal having been given to Antenor, from a post of observation, that these ships were passing along the main, he left Subota, and met them between Cape Erythræ and Chios, where the strait is narrowest. The officers of Eumenes believed nothing less probable than that a Macedonian fleet was cruising in that sea; they imagined that they were Romans, or that Attalus, or some people sent home by him from the Roman camp, were on their way to Pergamus. But when, on their nearer approach, the shape of the vessels was plainly perceived, and when the briskness of their rowing, and their prows being directed straight against themselves, proved that enemies were approaching, a panic was struck into them; for they had no hope of being able to make resistance, their ships being of an unwieldy kind, and the Gauls scarcely able to bear a state of quiet when at sea. Some, who were nearest to the shore of the continent, swam to Erythræ; some, crowding all their sail, ran the ships aground near Chios; and, leaving their horses behind, made for the city in disorderly flight. When the barks, however, had landed their troops nearer to the city, where the access was more convenient, the Macedonians overtook and put to the sword the flying Gauls, some on the road, and some who had been shut out before the gate, for the Chians had shut their gates, not knowing who they were that fled, or who that pursued. About eight hundred Gauls were killed, and two hundred made prisoners. Of the horses, some were lost in the sea, by the ships being wrecked, and others the Macedonians hamstrung on the shore. Antenor ordered the same ten barks, which he had employed before, to carry twenty horses of extraordinary beauty, with the prisoners, to Thessalonica, and to return to the fleet as speedily as possible; saying, that he would wait for them at Phanæ. The fleet staid about three days off the city, and then proceeded to Phanæ, and the ten barks having returned sooner than was expected, they set sail, and crossed the Ægean Sea to Delos.