29 While these things were taking place, the Roman ambassadors, Caius Popilius, Caius Decimius, and Caius Hostinus having sailed from Chalcis with three quinqueremes, arrived at Delos, and found there forty Macedonian barks, and five quinqueremes belonging to king Eumenes. The sacred character of the temple and the island secured all parties from injury; so that the Roman and Macedonian seamen, and those of Eumenes, used to meet promiscuously in the temple, a truce being imposed by the religious feeling which the place inspired. Antenor, the commander of Perseus’s fleet, having learned, by signals from his watch-posts, that several transport ships were passing by at sea, went himself in pursuit, with one half of his barks, (distributing the other half among the Cyclades,) and sunk or plundered every ship he met with, except such as were bound for Macedonia. Popilius and the ships of Eumenes assisted as many as they were able; but, in the night, the Macedonians sailing out, generally with two or three vessels, passed unseen. About this time, ambassadors from Macedonia and Illyria came together to Rhodes. Their influence was the greater, in consequence of their squadron cruising freely among the Cyclades, and over all the Ægean Sea, and likewise on account of the junction of Perseus and Gentius, and of the report of the Gauls approaching with a great force both of horse and foot. Dinon and Polyaratus, the partisans of Perseus, now took fresh courage, and the Rhodians not only gave a favourable answer to the ambassadors, but declared publicly, that “they would put an end to the war by their own influence; and therefore desired the kings to dispose themselves to accede to a peace.”

30 It was now the beginning of spring, and the new commanders had arrived in their provinces; the consul Æmilius in Macedonia, Octavius at Oreum, where the fleet lay, and Anicius in Illyria, to carry on the war against Gentius. This prince, who was the son of Pleuratus, king of Illyria, and his queen Eurydice, had two brothers, one called Plator, by both parents, the other Caravantius, by the same mother only. The latter, as descended of ignoble ancestors on his father’s side, was but little suspected; but, that his reign might be more secure, he had put to death Plator, and two active men his friends, Ettritus and Epicadus. It was rumoured, that he was actuated by jealousy towards his brother, who had engaged himself to Etuta, the daughter of Hononus, prince of the Dardanians, as if, by that match, engaging that nation in his interest; and this supposition was rendered the more probable by Gentius marrying her, after the death of Plator. From this time, when he was delivered from the fear of his brother, he began to be oppressive to his subjects, and the natural violence of his temper was inflamed by an immoderate use of wine. Having been incited, as was mentioned above, to a war with the Romans, he collected all his forces, amounting to fifteen thousand men, at Lissus. From thence, detaching his brother with one thousand foot and fifty horse, to reduce, either by force or terror, the nation of the Cavians, he marched himself to Bassania, a city five miles distant from Lissus. The inhabitants were in alliance with Rome. Therefore, having been first solicited by emissaries sent in advance, they determined rather to endure a siege than surrender themselves. In Cavia, the people of the town of Durnium cheerfully opened their gates to Caravantius, on his arrival; but another town, called Caravantis, refused him admittance; and whilst he was carelessly ravaging their lands, many of his straggling soldiers were killed by a muster of the peasants. By this time Appius Claudius, having joined to the army he had in command some bodies of auxiliaries, composed of Bulinians, Apollonians, and Dyrrhachians, had left his winter quarters, and was encamped near the river Genusus. Having heard of the treaty between Persius and Gentius, and being highly provoked at the ill-treatment of the outraged ambassadors, he was resolved to make war upon him. The prætor Anicius, who was now at Apollonia, being informed of what passed in Illyria, despatched a letter to Appius, desiring him to wait for him at the Genusus; and, in three days after, he arrived in the camp. Having added to the auxiliary troops which he then had, two thousand foot and two hundred horse of the Parthinians, (the foot commanded by Epicadus, and the horse by Agalsus,) he prepared to march into Illyria, chiefly that he might relieve the Bassanians from the siege. But an account brought him, of the sea-coast being ravaged by a number of the enemy’s barks, checked his efforts. These were eighty vessels, which, by the advice of Pantauchus, Gentius had sent to waste the lands of the Dyrrhachians and Apollonians. The Roman fleet was then lying near Apollonia. Anicius hastily repaired thither, soon overtook the Illyrian plunderers, brought them to an engagement, and, defeating them with very little trouble, took many of their ships, and compelled the rest to retire to Illyria. Returning thence to the camp at the Genusus, he hastened to the relief of Bassania. Gentius did not bear up against the rumour of the prætor’s coming; but, raising the siege, retired to Scodra with such precipitate haste, that he did not even take the whole of his army with him. There was a large body of forces, which, if their courage had been supported by the presence of their commander, might have given some check to the Romans; but, as he had withdrawn,[94] they surrendered.

31 The cities of that country, one after another, followed the example; their own inclinations being encouraged by the justice and clemency which the Roman prætor showed to all. The army then advanced to Scodra, which was the chief seat of the war, not merely because Gentius had chosen it for the metropolis of his kingdom, but because it has by far the strongest fortifications of any in the territory of the Labeatians, and is of very difficult access. Two rivers enclose it; the Clausula flowing past the eastern side of the city, and by the western, the Barbanna, which rises out of the lake Labeatus. These two rivers, uniting their streams, fall into the river Oriuns, which, running down from mount Scordus, and being augmented by many other waters, empties itself into the Adriatic Sea. Mount Scordus is much the highest hill in all that country; at its foot, towards the east, lies Dardania; towards the south, Macedonia; and towards the west, Illyria. Notwithstanding that the town was so strong, from the nature of its situation, and was garrisoned by the whole force of the Illyrian nation, with the king himself at their head, yet the Roman prætor, encouraged by the happy success of his first enterprises, and hoping that the fortune of the whole undertaking would correspond to its commencement, and thinking also that a sudden alarm might have a powerful effect, advanced to the walls with his troops in order of battle. But, if the garrison had kept their gates shut, and manned the walls and the towers of the gates with soldiers, they might have repulsed the Romans from the walls with their efforts frustrated, instead of which they marched out from the gate, and, on equal ground, commenced a battle with more courage than they supported it: for, being forced to give way, and crowded together in their retreat, and above two hundred having fallen in the very entrance of the gate, the rest were so terrified, that Gentius immediately despatched Teuticus and Bellus, two of the first men of the nation, to the prætor, through whom he begged a truce, in order that he might be able to deliberate on the state of his affairs. He was allowed three days for the purpose, and, as the Roman camp was about five hundred paces from the city, he went on board a ship, and sailed up the river Barbanna, into the lake of Labeatus, as if in search of a retired place for consultation; but, as afterwards appeared, he was led by a groundless report, that his brother Caravantius was coming, with many thousands of soldiers collected in the country, to which he had been sent. This rumour dying away, on the third day he sailed down the river in the same ship to Scodra; and, after sending forward messengers, to request permission to call upon the prætor, and leave being given, came into the camp. He began his discourse with reproaches against himself, for the folly of his conduct; then descended to tears and prayers, and, falling at the prætor’s knees, gave himself up into his power. He was at first desired to keep up his spirits, and having been even invited to supper, he went back into the city to his people, and, for that day, was entertained by the prætor with every mark of respect. On the day following, he was delivered into custody, to Caius Cassius, a military tribune, having, though a king, received ten talents, scarcely the hire of a party of gladiators, and that from a king, to reduce himself to these circumstances.

32 The first thing Anicius did, after taking possession of Scodra, was, to order the ambassadors, Petilius and Perperna, to be sought for and brought to him; and having restored to them their former dignity, he immediately despatched Perperna to seize the king’s friends and relations, who, hastening to Medeo, a city of Labeatia, conducted to the camp at Scodra, Etleva, the king’s consort; his brother Caravantius; with his two sons, Scerdiletus and Pleuratus. Anicius, having brought the Illyrian war to a conclusion within thirty days, sent Perperna to Rome with the news of his success; and, in a few days after, king Gentius himself, with his mother, queen, children, and brother, and other Illyrians of distinction. This one war was announced at Rome as finished before it was known to have been begun. At the time when these things took place, Perseus laboured under dreadful apprehensions, on account of the approach, both of the new consul Æmilius, who, as he heard, was coming with formidable threats, and also of the prætor Octavius: nor did he less dread the Roman fleet, and the danger which threatened the sea-coast. Eumenes and Athenagoras commanded at Thessalonica, with a small garrison of two thousand targeteers. Thither he sent Androcles, as governor, and ordered him to keep the troops encamped close by the naval arsenals. He ordered one thousand horse, under Antigonus, to Ænia, to guard the sea-coast; directing them, whenever they should hear of the enemy’s fleet approaching the shore in any part, instantly to hasten thither, to protect the country people. Five thousand Macedonians were sent to garrison the mountains Pythium and Petra, commanded by Histiæus, Theogenes, and Medon. After making these detachments, he set about fortifying the bank of the river Enipeus, the channel being dry and fordable; and, in order that all the men might apply themselves to this work, the women were obliged to bring provisions from the neighbouring cities into the camp. He ordered the soldiers to fetch timber from the woods which were not far distant. Then a mound was formed and works thrown up strengthened with towers and with engines, disposed in various parts so that the enemy might not be able to force a way through without great opposition and danger. Thus he trusted that he should be secure against every attack of the Romans, and that, wearied out with inaction and slow delay, and drained by expenses, a disgust at so difficult a war would seize on the mind of the enemy. On the other side, the more diligence and caution Paullus saw the Macedonians use, the more assiduously did he study to devise some means of frustrating those hopes, which the enemy had not without reason conceived. But he suffered immediate distress from the scarcity of water, as the neighbouring river was almost dried up, except that a little stream, and that impure, flowed in the part contiguous to the sea.

33 The consul, when those who were sent to search the neighbourhood announced that no water could be found,[95] at last ordered the water-carriers to attend him to the shore, which was not three hundred paces distant, and there to dig holes in several places, not far from each other. The great height of the mountains gave him reason to suppose that they contained hidden springs of water, the veins of which flowing through to the sea, mingled with its waves; and the more so, as they discharged no streams above ground. Scarcely was the surface of the sand removed, when springs began to boil up, small at first, and muddy, but in a little time they threw out clear water in great plenty, as if through the favourable interference of the gods. This circumstance added greatly to the reputation and influence of the general in the minds of the soldiers. He then ordered them to get ready their arms; and went himself, with the tribunes and first centurions, to examine the fords, in hopes of finding a passage, where the descent would be easy for the troops, and where the ascending the other bank would be least difficult. After taking a sufficient view of these matters, he made it his first care to provide, that, in the movements of the army, every thing should be done regularly, and without noise, at the first order and beck of the general. When notice was proclaimed of what was to be done to all at the same time, every one did not distinctly hear; and as the orders received were not clear, some making additions for themselves, did more than was ordered, while others did less; while dissonant shouts were raised in every quarter, insomuch that the enemy knew sooner than the soldiers themselves what was intended. He therefore directed, that the military tribune should communicate, secretly, to the first centurion of the legion, then he to the next, and that so on, in order that each should tell the next to him in rank what was requisite to be done, whether the instructions were to be conveyed from front to rear, or from rear to front. He likewise, by a new arrangement, forbade the sentinels to carry their shields when on duty; for as a sentinel did not go to fight, but to watch, he had no occasion for arms; it was his duty, when he perceived an enemy approaching, to retire, and to rouse the rest to arms. They used to stand with their helmets on, and their shields erected on the ground before them; when tired, they leaned on their spears; or laying their heads on the edge of their shields, stood dozing in such a manner, that from the glittering of their arms they could be seen afar off by the enemy, while themselves could see nothing. He likewise altered the practice of the advanced guards. Formerly, the guards were kept on duty through the whole day, all under arms, the horsemen with their horses bridled; and when this happened in summer, under a continual scorching sun, both men and horses were so much exhausted by the heat and the languor contracted in so many hours, that very often, when attacked by fresh troops, a few could get the better of a greater number. He therefore ordered, that they should retire from the morning-watch at noon, and that others should succeed to the duty for the rest of the day; by which means the enemy could never come fresh upon them when they were wearied.

34 Æmilius, after publishing, in a general assembly, his orders for these regulations, added a speech of similar purport to that which he had made in the city, that “it was the business of the commander alone to consider what was proper to be done, sometimes singly, sometimes in conjunction with those whom he should call to council; and that such as were not called, ought not to pronounce their opinions either in public or in private. That it was a soldier’s business to attend to these three things,—his body, that he may keep it in perfect strength and agility; his arms, in good order; and his provisions ready, in case of a sudden order; and to understand, that all other matters relating to him are under the care of the immortal gods and his captain. That in any army, where the soldiers formed plans, and that the chief was drawn, first one way, then another, by the rumours of the multitude, nothing was successful. For his part,” he declared, that “he would take care, as was the duty of a general, to afford them occasion of acting with success. On their part, they were to make no inquiries whatever as to what was about to take place; but, when the signal was given, to discharge the duty of a soldier.” After these precepts, he dismissed the assembly, while the veterans themselves acknowledged, that on that day, for the first time, they had, like recruits, been taught the business of a soldier. Nor did they, by such expressions only, demonstrate with what perfect conviction they had listened to the consul’s discourse; but the practical effect of it was immediate. In the whole camp, not one person was to be seen idle; some were sharpening their weapons; others scouring their helmets and cheek-pieces, their shields and breastplates; some fitted their armour to their bodies and tested the agility of their limbs under it; some brandished their spears, others flourished their swords, and tried the points; so that it could be easily perceived that their intention was, whenever they should come to battle, to finish the war at once, either by a splendid victory or a memorable death. On the other side, when Perseus saw that, in consequence of the arrival of the consul, and of the opening of the spring, all was motion and bustle among the Romans, as in a new war; and that the camp had been removed from Phila and pitched on the opposite bank, and that the Roman general employed himself busily, sometimes in going round and examining all his works, doubtless looking out for a place to pass the river; and sometimes in preparing every thing requisite for attack or defence of a camp, with the closest attention, and omitted nothing which could be attempted or achieved by a great general, whether against the enemy or for increasing the efficiency of his own men; he (Perseus) also exerted himself no less diligently on his part to rouse the courage of his soldiers, and add more and more strength to his defences, as if he were approaching the crisis of the whole business, and never considered all matters to be adequately provided for, or the bank sufficiently fortified and secured. Nevertheless, amidst this most vehement ardour on both sides, their camps were for some time in a state of tranquillity. Nor was it ever recorded that such powerful armies, with their camps pitched so near together, had ever lain so quiet.

35 In the mean time, a report announced that king Gentius had been defeated, in Illyria, by the prætor Anicius; and that himself, his family, and his whole kingdom, were in the hands of the Romans; which event greatly raised the spirits of the Romans, and struck no small degree of terror into the Macedonians and their king. At first, Perseus endeavoured to suppress the intelligence, and sent messengers to Pantauchus, who was on his way from that country, forbidding him to come near the camp; but some of his people had already seen certain boys, carried away among the Illyrian hostages; and it is certain that the more pains there are used to conceal any circumstances, the more readily they are divulged, through the gossiping disposition of the attendants of kings. About this time, ambassadors came to the camp from Rhodes, with the same message which had excited so much resentment in the Roman senate. They were now heard by the council in the camp with much greater indignation than at Rome; some even advised that they should be instantly driven out of the camp without any reply; but the consul said, that he would give them an answer in fifteen days. Meanwhile, to show how far the influence of the Rhodians as mediators extended, he began to consult on the plan of carrying forward the war. Some, particularly the older officers, advised to force their way across the Enipeus, and through the enemy’s works. “When they should advance in close order and make an assault, the Macedonians,” they said, “would never be able to withstand them. They had been, last year, beaten out of many fortresses much higher and better fortified, which they had occupied with much stronger garrisons.” Others recommended, that Octavius, with the fleet, should sail to Thessalonica; and, by committing depredations on the sea-coast, to divide the king’s forces; so that when, on the appearance of another enemy behind him, he should turn about to protect the interior part of the kingdom, he would be forced to leave a passage over the Enipeus open in some place or other. The consul himself was of opinion, that the nature of the bank, and the works erected on it, presented insuperable difficulties; and, besides its being every where furnished with engines, he had been informed, that the enemy were remarkable for using missile weapons with uncommon skill, and with a very certain aim. The consul’s full conviction leaned quite another way; as soon, therefore, as the council broke up, he sent for Schœnus and Menophilus, Perrhæbian merchants, whom he knew to be men of probity and good sense, and examined them in private about the nature of the passes leading into Perrhæbia. They told him, that the places themselves were not difficult; but that they were occupied by parties of the king’s troops; from which he conceived hopes of being able to beat off those parties, by making a sudden attack with a strong force in the night, when they were off their guard. For he considered that “javelins, and arrows, and other missile weapons, were useless in the dark, when one cannot see at distance what to aim at; but that, when combatants closed together in a throng, the business must depend on the sword, in which the Roman soldier was superior.” He resolved to employ those two men as guides; and, sending for the prætor Octavius, explained to him what he intended, ordering him to sail directly with the fleet to Heracleum, and to have in readiness, there, ten days’ provisions for one thousand men. He then sent Publius Scipio Nasica, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, his own son, with five thousand chosen men, to Heracleum, as if they were to embark in the fleet, to ravage the coast of the interior parts of Macedonia, as had been proposed in the council. He told them, in private, that there were provisions prepared for them on board, so that they should have no delay. He then ordered the guides to divide the road in such a manner that they might attack Pythium at the fourth watch on the third day. He himself, on the day following, in order to withdraw the king from the observation of other matters, attacked his advanced guards as soon as it was light in the middle of the channel of the river, where the fight was maintained by the light infantry on both sides, for the bottom was so uneven, that heavy arms could not be used. The slope of each bank was three hundred paces long, and the breadth of the channel, which was of various depths, somewhat more than a mile. In this middle space the fight was carried on, while the king on one side, and the consul with his legions on the other, stood spectators on the ramparts of their camps. At a distance, the king’s troops had the advantage in fighting with missile weapons; but in close fight the Roman soldier was more steady, and was better defended, either with a target or a Ligurian buckler. About noon, the consul ordered the signal of retreat to be given, and thus the battle ended for that day, after considerable numbers had fallen on both sides. Next morning at sun-rise, the fight was renewed with greater fury, as their passions had been irritated by the former contest; but the Romans were wounded, not only by those with whom they were immediately engaged, but much more by the multitudes that stood posted in the towers, with missiles of every sort, particularly stones; so that whenever they advanced towards the enemy’s bank, the weapons thrown from the engines reached even the hindmost of their men. The consul, having lost far more men on that day, somewhat later called off his men. On the third day he declined fighting, and moved down to the lowest side of the camp, as if intending to attempt a passage through an intrenchment which stretched down to the sea. Perseus, who did not extend his cares beyond the objects that lay before his eyes, bent all his thoughts and exertions to stop the progress of the enemy in the quarter where he lay, careful of nought beside. In the mean time, Publius Nasica, with the detachment assigned to him, having departed towards the sea to Heracleum, when he arrived there, waited for nightfall, ordering his soldiers to refresh themselves. He then explained to the principal of his officers the real directions of the consul, and when first the darkness spread itself, bending his course to the mountain, he led his troops in silence to Pythium, as he had been commanded. When they had arrived at the very summit, which rises to a height of more than ten stadia, some repose was given to the wearied soldiers. This height, as has been already stated, Medon, Histiæus, and Theogenes, who were sent by Perseus, were occupying with five thousand Macedonians, but so great was the negligence of the king’s generals, that no one perceived that the Romans were approaching. If we are to believe Polybius, Nasica, having attacked them while asleep, easily dislodged them from the height. Nasica himself however, narrates the affair very differently in a letter to one of the kings. He says, that the mountain was of steep ascent, but so unguarded that he could have taken possession of the pass with no trouble, had not a deserter from those Cretans, whom he was taking with him, fled to Perseus, and informed him what was being done. That the king himself remained in his camp, but sent two thousand Macedonians and ten thousand auxiliaries, with Medon as their leader, to take possession of the pass. That with these a most fierce engagement took place on the top of the hill, and, among other things, that he himself was thrust at with a sword by a Thracian soldier, whom he transfixed by driving his spear through his breast. That at length the Macedonians, being conquered, gave way, and that their leader himself, throwing away his arms, sought safety in a disgraceful flight. The Romans pursuing the fugitives had an easy descent, without any danger, to the plain. In this stale of things Perseus was in perplexity as to what was necessary to be done, as he feared lest, now that a way through the pass had been opened, he should be hemmed in by the Romans. It was absolutely necessary that he should either retire to Pydna, and await the enemy there, so as to fight with less danger under the walls of a fortified city; or that, dispersing his forces through the cities of Macedonia, conveying the corn and cattle into more fortified places, and devastating the fields, he, should leave the bare soil to the enemy. The mind of the king fluctuated irresolute between these two propositions: his friends, thinking that that which was the most honourable would also be the safer, advised him to try the fortune of a battle, alleging both that he was superior in the number of his soldiers, and that he ought surely to trust to that valour which, while it was natural to their minds, would be inflamed by the most powerful and sacred incitements to a valiant opposition which could act upon men;—their altars, their hearths, and their religious institutions, amidst which and for which they had to fight; their parents and their wives, and, lastly, their king himself observing them, and exposing himself to a share of the danger. Influenced by these suggestions, the king prepared himself for a battle, and when he had retired to Pydna, at once pitched his camp, drew up his army, and assigned to each of his leaders his position and duty, as if about to fight immediately after the march. The locality was of this hind; the plain was suited for the ranging of the phalanx, which requires an open and even space, not, however, such as that it could be easily moved forward; then there were continuous hills which afforded to the light-armed troops the means of retreating at one time, and at another of wheeling round. Two streams, the one of which the inhabitants called Œson, the other Leucus, though they flowed with but a scanty supply of water, yet seemed likely to occasion some trouble to the Romans. Æmilius, having united his forces with Nasica, set out directly against the enemy, but at the sight of their army, which was most effective both as to the number and the strength of the soldiers, and admirably drawn up and ranged for battle, he stopped, struck with awe, and revolving many considerations within himself.

36 The season of the year[96] was a little after the summer solstice; the time of the day was approaching towards noon; and his march had been performed amidst great quantities of dust, and the increasing heat of the sun. Lassitude and thirst were already felt, and both would certainly be aggravated by mid-day coming on. He resolved, therefore, not to expose his men in that condition to an enemy, fresh and in full vigour; but so great was the ardour for battle in the minds of both parties, that the general had occasion for as much art to elude the wishes of his own men, as those of the enemy. He urged the military tribunes to hasten the forming of the troops, went himself round the ranks, and with exhortations inflamed their courage for the fight. At first, they called to him for the signal briskly; but afterwards, as the beat increased, their looks became less lively, and their voices fainter, while many stood resting on their shields, or leaning on their javelins. He then, at length, openly ordered the foremost ranks to measure out the front of a camp, and store the baggage; on seeing which, some undisguisedly rejoiced that he had not compelled them to fight when they were wearied with marching and with the scorching heat. Immediately about the general were the lieutenants-general, and the commanders of the foreign troops; among others Attalus, who, when they thought that the consul intended to fight, (for even to them he did not disclose his intention of delaying,) had all approved the measure. On this sudden alteration of his plan, while the rest were silent, Nasica alone of them all ventured to advise the consul, not to let slip from his hands an enemy, who, by shunning a battle, had baffled former commanders. “There was reason to fear,” he said, “that if he should march off in the night, he would have to be pursued with extreme toil and danger, into the heart of Macedonia; and the troops must be led about, as under former generals, wandering through the glens and forests of the Macedonian mountains. He therefore earnestly recommended to attack the enemy while he had him in an open plain, and not to lose the opportunity of obtaining a victory, which now presented itself.” The consul, not in the least offended at the frank advice of so illustrious a youth, answered: “Nasica, I once thought as you do now; hereafter you will come to think as I do. By the many chances of war, I have learned when it is proper to fight, when to abstain from fighting. It would not be right in me, at present, standing at the head of the troops to explain to you the causes that render it better to rest to-day. Ask my reasons some other time. At present you will acquiesce in the judgment of an old commander.” The youth was silent, concluding that the consul certainly saw some objections to fighting, which did not appear to him.

37 Paullus, as soon as he saw the camp marked out, and the baggage laid up, drew off, first, the veterans from the rear line, then the first-rank men, while the spearmen stood in the front, lest the enemy might make any attempt; and lastly, the spearmen, beginning at the right wing, and leading them away, gradually, by single companies. Thus were the infantry drawn off without tumult; and, in the mean time, the cavalry and light infantry faced the enemy; nor were the cavalry recalled from their station, until the rampart and trench were finished. The king, though he was disposed to have given battle that day, was yet satisfied; since his men knew, that, the delay was owing to the enemy: and he led back his troops to their station. When the camp had been thoroughly fortified, Caius Sulpicius Gallus, a military tribune of the second legion, who had been prætor the year before, with the consul’s permission collected the soldiers in assembly, and gave them notice, lest they should any of them consider the matter as a prodigy, that, “on the following night, the moon would be eclipsed, from the second hour to the fourth.” He mentioned that, “as this happened in the course of nature, at stated times, it could be known, and foretold. As, therefore, they did not wonder at the regular rising and setting of the sun and moon, or at the moon’s sometimes shining with a full orb, and sometimes in its wane, showing only small horns, so neither ought they to construe as a portent, its being obscured when covered with the shadow of the earth.” When on the night preceding the day before the nones of September, at the hour mentioned, the eclipse took place, the Roman soldiers thought the wisdom of Gallus almost divine; but the Macedonians were shocked, as at a dismal prodigy, foreboding the fall of their kingdom and the ruin of their nation; nor did their soothsayers explain it otherwise. There was shouting and yelling in the camp of the Macedonians, until the moon emerged forth into its full light. Both armies had been so eager for an engagement, that, next day, both the king and the consul were censured by many of their respective men for having separated without a battle. The king could readily excuse himself, not only as the enemy had led back his troops into camp, openly declining a battle; but, also, as he had posted his men on ground of such a nature, that the phalanx (which even a small inequality of surface renders useless) could not advance on it. The consul, besides appearing to have neglected an opportunity of fighting, and to have given the enemy room to go off in the night, if he were so inclined, was thought to waste time at the present, under pretence of offering sacrifice, though the signal had been displayed, at the first light, for going out to the field. At last, about the third hour, the sacrifices being duly performed, he summoned a council, and there, too, he was deemed by several to spin out, in talking and unseasonable consultation, the time that ought to be employed in action; after the conversation, however, the consul addressed to them the following speech.

38 “Publius Nasica, a youth of uncommon merit, was the only one of those who were for fighting yesterday, that disclosed his sentiments to me; and even he was afterwards silent, so that he seems to have come over to my opinion. Some others have thought proper, rather to carp at their general in his absence, than to offer advice in his presence. Now, I shall, without the least reluctance, make known to you, Publius Nasica, and to any who, with less openness, entertained the same opinion with you, my reasons for deferring an engagement. For, so far am I from being sorry for yesterday’s inaction, that I am convinced that by that course I preserved the army. And if any of you think that I hold this opinion groundlessly, let him come forward, if he pleases, and take with me a review of how many things were favourable to the enemy and adverse to us. In the first place, how far they surpass us in numbers, I am sure not one of you was at any time ignorant; and yesterday, I am convinced that you must have observed it, when you saw their line drawn out. Of our small force, a fourth part had been left to guard the baggage; and you know that they are not the worst of the soldiers who are left in custody of the baggage. But suppose we were all here, can we believe it a matter of little moment, that, with the blessing of the gods, we shall this day, if judged proper, or tomorrow at farthest, march to battle out of this our own camp, where we have lodged last night? Is there no difference whether you order a soldier to take arms in his own tent, when he has not suffered any fatigue on that day, either from a long march or laborious work; after he has enjoyed his natural rest, and is fresh; so as to lead him into the field vigorous both in body and mind; or whether, when he is wearied by such a march, or fatigued with carrying a load; while he is wet with sweat, and while his throat is parched with thirst, and his mouth and eyes filled with dust, you oppose him, under a scorching noon-day sun, to an enemy who has had full repose, and who brings into the battle his strength unimpaired by any previous circumstance? Is there, in the name of the gods, any one so dastardly, that, if matched in this manner, he would not overcome the bravest man? We must consider, that the enemy had, quite at their leisure, formed their line of battle; had recruited their spirits, and were standing in regular order; whereas we must have formed our line in hurry and confusion, and have engaged before it was completed.