28. The beauty or agreeableness of an object, as it enters into the original perception, enters also into the secondary perception or idea. An idea of imagination is also agreeable; though in a lower degree than an idea of memory, where the objects are of the same kind. But this defect in the ideas of imagination is abundantly supply’d by their greatness and variety. For the imagination acting without control, can fabricate ideas of finer visible objects, of more noble and heroic actions, of greater wickedness, of more surprising events, than ever in fact existed. And by communicating these ideas in words, painting, sculpture, &c. the influence of the imagination is not less extensive than great.
29. In the nature of every man, there is somewhat original, that serves to distinguish him from others, that tends to form a character, and, with the concurrence of external accidents, to make him meek or fiery, candid or deceitful, resolute or timorous, chearful or morose. This original bent is termed disposition. Which must be distinguished from a principle: no original bent obtains the latter appellation, but what belongs to the whole species. A principle makes part of the common nature of man: a disposition makes part of the nature of this or that man. A propensity comprehends both; for it signifies indifferently either a principle or a disposition.
30. Affection, signifying a settled bent of mind toward a particular being or thing, occupies a middle place betwixt propensity on the one hand, and passion on the other. A propensity being original, must exist before any opportunity be offered to exert it: affection can never be original; because, having a special relation to a particular object, it cannot exist till the object be presented. Again, passion depends on the presence of the object, in idea at least, if not in reality: when the idea vanishes, the passion vanishes with it. Affection, on the contrary, once settled on a person, is a lasting connection; and, like other connections, subsists even when we do not think of it. A familiar example will clear the whole. There may be in the mind a propensity to gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be exerted, and which therefore is never discovered even by the person who has it. Another who has the same propensity, meets with a kindly office that makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is formed betwixt them, termed affection; which, like other connections, has a permanent existence, though not always in view. The affection, for the most part, lies dormant, till an opportunity offer of exerting it: in this circumstance, it is converted into the passion of gratitude; and the opportunity is greedily seized for testifying gratitude in the most complete manner.
31. Aversion, I think, must be opposed to affection, and not to desire, as it commonly is. We have an affection for one person; we have an aversion to another: the former disposes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.
32. What is a sentiment? It is not a perception; for a perception signifies our consciousness of external objects. It is not consciousness of an internal action; such as thinking, suspending thought, inclining, resolving, willing, &c. Neither is it a conception of relation amongst objects or of their differences: a conception of this kind, is termed opinion. The term sentiment is appropriated to those thoughts that are suggested by a passion or emotion.
33. Attention is that state of mind which prepares a man to receive impressions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a stronger or weaker impression[98]. In an indolent state, or in a reverie, objects make but a slight impression; far from what they make when they command our attention. In a train of perceptions, no single object makes such a figure as it would do single and apart: for when the attention is divided among many objects, no single object is intitled to a large share. Hence the stillness of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the attention.
Horror ubique animos, simul ipsa silentia terrent.
Æneid. 2.
Zara. Silence and solitude are ev’ry where!
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is seen or heard. A dreadful din was wont
To grate the sense, when enter’d here, from groans
And howls of slaves condemn’d, from clink of chains,
And crash of rusty bars and creeking hinges:
And ever and anon the sight was dash’d
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghastly executioners.
Yet more this stillness terrifies my soul
Than did that scene of complicated horrors.
Mourning Bride, act 5. sc. 8.
And hence it is, that an object seen at the termination of a confined view, is more agreeable than when seen in a group with the surrounding objects.