The crow doth sing as sweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,
The nightingale, if she should sing by day,
When ev’ry goose is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than the wren.
Merchant of Venice
34. In matters of slight importance, attention, in a great measure, is directed by will; and for that reason, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impression. Had we power equally to with-hold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep impression. But our power fails us here: an interesting object seizes and fixes the attention beyond the possibility of control; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached by one object, others may solicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a small misfortune is scarce felt in presence of a greater:
Lear. Thou think’st ’tis much, that this contentious storm
Invades us to the skin; so ’tis to thee;
But where the greater malady is fix’d,
The lesser is scarce felt. Thou’d’st shun a bear;
But if thy flight lay tow’rd the roaring sea,
Thou’d’st meet the bear i’ th’ mouth. When the mind’s free,
The body’s delicate: the tempest in my mind
Doth from my senses take all feeling else,
Save what beats there.
King Lear, act 3. sc. 5.
35. Genus, species, modification, are terms invented to distinguish beings from each other. Individuals are distinguished by their qualities: a large class of individuals enjoying qualities in common, is termed a genus: a subdivision of such class is termed a species. Again, that circumstance which distinguisheth one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modification: the same particular that is termed a property or quality when considered as belonging to an individual or a class of individuals, is termed a modification when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another. A black skin and soft curled hair, are properties of a negro: the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, are denominated modifications.
36. Objects of sight, being complex, are distinguishable into the several particulars that enter into the composition: these objects are all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thickness. When I behold a spreading oak, I distinguish in this object, size, figure, colour, and sometimes motion: viewing a flowing river, I distinguish colour, figure, and constant motion: a dye has colour, black spots, six plain surfaces, all equal and uniform. The objects of touch, have all of them extension. Some of them are felt rough, some smooth: some of them are hard, some soft. With respect to the other senses, some of their objects are simple, some complex: a sound, a taste, a smell, may be so simple as not to be distinguishable into any parts: others are perceived to be compounded of different sounds, different tastes, and different smells.
37. The eye at one look can take in a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: as these objects are distinct from each other, each having a separate and independent existence, they are distinguishable in the mind as well as in reality; and there is nothing more easy, than to abstract from some and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its spreading branches, fixes our attention upon itself, and abstracts us from the shrubs that surround it. In the same manner, with respect to compounded sounds, tastes, or smells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abstracting our attention from the rest. But the power of abstraction is not confined to objects that are separable in reality as well as mentally: it also takes place where there can be no real separation. The size, the figure, the colour, of a tree, are inseparably connected, and cannot exist independent of each other: the same of length, breadth, and thickness: and yet we can mentally confine our observations to one of these, neglecting or abstracting from the rest. Here abstraction takes place where there cannot be a real separation.
38. This power of abstraction is of great utility. A carpenter considers a log of wood, with regard to hardness, firmness, colour, and texture: a philosopher, neglectting these properties, makes the log undergo a chymical analysis; and examines its taste, its smell, and its component principles: the geometrician confines his reasoning to the figure, the length, breadth, and thickness. In general, every artist, abstracting from all other properties, confines his observations to those which have a more immediate connection with his profession.
39. Hence clearly appears the meaning of an abstract term, and abstract idea. If in viewing an object, we can abstract from some of its parts or properties, and attach ourselves to others; there must be the same facility, when we recall this object to the mind in idea. This leads directly to the definition of an abstract idea, viz. “A partial view of a complex object, limited to one or more of the component parts or properties, laying aside or abstracting from others.” A word that denotes an abstract idea, is called an abstract term.
40. The power of abstraction is bestowed upon man, for the purposes solely of reasoning. It tends greatly to the facility as well as clearness of any process of reasoning, that, withdrawing from every other circumstance, we can confine our attention to the single property we desire to investigate.
41. Abstract ideas, may, I think, be distinguished into three different kinds, all equally subservient to the reasoning faculty. Individuals appear to have no end; and did we not possess the faculty of distributing them into classes, the mind would be lost in an endless variety, and no progress be made in knowledge. It is by the faculty of abstraction that we distribute beings into genera and species: finding a number of individuals connected by certain qualities common to all, we give a name to these individuals considered as thus connected; which name, by gathering them together into one class, serves in a curt manner to express the whole of these individuals as distinct from others. Thus the word animal serves to denote every being which hath self-motion; and the words man, horse, lion, &c. answer similar purposes. This is the first and most common sort of abstraction; and it is of the most extensive use, by enabling us to comprehend in our reasoning whole kinds and sorts, instead of individuals without end. The next sort of abstract ideas and terms comprehends a number of individual objects considered as connected by some occasional relation. A great number of persons collected together in one place, without any other relation but merely that of contiguity, are denominated a crowd: in forming this term, we abstract from sex, from age, from condition, from dress, &c. A number of persons connected by being subjected to the same laws and to the same government, are termed a nation; and a number of men subjected to the same military command, are termed an army. A third sort of abstraction is, where a single property or part, which may be common to many individuals, is selected to be the subject of our contemplation; for example, whiteness, heat, beauty, length, roundness, head, arm.