The troops then, under orders from Lord Methuen, retired to Modder River. They started from Koodoesberg on the evening of Thursday, made a moonlight march to Fraser’s Drift, returning to camp footsore and dilapidated on Friday. But before leaving, the officers and men who fell in the action were buried on the south bank of the river. Among them was Captain Blair, who, after having been previously struck by a bullet, had been mortally wounded by a shell. Lieutenant Tait, a very gallant officer, a notable golfer, and a general favourite, also fell, and Captain Eykyn eventually died of his injuries.

General Macdonald’s reconnaissance at Koodoesberg Drift was entirely satisfactory. The position there was important, as it prevented Boer reinforcements from passing via the chief drift from Douglas to Majesfontein, and the movement served to confound the enemy, and protect the operations of the Belmont garrison in the direction of Douglas, not to speak of its value in keeping Boer activities to the west of Majesfontein at the time when Lord Roberts was developing his plans in regard to the east of that place. The enemy had been kept amused and out of mischief, and been wholesomely trounced into the bargain!

The casualties, which were comparatively few, were as follows:—

Killed:—2nd Royal Highlanders—Captain Eykyn; Lieutenant Tait. 2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Blair.

Wounded:—2nd Seaforth Highlanders—Captain Studdert, A.S.C. 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders—Captain Kirk. 9th Lancers—Second Lieutenant Cavendish; Lieutenant Mackenzie, R.A.M.C.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Watson was forty-six years of age. He entered the army as a sub-lieutenant of the 12th Foot (now the Berkshires) on August 9, 1873, and received his lieutenancy from the same date. He was instructor of musketry to the regiment from February 12, 1880, to January 24, 1883, received his company on the 14th of April following, and, passing the Staff College in 1884, served with the Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren later in the year, and from February 17 to October 28, 1885, was brigade-major in Bechuanaland, being honourably mentioned in dispatches. He was employed on staff service with the Egyptian army from February 12 to September 7, 1886, obtaining his major’s commission on October 21 following; and in 1888 served in the Hazara Expedition as brigade-major to the first column under Brigadier-General Channer, when he was again mentioned in dispatches, and received the medal with clasp. From July 20, 1889, to February 20, 1896, he was garrison instructor in Bengal, and deputy assistant-adjutant-general for instruction in the Punjaub, taking part in 1895 in the operations in the Chitral, accompanying the relief force under Sir Robert Low, acting as road commandant on the lines of communication. For his services in this campaign he received his second medal with clasp. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel of the Suffolk Regiment on September 19, 1898.

APPENDIX
THE STORY OF SPION KOP.

A great deal of consternation and not a little surprise was caused by the publication of the official account (London Gazette, April 16, 1900) of the evacuation of Spion Kop. In order to make intelligible the causes of the terrible fiasco it is necessary to quote for the benefit of those interested not only Lord Roberts’s comments on the subject, but the statements of the officers concerned. Sir Redvers Buller, writing from Spearman’s Hill, January 30, 1900, gave his version of the proceedings:—

“I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren’s Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions 10th Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it moved to Frere on the 9th.

“The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the 9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took 650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.

“The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important position of Spearman’s Hill, commanding Potgieter’s Drift, on the 11th.

“By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman’s Hill, and supply was well forward.

“On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days’ supply having been collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield to Trichardt’s Drift, which is about six miles west of Potgieter’s.

“I attach Sir Charles Warren’s report of his operations.

“On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop, which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren’s force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th; by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107; 4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the sick and wounded.

“By 2 P.M. the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30 P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear for the troops. By 4 A.M. the 27th all the troops were over, and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the infantry and artillery an average of five miles.

“Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour.”