He concluded by saying:—

“Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say, in excellent fettle.”

Sir Charles Warren’s report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, ran thus:—

“On the 8th January field orders were published constituting the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant, arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.

“On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt’s Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the 10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield Bridge to Spearman’s Hill.

“I was provided with four days’ rations with which I was to cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and join your column opposite Potgieter’s.

“On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt’s Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of the Tugela.

“On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela, passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave some verbal directions to General Woodgate.

“The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.

“During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright’s Farm.

“On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully brought to Venter’s Spruit.

“In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair View would be by taking three or four days’ food in our haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela, but before we could do this we must capture the position in front of us.

“On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F. Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day, after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line on the comparatively flat country beyond us.

“On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and telegraphed for four from Potgieter’s. These arrived early on the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving about the same time, directed me to place two of these howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that the attack might be put off for a day.

“On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel àCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.

“On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before 2 P.M. on the 26th January.”

In regard to the Council of War, Sir Charles Warren amplified his previous statement:

“Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter’s Laager, I assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers, together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a half (3½) days’ provisions allowed, it was impossible to advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and attempted to march through with our rations in our haversacks—without impedimenta.”

Sir Charles then added:—

“The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong intrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by waggons, without first taking Spion Kop.

“Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be sent there.

“On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and told me that there were two courses open—(1) to attack, (2) to retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the previous day.

“The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.

“The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion of Thorneycroft’s Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by Trichardt’s Drift.

“The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful. General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th, reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see. The position was rushed without casualties other than three men wounded.

“Lieutenant-Colonel àCourt came down in the morning and stated that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, ‘Reinforce at once, or all lost. General dead.’

“He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.

“I replied to Colonel Crofton, ‘I am sending two battalions, and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must hold on to the last. No surrender.’

“This occurred about 10 A.M.

“Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had heliographed, ‘With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit, with the local rank of Brigadier-General.’

“For some hours after this message I could get no information from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.

“I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could silence the enemy’s guns, the men on the summit could not stand another complete day’s shelling, and that the situation was extremely critical.”

Later on in the evening arrangements were made to send two (Naval) 12-pounders, and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit, together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the intrenchments and provide shell cover for the men. The 17th Company, Royal Engineers—it must be noted—proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate’s force, and were employed until daylight upon the intrenchments, then upon road-making and water supply.

Sand-bags were sent up early on the 24th instant, but they were too late. Colonel Sim and his party, while ascending, met Colonel Thorneycroft descending the hill. The position was evacuated. Sir Charles Warren concluded thus:—