But the calls of patriotism were altogether too urgent on Poerio to allow him to spend very much of his time in London society. About the middle of May he left for Turin, where he entered on a long correspondence with Panizzi. Here, for the first time in these volumes, we are able to present the reader with a comprehensive letter from Poerio, although short extracts from others have been given above. His letters are, both in language and style, the acme of combined nervousness and elegance, and we can only express our regret that, to meet the exigencies of the general reader, we are compelled to give this in English, feeling that by translation the beauty and force of the original must materially suffer. Most interesting in themselves, but of still greater value as throwing light on contemporary history, are the accounts of the sad continuance of disorder and misgovernment in the administration of Naples; of the various other complications in the affairs of the Peninsula; the course of action adopted by the French Emperor in connection with the attitude of the Sardinian Government, (which last, Poerio seems to consider occasionally as somewhat hesitating and undecided); and the dawn of the first possibility of effecting the union of distracted Italy, in the achievement of which, however, a thousand difficulties seemed yet to be overcome. Some few necessary excisions of matter of little importance have been made, but this has not materially reduced the bulk of the correspondence. Of Panizzi’s share we unfortunately possess nothing. A good notion, however, of his opinions on Italian, and (as connected with Italian) of European politics, as well as of his unwearying efforts in the cause, and the confidence that his compatriots rested in his exertions and influence here, may be gathered from the communications which he received from his friend and others who had suffered from or witnessed the revolting cruelties committed for so many years in Naples and elsewhere; but there is no querulousness, no recalling of the past; every energy, every aspiration, is devoted to the one glorious object—the unity and independence of Italy:—
“Turin, 21st of August, 1859.
“My dearest Panizzi,
I send you my ideas respecting your project, which would be excellent if it were only practicable.
Your programme, if I mistake not, may be summed up as follows:—The formation of a single Assembly of representatives from the four States of Central Italy, such assembly to proceed immediately—To confirm in common the separate decisions arrived at with regard to the deposition of the Princes and the annexation to Piedmont; to publish a manifesto to Europe, short, but solemn, energetic, and rich in facts which justify this severe but unavoidable determination; to nominate a Regent, who shall assume in its entirety and in the name of the Sardinian Government the exercise of executive power, commencing with the appointment of a commander-in-chief to all the forces now under arms, such forces to be combined and formed into a single army. After this the Assembly would adjourn, leaving the Regent full power to have himself represented at the European Congress called for by this Assembly, in order to obtain a decision in conformity with the solemn vote of the country, and to repel any aggression on the part of anybody who might intend forcibly to reinstate the deposed Princes.
First of all I must take exception in law to the judicial validity of the nomination of a Regent.
A popular Assembly, legitimately elected, has most certainly the right of declaring that the people represented by it intends to choose for its Prince the monarch of another State, and intends to identify itself with that State. But after this decision has been arrived at, the logical and legal order of things would be to address that Prince, in order to ascertain whether he is willing to accept this free and spontaneous surrender. If he accept, he alone can and in fact must nominate an authority to govern the annexed provinces provisionally in his name. The Assembly cannot do this, because, in proclaiming a new Prince, it invests him with the sovereign power. Victor Emmanuel proceeded in this way with the Lombards, who submitted to him of their own free will—that is to say, he nominated a Governor to rule in his name, neither did he act otherwise towards the people from whom he accepted the dictatorship. The only exception to this rule is when it is physically impossible for the Prince who has been proclaimed to speak his mind. It is not so in our case, because the King of Piedmont reigns both by right and in deed, and is personally free. He is, moreover, at the head of an army, and has made himself a champion of the war of independence. It is, therefore, necessary to address him. He is not only able, but is bound to declare himself openly, and in accepting he will be obliged to provide a government for those provinces until an European Congress recognizes the fact as accomplished, and includes him in the new public statute. Most assuredly no one will ever assert that the Congress ought to compel Victor Emmanuel to accept the submission of Central Italy, unless he had openly acceded at the proper time, and acted frankly in conformity with his utterances. Silence in this case might be termed prudent; but it certainly would not be very generous, particularly if it be considered that these people are determined to fight to the last against anybody who would wish to prevent them from belonging to him.
According to your plan, I conclude that King Victor Emmanuel must not only accept the surrender and nominate a Vicegerent or Lieutenant who will govern under his guidance, but must also prepare himself to protect and sustain the annexed provinces to the utmost of his power, and at the same time declare himself ready manfully to repel any aggression. It would, in truth, not only be strange, but indecorous, in a King invoked and proclaimed if he were to act negligently and look on with indifference at the cruel sacrifice of his new people, who are ready to shed the last drop of their blood to preserve their fidelity to him.
But this sacred duty will not be performed, and it is vain to hope for it, because just now a timid rather than a spirited policy prevails in the Piedmontese Cabinet.
I do not wish utterly to condemn it, because I know but too well the gravity of affairs generally, and the difficulties of such a perilous situation. Possibly the requisite boldness would amount to temerity, but it is none the less true that when a man cannot, or does not wish to, run any risk or leave anything to chance, he has no right to look for brilliant or glorious results, neither can he expect to add four millions of people to his own proper subjects without incurring any risk, and merely by remaining a careless spectator of the dangers to which others are exposed....