Let us suppose that the Piedmontese Government can do nothing to display a large amount of energy and tenacity of purpose; let us suppose that, notwithstanding the safe remission, the amalgamation of the four States, the single Assembly, and the unanimous declaration, are matters of supreme importance to the future of Italy, but how can one ever hope for this fusion in the midst of such discordant elements? It is true that the four States have formed a military confederation for mutual defence, but this fact of itself clearly shows that there is no intention of proceeding further, and of forming a single State....
Everybody apparently wishes for the fusion with Piedmont, but a great many object to the idea of a single State. Nor do the Romans and the Tuscans, who are so different in character, in customs, and in aspirations, intend to hold together. The Duchies alone really wish for the union with Piedmont. The Romans would in reality like a separate government, and the Tuscans who reason closely, know that in the actual condition of affairs the fusion with Piedmont is impossible, but they pretend to want it (and voted unanimously for it only yesterday), because it is for the present the only straightforward way of avoiding a relapse into the clutches of the Grand Duke and his myrmidons. In fact, when they had a chance of accomplishing the fusion, although they were advised to take advantage of it, they neither did so nor even desired it. Their own Ambassadors in Paris and London (Peruzzi and Lajatico) put it on one side, advancing instead a number of schemes and solutions, commencing with a Prince of the House of Savoy and finishing with Prince Leuchtenberg. The Times published the document, the Augsburg Gazzette has repeated it with evident satisfaction, and they have not denied it.
Lajatico (as you tell me) now writes in the same way as Marliani—that is, for the formation of a single Assembly which is to repeat the vote for annexation to Piedmont, forgetting that Parma has no Assembly, and on account of the unfortunate dissensions and paltry points of honour between the two rival cities of that nutshell, poor Manfredi has been obliged to have recourse to a Plebiscite; that, moreover, to escape from the machinations of an Armelonghi, who wanted to supplant him, he has been compelled to call upon Farini to act as Dictator, For my own part, I think that henceforth neither Marliani, nor Peruzzi, nor Lajatico, nor Linati will be able to persuade the people or obtain the one single Assembly as proposed by you. But even conceding that our respective friends fully approve, and supposing that everybody consents, also that there is an unanimous declaration of the desire to become Piedmontese, that Europe is called to witness it, and that a sole Regent is appointed (a matter of considerable difficulty in view of the passions, and ambition, and rivalry, and suspicion aroused), and conceding, moreover, that everything should go on according to a preconceived idea, let us see what would in all probability occur in actual practice.
Your dilemma is this: by such an arrangement you either succeed in convening an European Congress, which will deliberate upon the present abnormal and disturbed condition of central Italy, or the failure will at least be glorious. In the first case, therefore, you only rest upon a hope, and a hope that is evaporating daily, since France at heart does not so far wish for the Congress, and I do not see who is to force it on her.
I must say that Lord John Russell’s noble declaration to the effect that England does not intend to take part in any Congress, unless the bases of peace and rearrangement of Italy are different from those defined in the preliminaries at Villafranca, so that room may be left for discussion, does great honour to his high political capacity; but his declaration does not in the smallest degree further the possibility of this European Congress, particularly if it be borne in mind that those preliminaries are now being reduced at Zurich, to a definitive peace upon still more onerous conditions, and with the intervention of Sardinia.
The first part of the dilemma being disposed of, the second remains. I fully agree that in fighting manfully the fall will be glorious, but this glory will belong solely to the combatants, and will redound to the perpetual ignominy of Piedmont, which is condemned by some of its antecedents, and is perhaps obliged by dire necessity to remain a quiet though armed spectator of the struggle. The same Piedmont that has nevertheless assumed the magnanimous task of the redemption of Italy: that Piedmont which is the only State possessing the backbone of national strength; that Piedmont which contains in itself the fortunes of the Italy of the future, and to which we must all at least give our moral support, so that it may not utterly lose its reputation by too openly showing either its present impotence or the paltriness of its policy of partial aggrandizement—a policy which is, perhaps, a supreme necessity of the novel situation wherein an imprudent peace has placed it.
But let us see whether there is not a third hypothesis besides these two, and perhaps something even more probable, because I consider it certain that Central Italy cannot all be annexed to Piedmont, and likewise certain that France will not consent to the forcible restorations.
I maintain, in fact, that there will be no restorations at all, and my opinion is not shaken either by Reiset’s journey or by the mission of Poniatowski, nor even by the reception of one of the fugitive Princes at the Tuileries. I hold that the Emperor will permit the convocation of the Assembly devised by you, exactly as he has allowed the gathering of the local Assemblies and the record of their votes in favour of Piedmont.
But will this fact create any necessity for a Congress? Herein lies the essential part of it. You dare not make the assertion, and I tell you most distinctly that the Congress will never take place. But what will occur instead? Precisely that which Napoleon is now preparing with so many twists and turns—namely, the formation of a Central Italian State, of which his cousin will be the monarch—a State that will be located upon the two seas, and that will cut Italy in halves, putting an end to all communication between the Sardo-Lombardian States and that of the Two Sicilies, and excluding for ever any hope of future aggrandizement.
The means for arriving at this end are simple. He will praise the high-minded proposal, but will lament its impracticability. He will recall to mind the preliminaries of Villafranca, and the consent that was given for the restorations, and he will make it appear that those conditions can be modified in the Zurich negotiations (which depend solely upon him for their continuance), but never in the sense of annexation to Piedmont. He will have it whispered in the ears of those in power that in order to elude the ravenous claws of eaglets they will have to confide themselves to the care of the Imperial Eagle. Montanelli and his set (who did not abstain from voting for Piedmont without a reason) will then come forward.