The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

This double situation affords an explanation of the events, and many of the faults, of this period; the tergiversations of the cabinet, which appeared constantly to have an inclination towards public opinion, and then again, especially after the battle of Austerlitz, returned to their former dread of the Emperor. At length the king, pressed by the people, roused himself, and manifested a chivalrous disposition in accordance with the spirit of the nation, and more especially of the universities; and it reached such a pitch, that, after the retirement of Hardenberg, the people flew to arms in a hasty and adventurous manner, and without sufficiently calculating the course they were to pursue. And who was to conduct this war? Count Haugwitz, already devoted to France, and the secretary Lombard, both creatures of Napoleon! One would have said treachery was already determined upon.

Nothing could surpass the campaign of Jena, no praise be too great for that admirable military movement directed by the Eagle of Austerlitz. But were these splendid victories due entirely to the brilliant and energetic courage of the imperial army? had not a series of faults been committed by their opponents? and were those who directed the cabinet of Berlin perfectly faithful and devoted to the interests of Prussia? After the disasters of Jena so many acts of secret treason came to light, that Hardenberg, under the influence of Queen Louisa and the Emperor Alexander, was again placed at the head of foreign affairs, for an inclination to resist the power of France had now sprung up. This new situation of the cabinets of Russia and Prussia requires some explanation, because it formed the basis of the intimate union, which at a later period led to the ruin of the French empire. The dissatisfaction before entertained by the cabinet of St. Petersburg against Prussia proceeded entirely from the position of indifferent neutrality assumed by the latter ever since the treaty of Basle; and all the endeavours made by England, Austria, and Russia to induce the cabinet of Berlin to break through this mischievous situation had met with a refusal, for neutrality appeared to be the fundamental principle of the Prussian political system. It was, therefore, satisfactory to see Prussia willing to engage in hostilities, though at the eleventh hour, for her position by that means became clear and decided; and it was of little consequence if they had been unsuccessful in the campaign of Jena, provided the spirit of their government was in favour of war; if, in short, there was a degree of unity and vigour capable of supporting the coalesced cabinets.

Baron Hardenberg thus became the representative of the alliance between Russia and Prussia. Frederic William having been obliged to evacuate Berlin, had fallen back with the ruins of his army upon the Russian troops, and then commenced the campaign in the midst of wintry snows, the fiercely-contested and sanguinary battle of Prussisch-Eylau, where first paled the star of Napoleon! Friedland, however, saved the audacious eagle, as Austerlitz had preserved it two years before, and treaties were again had recourse to. Who can express the humiliating conditions dictated by the victor to Prussia? Who describe the cold sarcastic conduct of the fortunate soldier towards the heroic queen, the idol of the universities?

Baron Hardenberg, being again compelled to retire, resigned his portfolio to the new cabinet formed by Napoleon, from which every mind possessed of any degree of independence or elevation was excluded. Prussia became almost a department of France, traversed in every direction by military roads; the whole population of some districts was carried away by the generals of Buonaparte, with blows and violence; the universities were closed, and the provinces reduced to the last extremity; while such heavy military contributions were imposed, that they wrung from the peasant his last hard-earned crown, and even his plough and his oxen. People must not treat a country thus, when they are desirous of governing it; they should recollect that the superiority of a power does not result from violence, but from the moral ascendancy produced by protection and support.

But at the side of the public government of Prussia, bowed down before the wrath and violence of Napoleon, a number of secret associations had been brought into existence, by the oppression of the conquerors; and taking the Fatherland for their watchword, they only awaited a crisis for vengeance. After the death of their noble-hearted queen these associations greatly increased, and the most eminent among the patriots, as well as the statesmen out of favour, participated in them, for the salvation of the country was at stake. It is incontestable that Hardenberg was the mind of this national conspiracy, as Blucher and Gneisenau were its sword; this secret and magnificent undertaking, this moral resistance, advanced with indescribable and undeviating energy, during the period which elapsed between 1808 and 1811, and then, by a capricious will of the Emperor Napoleon, Hardenberg was again destined to receive a mark of confidence from his sovereign, and the government of Prussia was once more placed in his hands. I consider this to have been the most critical period for Northern Germany; the provinces, constantly traversed by French troops, were completely in the power of their generals, and that fine country was now nothing but a magazine of forage, provisions, and money for the French troops. In the midst of these disastrous circumstances, the minister applied himself particularly to reinstating some little degree of order in the complicated administration of Prussia; he relieved the people as far as it was possible, and above all, he endeavoured to reorganise the army, firmly, but not openly, for this Napoleon would not have permitted, but by a military system which constantly summoned the young soldiers to their duties, and then shortly afterwards restored them to their families and their homes; a plan which permitted him to have a fine army in preparation for future events, at a very moderate expense. The system of military reserves is essentially Prussian, because it realizes the double idea of a considerable army in time of war, and a limited contingent during peace; by this means every Prussian is a soldier.

If at this time the Emperor treated Prussia with some little degree of respect, if he even called for the concurrence of Baron Hardenberg, it was because, being then almost on the eve of undertaking a campaign against Russia, he was desirous of engaging Prussia in it as an auxiliary; and as the cabinet was already devoted to him, Buonaparte sought to enlist popular opinion in his favour, by means of their favourite minister. And here a question may be asked, of great importance to history. How came Hardenberg to affix his signature to the secret treaty which placed the Prussian army under the orders of Napoleon? Had he really and in good faith entered into the alliance? or had he only signed it with the determination of breaking through its conditions at the first check experienced by the French arms? It is necessary we should recollect, that with Napoleon there were no discussions, no considering the various clauses of a treaty; and the correspondence of M. de Saint-Marsan with M. Maret, with the notes and explanations of the Prussian minister with the French ambassador, are sufficient to carry conviction that nothing was free or spontaneous on this occasion: every thing was submitted to from the most imperious necessity; there was no choice given of acceptance or refusal, but Prussia placed her army and her treasury at the disposal of the conqueror, because he had said, It is my will.

Now in these necessities, imposed by misfortune, did no gleam of hope remain? In politics, no alliances are durable but those resting upon a perfect agreement of views and interests. When two people unite because they are free and happy, because they feel a mutual esteem and regard for each other, because they reciprocally afford and receive important services, then, depend upon it, these alliances are durable, these treaties will be carefully carried out. But suppose, on the contrary, a people vanquished and humbled—a king of Prussia, the descendant of Frederic the Great, to whom M. Maret insolently writes, "that he must sign a military and diplomatic convention, under pain of captivity;" does such a treaty as that form an alliance? is the convention which delivers up Berlin to the French army, a treaty between friends and allies? or could the plan which parcelled out the Prussian army, into divisions under French marshals or generals, be a free, upright, or durable proceeding? Surely not: this reconciliation could only be momentary; it was imposed by main force, and with the decline of power it must come to an end.

In addition to this, the Prussian government could no longer control the people of Germany, indignant at the humiliations they were called upon to submit to. That Hardenberg was acquainted with the proceedings of the secret societies, does not admit of a doubt, neither is it less certain that he permitted their developement, in order afterwards to avail himself of them, as a powerful instrument against the oppression of France; but a circumstance one cannot comprehend is, that it should not have occurred even to the inferior mind of M. de Saint-Marsan, and the very moderate capacity of M. Maret, that at the first reverse experienced by the grand army, all these alliances would be got rid of, as something troublesome and offensive—in fact, as a yoke to be cast off. To what a degree of humiliation was the House of Frederic now reduced! Prussia, in a suppliant attitude, had solicited an alliance with the Buonaparte family, and Hardenberg, the principal negotiator, had received a cold refusal! Was it possible all this should be forgotten? On one side was the recollection of their young and heroic queen, who had died broken-hearted, insulted in the public papers, and calumniated in pamphlets; and on the other, was a people ground down by oppression, but undertaking its own preparations for the day of independence; while to the insolence of the chief we must add all the harshness of his generals, and of the people employed in levying contributions. I do not wish here to mention proper names, but if any men are still living who were then employed in the local administration of Prussia, let them speak, and say, whether the system to which Prussia was subjected, was one possible for her to maintain, in spite of all the hopes of liberty inspired by the general rising in Europe? and whether it was not natural the conflagration of Moscow should be succeeded by other flames?

The most important events in Prussia commenced from this period. The fatal campaign of Moscow being concluded, the French army, a miserable swarm of fugitives, fell back upon the frontiers of Prussia, so lately traversed under different auspices! The corps of Marshal Macdonald was compelled to retreat from the siege of Riga, and the brave and faithful chief brought back with him the Prussians, especially the division of York, long under the influence of the principles inculcated by Schill. News suddenly arrived that the Prussians refused to fight, and General York addressed a respectful letter to the Marshal, declaring his intention of maintaining a perfect neutrality with the Russian armies. This defection extended to all the Prussian troops, and excited surprise, though it had long been in preparation; in fact, both officers and soldiers were all strongly imbued with the doctrines of Schill, Stein, and the secret societies; and Prussia, ripe for independence, obtained it at last: a bright dawn had begun to appear, and wherefore should she not avail herself of it?

Such being the state of popular opinion in Prussia, let us now inquire what was the spirit of the cabinet conducted by Baron Hardenberg. He had evidently been well acquainted with the existence of the secret societies, and the edicts of Breslau, issued on the 3d and 9th of February, which gave a military organisation to the Tugendbund, were drawn up and signed by him; and admirable indeed were these patriotic papers, calling upon all the sons of Germany to take up arms in defence of the Fatherland! It is necessary to read them, fully to understand the pitch excitement had now reached in Germany; all the young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four, were to take up arms, and form volunteer corps, clothed in the dress that had been worn by Schill and Stein, that is, the short frock girded with a leathern belt, and the little cap usually worn by students. No youth could be married unless he had performed this service, nor could he fill any public situation unless he had discharged his duty to his country; without this there was no hope for him, either in the path of ambition or of love. The patriotic edicts were signed by Hardenberg, who was desirous of placing himself at the head of popular feeling in Prussia. They were thus worded:—"The dangers with which the state is threatened demand an immediate augmentation of our military force, at the same time that the state of our finances forbids any increase of our expenditure. The subjects of Prussia have always been distinguished for their attachment to their king and country, and they require nothing to direct them to a determined object but a favourable occasion, which may enable our brave youth to display the courage which leads them to join the ranks of the ancient defenders of their native land, and acquit themselves at their side, of their first and noblest duties. It is with this object, that his majesty has been pleased to command the formation of detachments of yagers, intended to be annexed to the battalions of infantry and the regiments of cavalry of which the army is composed, so as to summon to military service those classes of the inhabitants of the country who are not compelled to it by the laws, and yet whose means permit them, to clothe and equip themselves at their own expense, and to serve the state in a manner compatible with their situation regarding the civil government. It will also afford an opportunity to young men of education to distinguish themselves, and become some day clever officers, or non-commissioned officers."