The Russian legation was at that time obliged to concern itself, with one of the most important questions of maritime rights, and of the law of nations. The treaty of Amiens, which never could have been any thing more than a truce between France and England, was broken by both parties at once; and it is an invidious question to inquire which of these two governments, was guilty of the first infringement of the treaty: the peace fell to the ground because it was only a momentary repose for two cabinets unable to live in peace with each other, on account of their gigantic ambition. As soon as war was declared between France and England, Napoleon was naturally desirous of carrying on hostilities in a vigorous manner, and for that purpose he endeavoured to secure the co-operation of some of the continental powers. Paul, who was as ardent in his admiration as in his hatred, had conceived a high esteem for the First Consul, and Buonaparte, taking advantage of this feeling, requested him again to put in force, for the benefit of the neutral powers, the principle of the liberty of the sea; a principle completely opposed to the ideas and interests of England, for the British government never would admit that the flag should protect the merchandise. A squadron appeared in the Sound, to act simultaneously against Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, who had adhered to the principle of armed neutrality. The legation at Paris, under the direction of Count Marcoff, based the treaty on the rights of the neutral nations, being the developement of a grand maritime idea renewed by Louis XVI.
A change, however, soon took place, for, as if stricken by a thunderbolt, Paul fell a victim to a conspiracy. The mysterious horrors of that awful night have been recorded in history. The mild and romantic Alexander was placed on the throne of his father, who appeared almost immediately inclined to proceed to warlike measures against France and Napoleon; and accordingly the influence exercised by England over the cabinet of St. Petersburg was very considerable. The Russian legation quitted Paris, and as it had lately exhibited great activity in obtaining information that was not favourable to the ideas of Napoleon, Count Marcoff was on the point of being arrested, and there was a good deal of hesitation whether he should receive his passports. These acts of violence were a habit of Napoleon, for even the barrier opposed by the law of nations to his will was displeasing to him, and he was always on the eve of breaking through it.
The part played since this period by Count Nesselrode, and the importance of the negotiations between Russia and France, render it necessary to explain the organisation of the highest class of the corps diplomatique, as it exists in the Russian empire. The Emperor being the supreme head of the army, of the government, and of the church, all the authorities depend upon him, and consequently he reserves to himself the entire direction of what is called the Chancellerie. This chancellerie appoints agents, who, under the title of ministers or ambassadors, represent officially their sovereign at foreign courts; it also exercises much activity and vigilance, and keeps a watch upon the ambassadors, who are often compelled to collect the most minute information—a proceeding not at all in keeping with their elevated rank, for the shades are almost imperceptible between what is allowable, and what is forbidden in diplomatic affairs; and, as I have before stated, this ambiguous situation often induced the Emperor Napoleon to be almost violent in his measures against the Russian ambassadors, when he found they obtained statements of the military establishments, and secret conventions, so as to become masters of the most carefully guarded secrets of the cabinet.
Independent of these people, who are officially accredited, the Czar despatches aides-de-camp, without any positive commission except that of travelling, or perhaps being the bearers of some complimentary message; and these officers examine into every thing and send reports, not only regarding the government and the population they are deputed to inspect, but even concerning the Russian agents. To recall an example: under the Emperor Napoleon, in 1811, the aide-de-camp Czernitcheff made two or three journeys to Paris, ostensibly to compliment the Emperor, and to carry him autograph letters from the Czar; and then he returned to Russia with a statement of all the military strength of the country, which had been given him by an employé in the war-office—information that was of the greatest possible service to Russia in the defence of 1812. In addition to all this, when the Czar takes the field a great number of general officers unite diplomatic missions and services, to their military titles; as, for instance, Count Pozzo di Borgo, as we have before observed, attended at the same time to the strategic operations, and to the arrangements in the cabinets, which might secure their developement. When England, who was the first to follow this plan, granted subsidies to a power, she always sent a commissioner with each army to follow the campaign.
Count Nesselrode was early attached as a councillor to the private chancellerie of the Czar, who soon discovered him to possess a faithful disposition, great and solid erudition, a serious understanding, and a spirit of ready obedience that would willingly support his sovereign will. Count Nesselrode took especial pains to please Alexander, whose mind was too full of his own ideas to bear any impulse that was not given by himself. At the time of his departure for the interview at Erfurt, it was evident that three ideas in particular possessed the minds of the members of the cabinet of St. Petersburg. The one, entirely Russian, observed with feelings of grief and humiliation, the alliance between Alexander and the head of the French government; a strong dislike was felt by the old Muscovites to the greatness of the new empire; the noble Sclavonian detested the proud and arrogant parvenus. They did not wish for an open rupture with France, but the engagements entered into by the treaty of Erfurt, the intimacy between the two crowns, which had been formed by the fascinations of Napoleon—all this, I say, was a source of great displeasure to the old aristocracy, to the successors of those Boyards who claimed the feudal government of the Russian provinces.
The second school of this diplomacy was in some degree Greek and Oriental. Napoleon had been desirous of satisfying some of the projects of Russia by the treaty of Erfurt; and as he was then dividing the world with Alexander, he conceded to him the full and entire realisation of the plans of Catherine, agreeing that Constantinople should be his in a few years, Ispahan and Persia in the course of time; they even spoke of the independence of Greece, and consequently of the possibility of an insurrection among the Hellenic and Syrian population. Napoleon had long revolved these projects in his mind; in fact, had not the general of the army of Egypt already had an idea of appealing to the Christian profession, as a means of rousing the Copts and Syrians against their Ottoman masters? Some maxims of liberty were to be attached to the Greek school of diplomacy, and they were brought forward some years afterwards at the congress of Vienna by Count Capo d'Istria.
The third diplomatic school, which was to a certain degree founded by Count Nesselrode, consisted in taking a middle course between the two former systems. The young Count had never been devoted to the plans proposed at Erfurt, and he did not for a moment allow himself to be carried away by the gigantic projects then determined upon in a moment of enthusiasm; he did not identify himself either with the Greek or the German school, nor even entirely with the Muscovite, in its repugnance for Napoleon. What Alexander particularly remarked was, the perfect obedience of his minister to all his wishes, though he sometimes strove to infuse a little moderation into his decisions, when their tendency was too abrupt or positive to be advisable in political affairs. Nesselrode always executed the orders of his sovereign, but in so doing he tempered the expressions of enthusiastic mysticism which often characterised the politics of the Czar; he did not attempt to give an impulse, but he endeavoured to prevent the will of his master from going too far.
The commencement of Count Nesselrode's favour dates especially from the French expedition to Russia. The movement, still more national than military, which repulsed this gigantic undertaking, naturally took its source from the old Muscovite families, and in the savage energy against which the Czars, ever since the days of Peter the Great, have struggled in vain; and Alexander, whose education and principles rendered him particularly averse to this return of barbarism, felt the need of a confidential friend, in whose bosom he might confide his fears of the results to be apprehended from this Muscovite tendency, which went beyond his own ideas and wishes. Count Nesselrode became one of these confidential servants, and as early as 1812, although he did not fill the official situation of conseiller d'état, he took the principal part in the prodigious diplomatic movement then in progress; he concluded and signed the treaty of the subsidies with England, and the secret alliance of the two great powers against Napoleon, which completed his political fortune.
The intimacy between Count Nesselrode and Prince Metternich began in the course of the negotiations at the congress of Prague. As I have before observed, it is impossible to institute a comparison between these diplomatists; Prince Metternich being the creator of a system, while Nesselrode was merely employed in executing, or perhaps in moderating an idea, which was not always his own. Count Nesselrode was not the official plenipotentiary at the congress of Prague, the full powers being entrusted to M. d'Anstett, a man of considerable ability, but hardly likely to be very favourably inclined to a peaceable system, for he was a French émigré; however, the impulse and the direction of the whole business emanated entirely from Alexander, and consequently from Count Nesselrode, the most faithful and devoted of his representatives. It was then, as we cannot but feel, of the greatest importance, to induce Austria to join the coalition of the Allies against Napoleon, for upon it depended the success of the campaign of Germany; but Metternich was far from being decided in favour of this step, and he wished to oblige them to purchase the co-operation of Austria at a very high price: the negotiations, however, were conducted with great ability by Count Nesselrode, and at the conclusion of the congress of Prague the alliance of Austria was well secured to the coalition. The Russian minister arranged in the name of his sovereign all the articles of this treaty, which calmed the fears of Austria, by assigning to her an advantageous frontier in Germany and Italy.
A new element had just manifested itself in the Russian diplomacy, General Pozzo di Borgo having arrived at head-quarters, after accomplishing his mission to Bernadotte, crown-prince of Sweden. Count Pozzo was the friend of the disaffected generals of the Empire; and his constant thought, and the master-passion of his soul, was his desire to bring about the ruin of his ancient rival, whom he considered as the oppressor of Europe. It was necessary for Count Nesselrode, if not exactly to contend with this influence over the mind of Alexander, at least not entirety to concur in it; for he, like Metternich, for a short time considered it might be possible to treat with Napoleon, and to impose such a degree of restraint upon his military power, as to prevent him from injuring the German independence, or the security of the interests and relations of the States. On this head Nesselrode perfectly agreed in the opinions of Alexander, who, during the campaign of 1813, was as far from desiring the downfall of Napoleon, as from wishing to interfere with the form of government in France; there was then quite enough to do in Germany, the Rhine had not yet been passed, and the question concerning the deposition of the French Emperor did not occur until 1814. Count Nesselrode having been present at the interview at Abo, between the Czar and Bernadotte, it was impossible he should be ignorant that questions had been raised concerning certain possible events, among which the chance of another form of government being established in France was spoken of. Those who have some knowledge of the state of the case, are well aware that nothing could be more vague and undecided than all that was settled in this interview, if we except the close alliance between Russia and Sweden, and certain decisions concerning their territorial claims. The Emperor Alexander conversed with Bernadotte about the plan of the campaign, and the state of the public mind in France, as well as concerning all the possibilities and chances that might be the consequence of the war; and Bernadotte in his turn naturally spoke of his grievances, and of the injuries which, as a Republican general, he had been exposed to from Napoleon, and for which he retained a strong dislike to him: but there was no talk of any change, and they entered into no positive agreement to overturn the sovereign who then reigned in France.