The Diplomatists of Europe

by M. Capefigue

During the campaign of 1814, there was as much activity in the negotiations as even in the military operations; and when the Allies had once passed the Rhine it was considered necessary diplomacy should follow all the phases of the war, so as to be ready to reply to the proposals that might be made by the Emperor of the French, and also to resolve all the difficulties they might encounter. The arrival of Lord Castlereagh on the Continent greatly facilitated the transactions regarding the subsidies and the equipment of the troops; and the treaty of Chaumont was signed by Count Nesselrode, as well as by the plenipotentiaries of the other allied powers. The ascendancy acquired by England just then was so great, that she may almost be said to have alone given the impulse and direction to all the acts of the cabinet; it must, however, be acknowledged, that as she furnished the sinews of war, it was very natural she should fix positively the use to which they were to be applied. Count Nesselrode arranged with Lord Castlereagh the method of issuing the pay of the troops, and the diplomatic result of the campaign.

The sad events of the war brought the Allies to Paris; and the moment was decisive for that portion of the senate which, under the direction of Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and Jaucourt, wished for the fall of Napoleon. A provisional government was established, after the occupation of the capital. There could be no hesitation in the choice of alliances, for the support of Alexander was indispensably necessary to accomplish the ruin of the imperial system, whose hour was come! For this purpose, however, it was essential to obtain the concurrence of Nesselrode, the minister who had signed all the diplomatic acts concluded in the last three years; and even had they considered him as a mere secretary (Alexander being accustomed to act very much for himself), they would naturally have been desirous of engaging him in the interests of the provisional government.

As soon as Alexander entered the French territory, the disaffected placed themselves in communication with his cabinet. I have already mentioned the mission of M. de Vitrolles, who, with a view to the restoration, had informed the Czar of the state of the public mind; and Count Nesselrode had hardly arrived in Paris before he was surrounded and assailed by a thousand conflicting intrigues and negotiations of all sorts, for the purpose of inducing his cabinet to decide in favour of the Bourbons. It was the general bent of the period, as the revolutionary principle had been that of a former era. The first steps taken by the Russian minister were full of caution; he wanted to feel his way and judge of the public feeling, and it was also necessary to induce Prince Schwartzenberg, who commanded the active army, to make an open demonstration in favour of the Bourbons; yet, at the same time, they were not quite certain what was the ultimate decision of Austria, and, more especially, of Prince Metternich. All the papers written about this time by Count Nesselrode bear evidence of this complicated situation; he, however, spoke in plain terms in an official letter addressed to M. Pasquier, that he might set at liberty some people arrested on account of the good cause, and this good cause was the restoration of Louis XVIII.

It was evident from this expression of opinions favourable to legitimate sovereignty, that the decision had been made before it was officially announced. Never, perhaps, at any time had more activity been displayed than at this period; Nesselrode must remember it as the most brilliant and busy part of his life. His salon never was empty; at one time Caulaincourt, with full powers from the Emperor, solicited peace; at another, the marshals of the empire stipulated for the rights of the army, and a special treaty for Napoleon; then, again, Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and De Jaucourt, came to press the Russian minister to put an end to all uncertainty by pronouncing the downfall of Buonaparte; and, finally, the royalists devoted to the Bourbons, such as Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, and De Vitrolles, endeavoured to obtain the triumph of the ancient dynasty.

After these various negotiations, the declaration of the Emperor Alexander, announcing to France that they would not treat with Napoleon, was agreed to in the cabinet. This remarkable declaration was drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo; it was printed by means of a hand-press at the hôtel of Prince Talleyrand, in the Rue St. Florentin, and thousands of copies were thrown from the balconies. It was a great party stroke for the house of Bourbon, for from that time its cause was secure. It has been reported that the resolution of Count Nesselrode was decided by immense diplomatic presents; but one should generally regard with distrust the various stories that are current after political events have been accomplished: there is less corruption than people imagine in public business. At the same time it is very probable that some gratitude would be manifested after so important an act; secret presents almost invariably accompany the signature of stipulations in all diplomatic transactions—it is an old custom, and, no doubt, the value of these presents was increased in consequence of the immense importance of the service rendered; but this is all that historical impartiality can say on the subject.

This season of 1814 was very brilliant for Count Nesselrode; there was nothing at Paris but fêtes and flowers. The moderation of Russia had swayed all the resolutions and softened the conditions of victory, and the Emperor Alexander enjoyed a great reputation as the symbol of peace and the expression of magnanimity in the midst of triumph. England and Austria were quite cast into the shade, nobody was spoken of but Alexander, and this celebrity was reflected upon Count Nesselrode in so great a degree as to occasion a feeling of jealousy in Metternich, who had hardly any thing to do with the transactions at Paris in 1814. The Austrian minister awaited his turn at the congress of Vienna. The first occupation of our capital was the apogée of the moral omnipotence of Russia in the affairs of southern Europe.

Here it is necessary I should mention all the difficulties of Nesselrode's situation. Nothing could be more changeable and more prone to sudden impressions than the mind of Alexander, who passed from one enthusiastic fancy to another with inconceivable rapidity; when he had taken up one idea it was difficult to put it out of his head; and if you followed in the same track, some time afterwards he would meet with some other fancy, which he adopted with equal warmth. We may, therefore, imagine how difficult was the part of a secretary of state desirous of giving some consistency to these projects, of classing them in a certain order, and of producing any result from them all. From the close of 1813, Alexander had been deeply imbued with the mysticism of Madame Krüdner, and he mingled with his manifestoes on the principles of Europe, and his theories of peace and war, a species of ascetic worship and enthusiastic superstition very difficult to translate or apply to the real business of life, and of which the ultimate object was not always understood by powers like England and Austria.

At the congress of Vienna they had to treat of serious affairs, and it was necessary to give a positive meaning to the vague conceptions of Alexander, and translate theories into treaties. Poland was occupied by a Russian army, and the diplomatists of the old Muscovite school, in hopes this occupation would become permanent, pressed the annexation of Poland to Russia, without a constitution or any free state privileges. Alexander, who was desirous of wearing the crown of Poland, was entirely opposed to these demands, and wanted to collect the ruins of that kingdom into one system of political organisation; and Count Nesselrode faithfully executed this idea of his sovereign at the congress of Vienna. The question of Poland was his sole anxiety, as the integrality of Saxony and the restoration of the House of Bourbon at Naples was the exclusive thought of Prince Talleyrand.

At the congress of Vienna Nesselrode formed an intimacy with Prince Hardenberg. Russia had supported the pretensions of Prussia, the States had been bound to each other by means of political and family arrangements, and, for the future, Prussia was destined to act as the advanced guard of Russia, in her projects of influence over the south of Europe. Russia was too busy with her own affairs to observe the sort of underhand alliance forming between England, France, and Austria, against Alexander's design of instituting a kingdom in Poland, dependent on a viceroyalty of the czars. Nesselrode had to contend at once with Metternich and Hardenberg, who were both afraid of seeing the portion of Poland that had accrued to them at the time of the first partition escape from their grasp; Austria fearing for Gallicia, and Prussia for the districts beyond the Vistula. The other opposition the Russian minister had to overcome was, as I have before observed, that of the old Muscovite families, who murmured at seeing the organisation of Poland with an independent constitution and a degree of national liberty. Great difficulty existed in this quarter, although Nesselrode had not entered as warmly into this project as his sovereign had done, but had taken a middle course, in order to avoid a misfortune with which he had at one time appeared threatened.