[72] 24th Div Opns Rpt Leyte, p. 51. [↑]
CHAPTER XIII
The Mountain Barrier: Part Two
By the middle of November both the Americans and the Japanese realized that the struggle for the island of Leyte was going to be long and costly—far longer and costlier than either had anticipated.
On 9 and 10 November, Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, the senior officer of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, held a series of conferences on the progress of the campaign. General Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th Area Army, strongly urged that the Leyte operation be discontinued and offered reasons for this stand: There was little likelihood that additional reinforcements would reach the Philippines, and the vital manpower needed for the defense of Luzon would be drained off uselessly at Leyte. The naval battle of Leyte Gulf, he also thought, had been “unsatisfactory” and there was reason to believe that the air battle off Formosa had been equally disappointing. The shortage of shipping and escort strength greatly aggravated the already difficult problem of troop transportation. Finally, the land operations were not proceeding favorably.[1] But Yamashita’s superior, Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding general of the Southern Army, insisted that the reinforcement program be continued and that the battle for Leyte be brought to a successful conclusion. General Yamashita is said to have replied, “I fully understand your intention. I will carry it out to a successful end.”[2]
Reinforcements
At the same time General Krueger was anxious to complete the third phase of the American campaign, the two-pronged drive toward the port of Ormoc. He felt, however, that there were insufficient troops to both protect the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and make the drives toward Ormoc.
In preparing for the Leyte Campaign, General Krueger had asked that the units which were to participate be embarked with a 10 percent overstrength. This request was disapproved. Just before the embarkation, however, he received 5,000 untrained replacements.[3] He had also requested that during the course of the operation 18,800 replacements be delivered to the combat zone, the first 10,000 to arrive by A plus 10. During the first thirty days of the operation he would need the following replacements: 14,300 Infantry, 1,300 Field Artillery, 1,130 Corps of Engineers, 750 Medical Corps, 375 Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Artillery, 185 Quartermaster Corps, 185 Ordnance, 185 Signal, and all others 375. Approximately 6 percent of these should be officers.[4]