Table 1—Sixth Army Daily Strength Reports, 12 November-25 December 1944
| Date | Authorized strength | DifferenceBetween Effective and Authorized Strength | ||
| Officers | Enlisted Men | Officers | Enlisted Men | |
| 12 Nov 1944 | 6,978 | 107,461 | -1,050 | -11,754 |
| 19 Nov 1944 | 9,290 | 147,497 | -1,099 | -15,058 |
| 26 Nov 1944 | 11,977 | 185,462 | -1,603 | -17,977 |
| 2 Dec 1944 | 11,637 | 191,060 | -1,819 | -19,012 |
| 9 Dec 1944 | 10,721 | 174,148 | -1,194 | -18,261 |
| 16 Dec 1944 | 10,905 | 176,466 | -1,361 | -21,059 |
| 25 Dec 1944 | 11,019 | 176,628 | -1,228 | -22,536 |
Source: Sixth Army Operations Report Leyte, 20 October–25 December 1944, p. 153.
As the fighting extended into the mountains, the lack of sufficient replacements began to be greatly felt. At no time did General Krueger know when replacements would arrive, or whether they would be combat or service troops, or what their individual specialties would be. During the course of the operation he received only 336 officers and 4,953 enlisted men as replacements.
To add to these difficulties, General MacArthur’s headquarters used figures for “assigned strength” rather than “effective strength,” that is, the number actually present with a unit, in computing the need for replacements. Such figures gave an entirely erroneous picture, since evacuations were to change rapidly the figures for medical installations, and dispositions reports were delayed for long periods. For example, on 12 November the assigned strength of the Sixth Army was only 289 officers and 1,874 enlisted men short of its Table of Organization strength, but its effective strength was 1,050 officers and 11,754 enlisted men short of the Table of Organization strength. By 20 December this shortage had pyramided to about 21,000—considerably more than a division. (Table 1) General Krueger was seriously concerned about the situation, especially since nearly 79 percent of the casualties occurred in the infantry.[5]
Fortunately, the 32d and 77th Infantry Divisions—the Sixth Army reserve—were due to come in soon or had already done so, and there were on the island additional units that were to have used Leyte as a shipping area for subsequent operations. The availability of the 11th Airborne Division, under Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, and the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team,[6] under General Cunningham, was most timely. They could be used to help guard the mountain passes into Leyte Valley and also to give support to the drive of X Corps south down the Ormoc Valley.
At the same time General Krueger proposed that as soon as there were sufficient troops and supplies available, an amphibious landing be made near Ormoc to capture the town. This operation would speedily reduce the Japanese opposition south of Ormoc, cut the enemy’s line of communication at Ormoc, and place the hostile forces in Ormoc Valley “in a vise which could shortly squeeze them into extermination.”[7]
The supporting naval forces, however, could not make available sufficient assault and resupply shipping to mount and support such an operation. The Navy also thought that there was insufficient air support on the island to insure the safe arrival of a convoy into Ormoc Bay. There was a strong possibility that severe losses might result from the suicide bombing techniques of the Japanese pilots. General Krueger therefore set aside his plan until it could be introduced at a more opportune time.[8] When the 11th Airborne Division arrived, General Krueger could attach it to the XXIV Corps in southern Leyte. General Hodge could then relieve some of the troops that had been guarding the mountain entrances into the valley and also send additional support to the troops on the shores of Ormoc Bay, thus enabling the XXIV Corps to launch a strong drive toward Ormoc from the south.
General Krueger originally had planned to have the 32d Division, under Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, establish control over southern Samar, but in view of the limited number of Japanese on that island, he decided to make use of the division to add momentum to the attack of X Corps and to give rest to the weary troops of the 24th Division.[9] On 14 November General Krueger therefore directed General Sibert to relieve the units of the 24th Division with elements of the 32d Division. At the same time, the 112th Cavalry was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division in order to give impetus to the attack.[10]