In the meantime two carrying parties from Consuegra entered the perimeter of the battalion with food and ammunition. One carried the “Thanksgiving ration of roast turkey and ... fresh eggs.” The battalion therefore hoped for “a good meal” if the situation permitted.[45]
Colonel Clifford urgently requested General Gill to send reinforcements. At 1325 Gill told Clifford that he had ordered the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, 32d Division, to proceed to Kilay Ridge immediately and come under Clifford’s control. Colonel Clifford forcibly reopened the trail to Company C and had food and ammunition brought into the forward position. A short time later, Company G, 128th Infantry, arrived and Clifford immediately committed it to reinforce Company C. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, 128th Infantry, arrived at 1835 and was held in reserve. (See [Map 14].)
The action for 1 December began at 0800 when a patrol from Company B proceeded down a draw to the west of Kilay Ridge. The patrol was to swing wide and approach the right rear almost directly south of the enemy-held knolls on Kilay Ridge. These were thought to be the Japanese strong points and were the objectives for the day. A preparatory concentration from supporting artillery and from mortars of both battalions was first laid. The heavy machine gun section of the 128th Infantry moved into the draw to the west and set up its guns on the right flank of the ridge in order to be in a position to fire across the face of the ridge when the main assault began. Company E of the 128th Infantry then passed through Company C and launched an attack against the Japanese-held knolls on the southeastern end of the ridge. Heavy and light machine gun fire from Company C protected the flanks of Company E.
The company took the first knoll easily, but heavy fire from behind a huge log on the second knoll halted Company E. Company A sent a bazooka team forward to knock out the position and Company C sent all of its grenades forward, but by 1320 the Japanese soldiers were still resisting all attempts to dislodge them. The patrol from Company B returned at 1345 with the report that it had been to the rear of its objective and had seen no enemy activity. No unit made any further progress that day. At 1720 General Gill ordered Colonel Clifford to withdraw the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry.[46]
At 0925 on 2 December, Company E, 128th Infantry, attacked the knolls at the south tip of Kilay Ridge, while Company F moved down the ridge and swung to the right to attack the ridge to the south—the objective of the two-battalion assault. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, withdrew one unit, but at 1245 Colonel Clifford received orders to halt all further withdrawals pending orders from the commanding officer, 128th Infantry. By then Company E had taken its objective but Company F had encountered determined resistance fifty yards from the top of the ridge. It doggedly advanced and by 1625 reached the crest and dug in, though still receiving hostile mortar fire.
The next day examination of the battlefield where the two battalions had been fighting revealed numerous enemy dead and the following abandoned equipment: three 70-mm. mountain guns, four heavy machine guns, seventeen light machine guns, one 90-mm. mortar, and many rifles, pistols, sabers, and field glasses. Documents containing valuable intelligence were also found. On 4 December the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, started to withdraw. During the next two days elements of the battalion moved through Consuegra and Calubian to Pinamopoan. The battalion had lost 26 men killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, but it estimated that it had killed 900 men of the 1st Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had acquitted itself well. It had prevented the Japanese from reinforcing the Limon forces and imperiling the 32d Division. For its work the battalion received the presidential unit citation.
Central Mountain Range
1st Cavalry Division
As elements of the X Corps were pushing south on Highway 2 through Breakneck Ridge, other units from the corps were engaged in securing the central mountain range that divided Leyte and Ormoc Valleys in order to prevent any Japanese forces from debouching into Leyte Valley. General Suzuki had ordered the 1st Division commander to place the 57th Infantry in the Limon area while the 1st and 49th Infantry Regiments were to go to the central mountain range. The two regiments last mentioned were to prevent any American attempts to infiltrate into Ormoc Valley and to exploit any favorable opportunity to break through into Leyte Valley. About 8 November the 102d Division, including its signal, artillery, and engineer units, arrived at Ormoc and General Suzuki immediately sent them into the mountains of central Leyte.[47]