Leyte: The Return to the Philippines

by M. Hamlin Cannon

General Krueger had already anticipated this movement and had stationed elements of the X and XXIV Corps at the principal entrances into Leyte Valley. On 10 November General Mudge sent elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to patrol the area extensively.[48]

The northern mountains between Ormoc and Leyte Valleys were high and rugged, with precipitous sides. The area was heavily forested, and there were many ground pockets which constituted natural, heavily wooded fortresses for the Japanese. The very few trails in the sector were scarcely better than pig trails. The area had not been properly mapped and at all times the troops were seriously handicapped by insufficient knowledge of the terrain. The nearly constant rainfall bogged down supply and made the sides of the hills slippery and treacherous. From 5 November through 2 December, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division extensively patrolled the central mountain area and had many encounters with small forces of the enemy. At all times the supply situation was precarious.

The 1st Cavalry Division utilized motor transport, LVT’s, tractors and trailers, native carriers, and airdrops to get supplies to forward troops. Motor transport hauled supplies from the warehouses in Tacloban to Carigara, a distance of thirty miles. At this point LVT’s of the 826th Amphibian Tractor Battalion hauled the supplies, through rice paddies churned into waist-deep morasses, to Sugud, three miles south of Carigara. The supplies were manhandled from the LVT’s into one-ton two-wheeled cargo and ammunition trailers, which were towed by the tractors of the artillery battalions that fired in support of the division. The tractors wound their way laboriously into the foothills through boulder-strewn streams and up steep inclines that made it necessary for the tractors to be arranged in tandem. There was always mud, which made traction difficult, and the LVT’s were better able than the tractors to navigate through slick, soft mud which had little body texture.

The 12th Cavalry established high in the foothills, at the entrance to the passes through the mountains, a supply base that was also a native camp, a hospital, and a rest camp. About 300 Filipino carriers were kept here under the protection of the guerrillas. The carriers had been hired for six days at a time and were not allowed to leave without a pass from their Filipino leader. This precaution was necessary, since the ration-carrying assignment was extremely arduous.

FILIPINO CARRIERS HAUL SUPPLIES over slippery mountain trails for the 12th Cavalry.

Under armed escort, the long train of carriers, two men to each fifty-pound load of rations, ammunition, and other types of supply, began immediately to struggle forward from the supply camp over narrow, slippery trails, across waist-deep rivers and streams, and through heavy undergrowth. In the never-ending climb to gain altitude, it took five hours to traverse a track that measured less than three miles. At the base of a vertical descent of more than 500 feet, there was a second supply base, the relay station. From this station it was another day’s forced march to the forward troops. An additional 300 Filipinos were stationed at the relay station in the mountain wilderness, surrounded by elements of the enemy. These carriers made the last half of the tortuous journey, while the others returned to the base camp for resupply. It took four days to get supplies from the warehouses to the front-line troops.[49]

The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, under General Cunningham, had arrived at Leyte on 14 November.[50] At this time the 21st Infantry was advancing very slowly along Breakneck Ridge, against strong resistance, and the units of the 1st Cavalry Division were spread thinly over the central mountain area.[51] In order to strengthen the defense line, the 112th Cavalry was committed upon its arrival and passed to the control of X Corps.[52] On 15 November General Sibert attached the 112th Cavalry to the 1st Cavalry Division and ordered it to operate in the Carigara area.[53] General Mudge directed the 112th Cavalry to assume, on 16 November, the responsibility for beach defenses in the Capoocan-Carigara-Barugo area and to mop up in the Mt. Minoro area about 3,000 yards south of Capoocan.[54]

The 112th Cavalry patrolled the Mt. Minoro area until 22 November. In accord with General Krueger’s desire to relieve some of the pressure that was being exerted against the 32d Division in its drive south down Highway 2, General Mudge on 23 November ordered the 112th Cavalry to move southwest from Mt. Minoro toward the highway. The combat team encountered sporadic resistance and on the morning of 30 November reached a ridge about 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000 yards southeast of Limon.[55] A strongly entrenched enemy force on the ridge resisted all attempts of the 112th Cavalry to dislodge it.

The ridge was covered with a dense rain forest, and the lower slopes were thickly spotted with bamboo thickets and other extremely dense vegetation. Clouds covered the tops of the peak and rain fell almost continuously, churning the ground into ankle-deep mud. Visibility was limited to only a few yards. The enemy defensive field works consisted of foxholes, prone shelters, communication trenches, and palm-log bunkers. These positions presented no logical avenue of approach. They were complete perimeters and employed all-round mutually supporting automatic weapons fire. Although the fields of fire were limited, the weapons were so effectively placed that they covered all approaches.[56]