The Japanese during the summer of 1944 anticipated that the United States forces would return to the Philippine Islands, but when and where were two questions for which not even Tokyo Rose, the Japanese radio propagandist, had the answers. Consequently, the Japanese wished to keep their troops sufficiently mobile that reinforcements might be rushed to the point of contact. The original plan called for the main defensive effort of the ground forces to be made on Luzon, since there were too few Japanese troops in the archipelago to defend all of the Philippines. The Japanese Navy and Air Forces, however, were to carry out “decisive” actions in the central and southern Philippines.[36]
To General Kuroda fell the task of making and executing plans for the defense of the Philippines by the 14th Area Army. General Kuroda was essentially a realist. He stated in June 1947 that in October 1944 he had told Maj. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief of Army Intelligence, Imperial General Headquarters, that “it would be best for Japan to negotiate an immediate peace before the Americans could destroy our nation by air power.”[37] Kuroda thought that all available land forces should be concentrated in the Luzon area in order to counterattack any American landing within the Luzon perimeter. However, because of their predominant aerial strength, the Americans in their next attempt could unless they made “some terrible mistake ... land in force and once ashore, could take the Philippines.”[38] General Kuroda’s plan was never considered. Imperial General Headquarters’ plan for the defense of the Philippines called for the employment of ten divisions and five brigades: five divisions and two brigades in Luzon, four divisions and two brigades in the southern Philippines, and one division and one brigade in China and Formosa. The two units last mentioned would be rushed to the Philippines as soon as the American landing became imminent.[39] When the Americans landed, all of these units, acting in concert, were to participate in fighting a decisive battle against the American troops. This plan was never carried out in its entirety.
The Japanese occupation troops of the Philippine Islands had grown soft and had “no particular will to fight.” In the spring of 1944, there were only minor units available to set up an organized defense.
Imperial General Headquarters and the Southern Army thought that because of the many islands in the archipelago emphasis should be placed on air power. Air attacks could destroy the American forces before they arrived at the landing areas or at least before they could make appreciable gains. The way could then be opened to turn a defense into an offensive.[40] General Kuroda threw cold water on this plan by bluntly stating:
That concept is good, but you cannot fight with concept alone. Words alone will not sink American ships and that becomes clear when you compare our airplanes with theirs. That is why the major battles have been occurring on land. We can say that the power of our air force is negligible at this time. No matter how much the Fourteenth Army devotes their efforts toward air power, in actuality, should there be a decisive fight, they must fight on land. The preparation and conduct of an operation, and the responsibilities thereof cannot be conducted by airplanes and air units. The land army should initiate its own preparations. For example, for what purpose were the group of air bases constructed at Davao and Tacloban? Even though they are built, they aren’t used. It amounts to construction for the use of the enemy.[41]
During the month of August, the Japanese devoted their main efforts toward strengthening the air force. After the first of September more emphasis was placed on building up the ground troops while the air preparations continued to some extent. The Southern Army in late August ordered about one half of a division to Sarangani and one division to Davao against the wishes of the 14th Area Army. This meant a reshuffling of the troops that had been moving and repairing defenses since the first part of August. “The order was carried out begrudgingly.”[42]
Lt Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, the commander of the 35th Army, thinking that the American Army would land on 1 October, said: “Contrary to what has been announced by General Headquarters our air force cannot be prepared and equipped in time, nor can the Combined Fleet be depended upon. The situation grows worse and for this reason the land force preparations must be hastened. Yet, in spite of that, we must not discourage the air forces and should do as much as possible to prepare aggressive aerial opposition.”[43]
In the middle of September, Imperial General Headquarters decided to replace General Kuroda with General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander.[44] Lt. Col. Seiichi Yoshie of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident:
Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax.
On 4 September 1944, I left Tokyo under orders ... to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita ... who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.[45]