[236] The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category viśesha does reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludes tantutva, and "existing in intimate relation" excludes ether, &c.
[237] Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.
[238] The viruddha-hetu is that which is never found where the major term is.
[239] This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term."
[240] For the upádhi cf. pp. 7, 8.
[241] As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault of áśrayásiddhi, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."
[242] If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, vikalpaparáhatatvát, and then begin the next clause with syád etat. The printed text, vikalpaparáhataḥ syát tad etat, seems unintelligible.
[243] The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body (viráj).
[244] The usual reading is tasthur for tasthe.
[245] For these divisions of the anyonyáśraya fallacy, see Nyáyasútra vṛitti, i. 39 (p. 33).