[246] For tívra cf. Yoga sútras, i. 21, 22.
CHAPTER XII.
THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA.
An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that merit (dharma) comes from the practice of duty (dharma), but how is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older[247] Mímáṃsá by the holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímáṃsá consists of twelve books.[248] In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (vidhi), "explanatory passage" (arthaváda), hymn (mantra), tradition (smṛiti), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions [as e.g., on apúrva] relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the third, Śruti, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (liṅga), "context" (vákya), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called pratipatti-karmáṇi, things mentioned incidentally (anárabhyádhíta), things accessory to several main objects, as prayájas, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the juhú being made of the butea frondosa, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which form subordinate parts of the rájasúya sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different passages of Śruti, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the vájapeya], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of Śruti, order of mention, &c., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the sattra offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed "sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (úha), the adaptation of sámans and mantras, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with the graha offerings, certain sámans, and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of tantra[249] [where several acts are combined into one], and ávápa [or the performing an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a discussion on prasaṅga [where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference], tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (samuchchaya) and option.
Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the Púrva-Mímáṃsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee">[. Now the learned describe a "topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (a.) the subject, (b.) the doubt, (c.) the primâ facie argument, (d.) the demonstrated conclusion, and (e.) the connection (saṅgati). The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is whether the study of Jaimini's śástra concerning duty, beginning with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the anváhárya," is to be commenced or not. The primâ facie argument is that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit. (a.) If you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit, and this can be no other[250] than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251] It cannot be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the baked flour cake called puroḍása is made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which is the principal apúrva, by means of the various minor effects or subordinate apúrvas, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony; and consequently the minor apúrva of the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Púrva Mímáṃsá as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda. (b.) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the present case also. As it has been said—
"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the analogy of the Viśvajit, &c."
Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛiti rule from being violated: "Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the Mímáṃsá discussions, and thus the idea of no interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three reasons, (a.) that the study of Mímáṃsá is not enjoined, (b.) that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (c.) that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintain that the study of the Mímáṃsá discussions on duty is not to be commenced.
The "authoritative conclusion" (siddhánta), however, is as follows:—