[266] The Mímáṃsaka allows that the uchcháraṇa or utterance is non-eternal.
[267] The inference will be as follows: "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, &c."
[268] The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, &c."
[269] In assuming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.
[270] The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments (atiśayáḥ) in their saints.
[271] Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.
[272] "What is meant by 'noise' (náda) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."—Ballantyne, Mímáṃsá Aphorisms, i. 17.
[273] The Nyáya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether, each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.
[274] In p. 131, line 7, I read pratyakshásiddheḥ.
[275] Cf. my note pp. 7, 8, (on the Chárváka-darśana) for the upádhi. The upádhi or "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle." Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire," the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyáya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense") is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, e.g., in sound itself, according to the Mímáṃsá doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the "condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which, while not causing audition, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Púrva Mímáṃsá and the Nyáya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.