[276] In the former case we have the dhwaṃsa of sound, in the latter its prágabháva.
[277] In p. 131, line 12, I read samapauhi for samápohi, i.e., the passive aorist of sam + apa + úh.
[278] I do not know this legend. Tála and Betála are the two demons who carry Vikramáditya on their shoulders in the Siṃhásan-battísí. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.
[279] This is probably a work by Bhásarvajña (see Dr. Hall's Bibl. Index, p. 26).
[280] Dhvani, or our "articulate noise," produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I take saṃskṛita here as equivalent to abhivyakta.
[281] I read in p. 131, line 15, saṃskárakasaṃskáryabhávábhávánumánam.
[282] It would be a case of vyabhichára. The Naiyáyika argument would seem to be something as follows:—Sound is not thus manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the Mímáṃsá rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.
[283] Here begins a long púrva-paksha, from p. 131, line 18, down to p. 133, line 9; see p. 198 infra.
[284] This is Prabhákara's view (see Siddh. Muktáv., p. 118). The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar;" the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (prámáṇya), which resides in it as its characteristic.
[285] Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities; now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is, right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.