[286] The eye, &c., would be its instrumental causes.
[287] The first three categories "substance," "quality," and "action," are called játis or species; the last four, "genus," "viśesha," "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called upádhis or "general characteristics."
[288] The Púrva Mímáṃsá denies that recollection is right knowledge.
[289] Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, &c.) which produced right knowledge, but by these together with a "defect," as biliousness, distance &c.
[290] Scil. if there be doshábháva there is pramá; if not, not. In p. 132, line 20, I read doshábhávatvena for doshábhávasahakṛitatvena.
[291] Anyathásiddhatvam means niyatapúrvavartitve sati anávaśyakatvam.
[292] Scil. or the absence of "defect," doshábháva.
[293] Wrong knowledge has doshábháva or the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.
[294] Wrongness of knowledge (apramátva) can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as, e.g., the potter's stick, &c.), but it is not produced by these other causes in combination with being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge (with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced-by-any-other-instrumental-causes-than-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.
[295] I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long púrva-paksha.