[296] These words "and is other than defect" (dosha-vyatirikta) are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned; they are simply added to enable the author to bring in "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledge plus "defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.
[297] The Nyáya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, &c., in the eye, and right knowledge by a guṇa or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."
[298] The guṇa (or βελτἱστη ἕξις of an organ is not properly a cause of pramá but rather doshábháva-bodhaka.
[299] Scil. "doubtful" (sandigdha) and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" (niśchitáprámáṇya).
[300] Utsarga is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," &c.
[301] The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception, i.e., its authoritativeness or prámáṇya.
[302] This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumáñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6?).
[303] I read tat-práchuryam for tatpráchurye in p. 134, line 7.
[304] This stanza affirms that according to the Mímáṃsá school, while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, &c.)
[305] I take vyutpatti here as used for śakti; siddhe means ghaṭádau.