[45] I correct the reading tasyágrahaṇaṃ to tasyá grahaṇaṃ (tasyá being jaḍatáyáḥ).
[46] I.e., if you say that the avayava may be not seen though the avayavin is seen, then I may say that the post is the avayavin, and the unperceived three worlds its avayava!
[47] I read arhatsvarúpam arhachchandra in p. 27, line 3, infra.
[48] The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching. Jainagurumukhát kaśchid vidyáleśo játaḥ.
[49] Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs,—the sixth, abháva, being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" or arthá-patti. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.
[50] In p. 29, line 2, read tatsadbhávávedakasya for tatsadbhávádekasya.
[51] In p. 29, line 9, for nikhilárthajñanát notpatty, I propose to read nikhilárthajñánotpatty.
[52] Janya is included in Kárya and equally disputed.
[53] Thus "I am possessed of a body" (aham Śarírí), "my hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."
[54] Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes the Anavasthádosha or reasoning ad infinitum. He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.