[63]. “Men dwelling amidst the snows of Russia are driven by very nature to grow covetous when they hear of the happier lands where all the year round there are roses and long sunny days. And since this people have a seaboard and ports on the Euxine, they are forced by an everlasting policy to desire the command of the straits which lead through the heart of an empire into the midst of that world of which men kindle thoughts when they speak of the Ægean and of Greece, and the Ionian shores, and of Palestine and Egypt, and of Italy, and of France, and of Spain, and the land of the Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and the path of ships on the ocean” (Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. i. p. 54).
[64]. Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. i. p. 90.
[65]. The Grand Vizier said the mission was meant “to win some important right from Turkey, which would destroy her independence, and that the Czar’s object was to trample under foot the rights of the Porte and the independence of the Sovereign” (Kinglake’s “Invasion of the Crimea,” vol. i. p. 99).
[66]. “That the Sultan’s promise to protect his Christian subjects in the free exercise of their religion differed extremely from a right conferred on any foreign Power to enforce that protection, and also the same degree of interference might be dangerous to the Porte when exercised by so powerful an empire as Russia, on behalf of ten millions of Greeks” (Lord Stratford’s view).
[67]. “When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting the modifications we found that he interpreted the Note in a manner quite different from ourselves, and in a great degree justified the objections of Turks. We could not therefore honestly continue to give an interpretation to the Note, and ask the Turks again to sign it, when we knew that the interpretation of the Emperor is entirely different” (Lord Sheridan’s letter to Earl Russel, Sept. 22, 1853).
[68]. “I thought the Emperor Alexander had shown considerable moral courage in making peace after the Crimean War, contrary to the general feeling in Russia, and Prince D—— gave me the following curious details of what occurred on that occasion, which he said had been related to him by one of the Ministers present:—The Emperor called a Council of War at St. Petersburg, which was composed of the following members: Prince Dolgorouky, Minister of War; the Grand Duke Constantine, Minister of Marine; M. de Broek, Minister of Finance; Count Blondoff, Prince Moronzow, and, I think, M. Lapouchine, Minister of the Interior. The Emperor first called on the Minister of War to report on the state of the army, and he said the resources were exhausted, that more recruiting was almost impossible, and that he did not see how the war could be continued. The Emperor next addressed himself to his brother, who, together with Count Blondoff, was in favour of continuing hostilities at all risks. The Emperor asked what was the state of the navy? The Grand Duke answered, ‘Sire, we have a fleet in the Baltic, and another in the Black Sea.’ The Emperor acquiesced, but added, ‘True; but those fleets have never left our harbours. Are they fit to oppose the English and French fleets?’ The Grand Duke was obliged to reply in the negative. ‘Then,’ said the Emperor, ‘it appears we have no army and no fleet?’ The Grand Duke sighed, looked down, but made no answer. The Emperor next addressed the Minister of Finance, and asked what report he could give. He said, ‘Sire, we have just made one disadvantageous loan, upon conditions imposed upon us at Hamburg, and I believe another to be impossible.’ The Emperor then addressed the Council, and said, ‘Gentlemen, it appears from what we have just heard that we have neither army, navy, nor money; how, then, is it possible for me to continue the war?’ Count Blondoff then stepped forward and said, with deep emotion, ‘Sire, after the report we have just heard, it is clear that your Majesty is forced to make peace, but at the same time you must dismiss your incompetent Ministers, who have not known how to serve either your father or yourself—dismiss us all.’ The consternation of the other members of the Council at this outburst was great, but peace was signed forthwith” (Lady Bloomfield’s “Court and Diplomatic Life”).
[69]. A letter to Lord Clarendon, May 22, 1853.
[70]. The strength of Lord Palmerston’s character and his determination in matters of ready action is well illustrated through an incident recorded by Baron Bunsen (“Memoirs of Bunsen”): “Bunsen and Palmerston had elected to be rowed over to Portsmouth from Osborne, when guests of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and, the weather being rough, the Foreign Minister took the helm, demonstrating the connection between steering the vessel of State, as Bunsen phrased it, and steering a boat at sea—‘Oh, one learns boating at Cambridge, even though one may have learnt nothing better,’ remarked Lord Palmerston; and guide the craft safely to shore he certainly did. But when they landed, alas! the train was gone.”
[71]. Gladstone’s speech, May 8, 1854.
[72]. “Napoleon’s object was clear: in the first place, to wrest from the Emperor Nicholas the moral hegemony which he wielded on the Continent, and then, after conquering Russia, to get his hands free to tear up the treaties of 1815, restore to France her so-called natural frontiers, and reconstruct the map of Europe in accordance with Napoleonic ideas” (Count Vitzthum’s “St. Petersburg and London,” vol. i. p. 73).