[§37]. To cope thoroughly with the extraordinary difficulties of this section the student must read the whole of the chapters on Stoic ethics in Zeller and Ritter and Preller. There is no royal road to the knowledge, which it would be absurd to attempt to convey in these notes. Assuming a general acquaintance with Stoic ethics, I set out the difficulties thus: Cic. appears at first sight to have made the αποπροηγμενα a subdivision of the ληπτα (sumenda), the two being utterly different. I admit, with Madv. (D.F. III. 50), that there is no reason for suspecting the text to be corrupt, the heroic remedy of Dav., therefore, who reads media in the place of sumenda, must be rejected. Nor can anything be said for Goerenz's plan, who distorts the Stoic philosophy in order to save Cicero's consistency. On the other hand, I do not believe that Cic. could so utterly misunderstand one of the cardinal and best known doctrines of Stoicism, as to think even for a moment that the αποπροηγμενα formed a branch of the ληπτα. This view of Madvig's is strongly opposed to the fact that Cic. in [36] had explained with perfect correctness the Stoic theory of the αδιαφορα, nor is there anywhere in the numerous passages where he touches on the theory any trace of the same error. My explanation is that Cic. began with the intention to speak of the sumenda only and then rapidly extended his thought so as to embrace the whole class of αδιαφορα, which he accordingly dealt with in the latter part of the same sentence and in the succeeding sentence. (The remainder has its own difficulties, which I defer for the present.) Cic. therefore is chargeable not with ignorance of Stoicism but with careless writing. A striking parallel occurs in D.F. III. 52, quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγμενα id est producta nominentur, quae vel ita appellemus, vel promota et remota. If this language be closely pressed, the αποπροηγμενα are made of a subdivision of the προηγμενα, though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have had that intention. So if his words in D.F. V. 90 be pressed, the sumenda are made to include both producta and reducta, in D.F. III. 16 appeterent includes fugerent, ibid. II. 86 the opposite of beata vita is abruptly introduced. So D.F. II. 88 frui dolore must be construed together, and ibid. II. 73 pudor modestia pudicitia are said coerceri, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to the vices which are opposite to these virtues.
I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by ex iis Cic. means mediis, and not sumendis, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that pluris aestimanda and minoris aestimanda simply indicate the αξια and απαξια of the Greek, not different degrees of αξια (positive value). That minor aestimatio should mean απαξια need not surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this απαξια or negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on [36]; (2) on the strong negative meaning which minor bears in Latin, e.g. sin minus in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks fall victims to the task of expressing απαξια. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours makes ελαττων αξια equivalent to πολλη απαξια (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining αποπροηγμενα as τα ‛ικανην απαξιαν εχοντα (Adv. Math. XI. 62—64) again speaks of them as τα μη ‛ικανην εχοντα αξιαν (Pyrrhon. Hypot. III. 191) words which usually have an opposite meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words minoris aestimanda bear quite as strong a negative meaning as the phrase of Sextus, τα μη ‛ικανην αξιαν εχοντα. I therefore conclude that Cicero has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the αδιαφορα, some have αξια while others have απαξια. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words the rule "re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus" (D.F. III. 52). There is quite as good ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms ‛ικανη αξια and ‛ικανη απαξια which are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the passages of the D.F. quoted in this note. Non tam rebus quam vocabulis: Cic. frequently repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. Inter recte factum atque peccatum: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of τα μεταξυ αρετης και κακιας. (This does not contradict his words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, αρετης δε και κακιας ουδεν μεταξυ, which have regard to divisions of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see R. and P. 393.) Recte factum = κατορθωμα, peccatum = ‛αμαρτημα, officium = καθηκον (cf. R. and P. 388—394, Zeller 238—248, 268—272). Servata praetermissaque: MSS. have et before servata, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where et and que correspond in Cic., the que is always an afterthought, added in oblivion of the et. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate clauses it is possible. Cf. [43] and M.D.F. V. 64.
[§38]. Sed quasdam virtutes: see [20]. This passage requires careful construing: after quasdam virtutes not the whole phrase in ratione esse dicerent must be repeated but dicerent merely, since only the virtutes natura perfectae, the διανοητικαι αρεται of Arist., could be said to belong to the reason, while the virtutes more perfectae are Aristotle's ηθικαι αρεται. Trans. "but spoke of certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." Ea genera virtutum: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. T.D. II. 47, and Arist. το μεν ‛ως λογον εχον, το δε επιπειθες λογωι); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name ‛ηγεμονικον (Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, D.F. III. passim). When the ‛ηγεμονικον was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. Virtutis usum: cf. the description of Aristotle's finis in D.F. II. 19. Ipsum habitum: the mere possession. So Plato, Theaetet. 197 B, uses the word ‛εξις, a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the Ethics of Arist. In this sense virtue is not a ‛εξις, according to the Stoics, but a διαθεσις (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog. VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a ‛εξις, VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 δυο γενη των ανθρωπων ειναι το μεν των σπουδαιων, το δε των φαυλων, και το μεν των σπουδαιων δια παντος του βιου χρησθαι ταις αρεταις, το δε των φαυλων ταις κακιαις. Perturbationem: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the Acad. appears, should read the plural perturbationes, a conj. of Walker. Perturbationem means emotion in the abstract; perturbationes below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in T.D. III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while perturbatio is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the T.D., i.e. IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. Quasi mortis: a trans. of Stoic παθεσι, which Cic. rejects in D.F. III. 35. Voluit carere sapientem: emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue ([20]), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.). All emotions are reasonless; ‛ηδονη or laetitia for instance is αλογος επαρσις. (T.D. Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, Em. to the T.D. III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses efferri laetitia but ferri libidine.
[§39]. Aliaque in parte: so Plato, Tim. 69 C, Rep. 436, 441, Arist. De Anima II. 3, etc.; cf. T.D. I. 20. Voluntarias: the whole aim of the Stoic theory of the emotions was to bring them under the predominance of the will. How the moral freedom of the will was reconciled with the general Stoic fatalism we are not told. Opinionisque iudicio suscipi: all emotion arose, said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external object; cf. Diog. VII. 111. τα παθη κρισεις ειναι. Instances of each in Zeller 233. For iudicio cf. D.F. III. 35, T.D. III. 61, IV. 14, 15, 18. Intemperantiam: the same in T.D. IV. 22, Gk. ακολασια, see Zeller 232. Quintam naturam: the πεμπτη ουσια or πεμπτον σωμα of Aristotle, who proves its existence in De Coelo I. 2, in a curious and recondite fashion. Cic. is certainly wrong in stating that Arist. derived mind from this fifth element, though the finest and highest of material substances. He always guards himself from assigning a material origin to mind. Cic. repeats the error in T.D. I. 22, 41, 65, D.F. IV. 12. On this last passage Madv. has an important note, but he fails to recognise the essential fact, which is clear from Stob. I. 41, 33, that the Peripatetics of the time were in the habit of deriving the mind from αιθηρ, which is the very name that Aristotle gives to the fifth element (σωμα αιθεριον in the De Coelo), and of giving this out to be Aristotle's opinion. The error once made, no one could correct it, for there were a hundred influences at work to confirm it, while the works of Aristotle had fallen into a strange oblivion. I cannot here give an exhaustive account of these influences, but will mention a few. Stoicism had at the time succeeded in powerfully influencing every other sect, and it placed νους εν αιθερι (see Plutarch, qu. R. and P. 375). It had destroyed the belief in immaterial existence The notion that νους or ψυχη came from αιθηρ was also fostered by the language of Plato. He had spoken of the soul as αεικινητος in passages which were well known to Cic. and had taken great hold on his mind One from the Phaedrus 245 C is translated twice, in Somnium Scipionis (De Rep. VI.), and T.D. I. 53 sq. Now the only thing with Aristotle which is αεικινητος in eternal perfect circular motion (for to the ancients circular motion is alone perfect and eternal), is the αιθηρ or πεμπτον σωμα, that fiery external rim of the universe of which the stars are mere nodes, and with which they revolve. How natural then, in the absence of Aristotle's works, to conclude that the αεικινητος ψυχη of Plato came from the αεικινητος αιθηρ of Aristotle! Arist. had guarded himself by saying that the soul as an αρχη κινησεως must be ακινητος, but Cic. had no means of knowing this (see Stob. I. 41, 36). Again, Plato had often spoken of souls at death flying away to the outer circle of the universe, as though to their natural home, just where Arist. placed his πεμπτον σωμα Any one who will compare T.D. I. 43 with the Somn. Scipionis will see what power this had over Cicero. Further, Cic. would naturally link the mind in its origin with the stars which both Plato and Arist. looked on as divine (cf. Somn. Scip. 15) These considerations will be enough to show that neither Cic. nor Antiochus, whom Madv. considers responsible for the error, could have escaped it in any way not superhuman except by the recovery of Aristotle's lost works, which did not happen till too late. Sensus: we seem here to have a remnant of the distinction drawn by Arist. between animal heat and other heat, the former being αναλογον τω των αστρων στοιχειω (De Gen. An. II. 3, qu. R. and P. 299). Ignem: the Stoics made no difference, except one of degree, between αιθηρ and πυρ, see Zeller 189, 190. Ipsam naturam: πυρ is κατ' εξοχην στοιχειον (Stob. I. 10, 16), and is the first thing generated from the αποιος ‛υλη; from it comes air, from air water, from water earth (Diog. Laert. VII. 136, 137) The fire is λογικον, from it comes the ‛ηγεμονικον of man, which comprises within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions came from Heraclitus who was a great hero of the Stoics (Zeller ch. VIII. with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 127—129, qu. by R. and P. 21. The Stoics probably misunderstood him; cf. R. and P. "Heraclitus," and Grote's Plato I. 34 sq. Expers corporis: for Stoic materialism see Zeller, pp. 120 sq. The necessity of a connection between the perceiving mind and the things perceived followed from old physical principles such as that of Democritus (ου γαρ εγχωρειν τα ‛ετερα και διαφεροντα πασχειν ‛υπ' αλληλων, qu. from Arist. De Gen. et Corr. I. 7, by R. and P. 43), the same is affirmed loosely of all the old φυσικοι, (Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 116), and by Empedocles in his lines γαιαι μεν γαιαν οπωπαμεν, etc. Plato in the Timaeus fosters the same notion, though in a different way. The Stoics simply followed out boldly that line of thought. Xenocrates: see II. [124], n. Superiores: merely the supposed old Academico-Peripatetic school. Posse esse non corpus: there is no ultimate difference between Force and Matter in the Stoic scheme, see Zeller, pp. 134, 135.
[§40]. Iunctos: how can anything be a compound of one thing? The notion that iunctos could mean aptos (R. and P. 366) is untenable. I entirely agree with Madv. (first Excursus to his D.F.) that we have here an anacoluthon. Cic. meant to say iunctos e quadam impulsione et ex assensu animorum, but having to explain φαντασια was obliged to break off and resume at sed ad haec. The explanation of a Greek term causes a very similar anacoluthon in De Off. I. 153. Schuppe, De Anacoluthis Ciceronianis p. 9, agrees with Madv. For the expression cf. D.F. II. 44 e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus Ernesti em. cunctos, Dav. punctos, ingeniose ille quidem says Halm, pessime I should say. Φαντασιαν: a full and clear account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch. V., R. and P. 365 sq. Nos appellemus licet: the same turn of expression occurs D.F. III. 21, IV. 74. Hoc verbum quidem hoc quidem probably ought to be read, see [18]. Adsensionem = συγκαταθεσιν. In nobis positam: the usual expression for freedom of the will, cf. II. [37], De Fato, 42, 43 (a very important passage). The actual sensation is involuntary (ακουσιον Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. VIII. 397). Tironum causa I note that the Stoics sometimes speak of the assent of the mind as involuntary, while the καταληπτικη φαντασια compels assent (see II. [38]). This is, however, only true of the healthy reason, the unhealthy may refuse assent.
[§41]. Visis non omnibus: while Epicurus defended the truth of all sensations, Zeno abandoned the weak positions to the sceptic and retired to the inner citadel of the καταληπτικη φαντασια. Declarationem: εναργειαν, a term alike Stoic, Epicurean, and Academic, see n. on II. [17]. Earum rerum: only this class of sensations gives correct information of the things lying behind. Ipsum per se: i.e. its whole truth lies in its own εναργεια, which requires no corroboration from without. Comprehendibile: this form has better MSS. authority than the vulg comprehensibile. Goerenz's note on these words is worth reading as a philological curiosity Nos vero, inquit: Halm with Manut. writes inquam. Why change? Atticus answers as in [14], [25], [33]. Καταληπτον: strictly the thing which emits the visum is said to be καταληπτον, but, as we shall see in the Lucullus, the sensation and the thing from which it proceeds are often confused. Comprehensionem: this word properly denotes the process of perception in the abstract, not the individual perception. The Greeks, however, themselves use καταληψις for καταληπτικη φαντασια very often. Quae manu prehenderentur: see II. [145]. Nova enim dicebat: an admission not often made by Cic., who usually contends, with Antiochus, that Zeno merely renamed old doctrines (cf. [43]). Sensum: so Stob., I. 41, 25 applies the term αισθησις to the φαντασια. Scientiam: the word επιστημη is used in two ways by the Stoics, (1) to denote a number of coordinated or systematised perceptions (καταληψεις or καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι) sometimes also called τεχνη (cf. Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 188 τεχνην δε ειναι συστημα εκ καταληψεων συγγεγυμνασμενων); (2) to denote a single perception, which use is copied by Cic. and may be seen in several passages quoted by Zeller 80. Ut convelli ratione non posset: here is a trace of later Stoicism. To Zeno all καταληπτικαι φαντασιαι were ασφαλεις, αμεταπτωτοι ‛υπο λογου. Later Stoics, however, allowed that some of them were not impervious to logical tests; see Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 253, qu. Zeller 88. Thus every καταληπτικη φαντασια, instead of carrying with it its own evidence, had to pass through the fire of sceptical criticism before it could be believed. This was, as Zeller remarks, equivalent to giving up all that was valuable in the Stoic theory. Inscientiam: ex qua exsisteret: I know nothing like this in the Stoic texts; αμαθια is very seldom talked of there. Opinio: δοξα, see Zeller and cf. Ac. II. [52], T.D. II. 52, IV. 15, 26.
[§42]. Inter scientiam: so Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 151 speaks of επιστημην και δοξαν και την εν μεθοπιαι τουτων καταληψιν. Soli: Halm, I know not why, suspects this and Christ gives solum ei. Non quod omnia: the meaning is that the reason must generalize on separate sensations and combine them before we can know thoroughly any one thing. This will appear if the whole sentence be read uno haustu; Zeller p. 78 seems to take the same view, but I have not come across anything exactly like this in the Greek. Quasi: this points out normam as a trans. of some Gk. word, κριτηριον perhaps, or γνωμων or κανων. Notiones rerum: Stoic εννοιαι; Zeller 81—84, R. and P. 367, 368. Quodque natura: the omission of eam is strange; Faber supplies it. Imprimerentur: the terms εναπεσφραγισμενη, εναπομεμαγμενη, εντετυπωμενη occur constantly, but generally in relation to φαντασιαι, not to εννοιαι. Non principia solum: there seems to be a ref. to those αρχαι της αποδειξεως of Arist. which, induced from experience and incapable of proof, are the bases of all proof. (See Grote's Essay on the Origin of Knowledge, first printed in Bain's Mental and Moral Science, now re-published in Grote's Aristotle.) Zeno's εννοιαι were all this and more. Reperiuntur: two things vex the edd. (1) the change from oratio obliqua to recta, which however has repeatedly taken place during Varro's exposition, and for which see M.D.F. I. 30, III. 49; (2) the phrase reperire viam, which seems to me sound enough. Dav., Halm give aperirentur. There is no MSS. variant. Aliena: cf. alienatos D.F. III. 18. A virtute sapientiaque removebat: cf. sapiens numquam fallitur in iudicando D.F. III. 59. The firma adsensia is opposed to imbecilla [41]. For the adsensio of the sapiens see Zeller 87. More information on the subject-matter of this section will be found in my notes on the first part of the Lucullus. In his constitit: cf. II. [134].
[§§43]—end. Cicero's historical justification of the New Academy. Summary. Arcesilas' philosophy was due to no mere passion for victory in argument, but to the obscurity of phenomena, which had led the ancients to despair of knowledge ([44]). He even abandoned the one tenet held by Socrates to be certain; and maintained that since arguments of equal strength could be urged in favour of the truth or falsehood of phenomena, the proper course to take was to suspend judgment entirely ([45]). His views were really in harmony with those of Plato, and were carried on by Carneades ([46]).
[§43]. Breviter: MSS. et breviter; see [37]. Tunc: rare before a consonant; see Munro on Lucr. I. 130. Verum esse [autem] arbitror: in deference to Halm I bracket autem, but I still think the MSS. reading defensible, if verum be taken as the neut. adj. and not as meaning but. Translate: "Yet I think the truth to be ... that it is to be thought," etc. The edd. seem to have thought that esse was needed to go with putandam. This is a total mistake; cf. ait ... putandam, without esse II. [15], aiebas removendum II. [74]; a hundred other passages might be quoted from Cic.
[§44]. Non pertinacia aut studio vincendi: for these words see n. on II. [14]. The sincerity of Arcesilas is defended also in II. [76]. Obscuritate: a side-blow at declaratio [41]. Confessionem ignorationis: see [16]. Socrates was far from being a sceptic, as Cic. supposes; see note on II. [74]. Et iam ante Socratem: MSS. veluti amantes Socratem; Democritus (460—357 B.C.) was really very little older than Socrates (468—399) who died nearly sixty years before him. Omnis paene veteres: the statement is audaciously inexact, and is criticised II. [14]. None of these were sceptics; for Democritus see my note on II. [73], for Empedocles on II. [74], for Anaxagoras on II. [72]. Nihil cognosci, nihil penipi, nihil sciri: the verbs are all equivalent; cf. D.F. III. 15 equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci ... idem pluribus verbis exponere. Angustos sensus: Cic. is thinking of the famous lines of Empedocles στεινοποι μεν γαρ παλαμαι κ.τ.λ. R. and P. 107. Brevia curricula vitae: cf. Empedocles' παυρον δε ζωης αβιου μερος. Is there an allusion in curricula to Lucretius' lampada vitai tradunt, etc.? In profundo: Dem. εν βυθω, cf. II. [32]. The common trans. "well" is weak, "abyss" would suit better. Institutis: νομω of Democritus, see R. and P. 50. Goerenz's note here is an extraordinary display of ignorance. Deinceps omnia: παντα εφεξης there is no need to read denique for deinceps as Bentl., Halm. Circumfusa tenebris: an allusion to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., see II. [73]. Dixerunt: Halm brackets this because of dixerunt above, parts of the verb dicere are however often thus repeated by Cic.