The sanctity of an oath in the old days.
112 Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, brought an indictment against Lucius Manlius, Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his dictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He further charged him with having banished his own son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus) from all companionship with his fellow-men, and with requiring him to live in the country. When the son, who was then a young man, heard that his father was in trouble on his account, he hastened to Rome—so the story goes—and at daybreak presented himself at the house of Pomponius. The visitor was announced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he thought that the son in his anger meant to bring him some new evidence to use against the father, he arose from his bed, asked all who were present to leave the room, and sent word to the young man to come in. Upon entering, he at once drew a sword and swore that he would kill the tribune on the spot, if he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit against his father. Constrained by the terror of the situation, Pomponius gave his oath. He reported the matter to the people, explaining why he was obliged to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his suit against Manlius. Such was the regard for the sanctity of an oath in those days.
And that lad was the Titus Manlius who in the battle on the Anio killed the Gaul by whom he had been challenged to single combat, pulled off his torque and thus won his surname. And in his third consulship he routed the Latins and put them to flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was one of the greatest of the great, and one who, while more than generous toward his father, could yet be bitterly severe toward his son.
113 XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando iure iurando, sic decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal se in castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi de redimendis captivis impetravissent, si non redierunt, vituperandi. De quibus non omnes uno modo; nam Polybius, bonus auctor in primis, ex decem nobilissimis, qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse dicit re a senatu non impetrata; unum ex decem, qui paulo post, quam erat[368] egressus e castris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse; reditu enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur, non recte; fraus enim astringit,[369] non dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur stulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit senatus, ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.
114[370] Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui relicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos senatus non censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset insitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita fractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione ea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur.
115 C.[371] Acilius autem, qui Graece scripsit historiam, plures ait fuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem fraude, ut iure iurando liberarentur, eosque a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.
Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, quae timido animo, humili, demisso fractoque fiant, quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de captivis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae, censuisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, quia sint flagitiosa, foeda, turpia.
Contrast between Regulus and the ten envoys from Hannibal.
113 XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for being true to his oath, so those ten whom Hannibal sent to the senate on parole after the battle of Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not return; for they were sworn to return to the camp which had fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians, if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange of prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in regard to the facts. Polybius, one of the very best authorities, states that of the ten eminent nobles who were sent at that time, nine returned when their mission failed at the hands of the senate. But one of the ten, who, a little while after leaving the camp, had gone back on the pretext that he had forgotten something or other, remained behind at Rome; he explained that by his return to the camp he was released from the obligation of his oath. He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the guilt of perjury—it merely aggravates it. |The ancient Roman discipline.| His cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence was, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ordered that the cunning scoundrel should be taken back to Hannibal in chains.
114 But the most significant part of the story is this: the eight thousand prisoners in Hannibal's hands were not men that he had taken in the battle or that had escaped in the peril of their lives, but men that the consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in camp. Though these might have been ransomed by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to redeem them, in order that our soldiers might have the lesson planted in their hearts that they must either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard this news, according to that same writer, he lost heart completely, because the senate and the people of Rome displayed courage so lofty in a time of disaster. Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when placed in the balance against moral rectitude.