2. In an infantry regiment of another camp were 765 men (Regulars) who had been with their officers for several months. The company commanders were asked to rate these men as 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 according to “practical soldier value,” “1” being highest, and “5” lowest. The men were then tested, with the following results:
(a) Of 76 men who earned the grade A or B, none was rated “5” and only 9 were rated “3” or “4.” (b) Of 238 “D” and “D−” men, only one received the rating “1” and only 7 received a rating of “2.” (c) Psychological ratings and ratings by company commanders were identical in 49.5 per cent. of all cases. There was agreement within one step in 88.4 per cent. of cases, and disagreement of more than two steps in only 7
10 of 1 per cent. of cases.
3. In another camp the company officers of a regiment were asked to designate the ten “best” and ten “poorest” privates in each company. The officers had been with their men long enough to know them thoroughly. Comparison of the officers’ estimates with the results of intelligence tests brought out the following facts:
(a) Of 156 men classed with the ten “best” in their respective companies, only 9 tested below C−. (b) Of 133 men classed with the “poorest” ten in their respective companies, only 4 tested above C+. (c) Men above C+ are 7.3 times as likely as men below C− to be classed with the ten “best.” (d) Men below C− are 10.8 times as likely as men above C+ to be classed with the ten “poorest.” (e) An “A” man is 11.7 times as likely as a man below C− to be rated “best”; but a man below C− is 13.5 times as likely as an “A” to be rated “poorest.”
4. The same experiment was made in still another camp. Officers of 36 different companies picked the ten “best” and the ten “poorest” men in each company. Of the “poorest,” 62.22 per cent. tested below C− and only 3.06 per cent. above C+. Of the “best,” 38 per cent. tested above C+ and only 9.72 per cent. below C−. According to this investigation, a man below C− is 6.4 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.” A man above C+ is 12.5 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating A is 62 times as likely to be “best” as to be “poorest.” A man rating D− is 29.3 times as likely to be “poorest” as to be “best.”
5. Where commissioned officers are selected on the basis of trying out and “survival of the fittest” it is ordinarily found that about 80 per cent. are of the A or B grade, and only about 5 per cent. below the C+ grade. Of non-commissioned officers chosen by this method, about 75 per cent. are found to grade A, B, or C+, and only 5 per cent. below C. Moreover, there is a gradual rise in average score as we go from privates up through the ranks of privates first class, corporals, sergeants first class, O. T. S. candidates, and commissioned officers. This is seen in the following table:
| PER CENT. EARNING EACH LETTER RATING | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Various Groups (Whites) | D− or E | D | C− | C | C+ | B | A | A and B |
| 8,819 Commissioned Officers | 0.0 | 0.01 | .25 | 2.92 | 13.8 | 34.6 | 48.4 | 83. |
| 9,240 O.T.S. Candidates | 0.0 | 0.14 | .98 | 6.16 | 19.5 | 36.4 | 36.8 | 73.2 |
| 3,393 Sergeants | 0.0 | 1.05 | 4.05 | 14.2 | 27.3 | 32.5 | 20.9 | 53.4 |
| 4,023 Corporals | 0.0 | 1.33 | 7.33 | 20.33 | 31.3 | 26. | 13.7 | 39.7 |
| 81,114 Literate Privates | 0.22 | 10.24 | 21.48 | 28.79 | 20.48 | 12.38 | 6.37 | 18.75 |
| 10,803 Illiterate Privates | 7.8 | 41.16 | 29.11 | 14.67 | 4.43 | 1.95 | .52 | 2.47 |
6. Experience shows that “D” candidates admitted to Officers’ Training Schools almost never make good, and that the per cent. of elimination among the “C−” and “C” students is several times as high as among “A” students. For example, in one of the Fourth Officers’ Training Schools 100 per cent. of the “D” men were eliminated as unsatisfactory, 55 per cent. of the “C−” men, 14.8 per cent. of the “B” men, but only 2.7 per cent. of the “A” men. In another Fourth Officers’ Training School 76.2 per cent. of the men rating below C were eliminated in the first six weeks, 51.5 per cent. of the “C” men, and none at all of the “A” or “B” men. These findings are typical.
The psychological ratings are valuable not so much because they make a better classification than would come about in the course of time through natural selection, but chiefly because they greatly abbreviate this process by indicating immediately the groups in which suitable officer material will be found, and at the same time those men whose mental inferiority warrants their elimination from regular units in order to prevent the retardation of training. Speed counts in a war that costs fifty million dollars per day and requires the minimum period of training.
Directions for the Use of Intelligence Ratings.—In using the intelligence ratings the following points should be borne in mind: