1. The mental tests are not intended to replace other methods of judging a man’s value to the service. It would be a mistake to assume that they tell us infallibly what kind of soldier a man will make. They merely help to do this by measuring one important element in a soldier’s equipment, namely, intelligence. They do not measure loyalty, bravery, power to command, or the emotional traits that make a man “carry on.” However, in the long run these qualities are far more likely to be found in men of superior intelligence than in men who are intellectually inferior. Intelligence is perhaps the most important single factor in soldier efficiency apart from physical fitness.
2. Commissioned officer material is found chiefly in the A and B groups, although of course not all high-score men have the other qualifications necessary for officers. Men below C+ should not be accepted as students in Officers’ Training Schools unless the score on the Officers’ Rating Scale indicates exceptional power of leadership and ability to command.
3. Since more than one fourth of enlisted men rate as high as C+, there is rarely justification for going below this grade in choosing non-commissioned officers. This is especially the case in view of the likelihood of promotion from non-commissioned rank. Even apart from considerations of promotion, it is desirable to avoid the appointment of mentally inferior men (below C) as non-commissioned officers. Several careful studies have shown that “C−” and “D” sergeants and corporals are extremely likely to be found unsatisfactory. The fact that a few make good does not justify the risk taken in their appointment.
4. Men below C+ are rarely equal to complicated paper work.
5. In selecting men for tasks of special responsibility the preference should be given to those of highest intelligence rating who also have the other necessary qualifications. If they make good they should be kept on the work or promoted; if they fail they should be replaced by men next on the list.
To aid in selecting men for occupational assignment, extensive data have been gathered on the range of intelligence scores found in various occupations. This material has been placed in the hands of the Personnel Officers for use in making assignments. It is suggested that those men who have an intelligence rating above the average in an occupation should be the first to be assigned to meet requirements in that occupation, and after that men with lower ratings should be considered.
6. In making assignments from the Depot Brigade to permanent organizations it is important to give each unit its proportion of superior, average, and inferior men. If this matter is left to chance there will inevitably be “weak links” in the army chain.
Exceptions to this rule should be made in favour of certain arms of the service which require more than the ordinary number of mentally superior men; e. g., Signal Corps, Machine Gun, Field Artillery and Engineers. These organizations ordinarily have about twice the usual proportion of “A” and “B” men and very much less than the usual proportion of “D” and “D−” men.
The first two columns in the following table illustrate the distribution of intelligence grades typical of infantry regiments and also the extreme differences in the mental strength of organizations which are built up without regard to intelligence ratings. The last column to the right shows a balanced distribution of intellectual strength which might have been made to each of these two regiments.
| Intelligence Rating | Interpretation | Actual Distribution | Balanced Distribution | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Regiment | 2nd Regiment | |||
| A | Very Superior | 1.0% | 6.0% | 3.5% |
| B | Superior | 3.0 | 12.0 | 7.5 |
| C+ | High Average | 7.0 | 20.0 | 13.5 |
| C | Average | 15.0 | 28.0 | 21.5 |
| C− | Low Average | 25.0 | 19.0 | 22.0 |
| D | Inferior | 31.0 | 13.0 | 22.0 |
| D− | Very Inferior | 18.0 | 2.0 | 10.0 |