Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix; troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~{1}
Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing batteries onshore; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort, that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers, three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character, his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen, but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of January;~{2} it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January; but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are assured that four or five weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops, there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn, and even for the month of September.
The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be, first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island; secure to ourselves, till spring, a fine island and harbour, and have it in our power to open the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance. Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any one of the states, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should take them by surprise.
A few days before our departure, and not sooner (to prevent the consequences of an indiscretion), three corvettes should be despatched to America, with letters to M. de Luzerne, to congress, and to General Washington. We might write that the king, desiring to serve his allies, and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some vessels to America, and, with them, a body of land forces; and that, if congress is in want of their assistance, they will willingly lend their aid to General Washington, but otherwise they will proceed to the Islands: This form will be perfectly appropriate. On any part, I would write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters to congress, and to General Washington. To the latter I would say, confidentially, that we have almost a carte blanche, and unfold my plans, and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be reported at our departure that we are destined as a garrison to one of the Antilles, while the troops of these islands act on the offensive, and that, in the summer, we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in Canada.
The squadron sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem to threaten New York, and we should find, on our arrival, pilots for different destinations, and the necessary signals and counter signs.~{3} If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about during the night, land at Block Island, and lay siege to Newport.
There are some continental troops, who might reach Bristol in a day. There are militia at Tivertown, who might also be mustered. Greenwich having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot. To escape the inconveniences experienced the last year, the naval commander should send, without a moment's delay, two frigates, to occupy the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and as the enemy usually leave at Conanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If the wind should be favourable, the vessels might return the same night, or the end of the squadron might join them; all these manoeuvres, however, will depend on circumstances. Thus much is certain, that the same wind which brings us to land will enable us to make ourselves masters of the eastern channel, so as to assist the Americans at Bristol and Tivertown, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel; at all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I describe.~{4}
Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the shore that is behind the town offers great facilities for landing; it is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries. There the French troops might easily disembark, and, reaching at day-break the heights which command the town and the enemy's lines, might seize their outworks and storm all before there, protected, if necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded by these false attacks on both sides of the island, would suppose that the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manoeuvre appears, the more confident we may be of its success.
You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment; the details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only say here, that my thorough knowledge of the island leads me to think that, with the above mentioned number of troops, and a very slender co-operation on the part of America, I might pledge myself to gain possession of the island in a few days.~{5}
As soon as we are in possession of the island, we must write to the state of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national troops. Unless the state should prefer waiting for the opinion of General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries upon Goat Island, Brenton's Point and Conanicut Island, would render the passage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there, and would never attempt it in an unfavourable season. We should be supported by the country, and although it is said to be difficult to procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and should obtain more resources than the American army itself.
The same letter that announces to congress our success in Rhode Island, of which, as far as calculations may be relied on, there is little doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and inquire whether, our assistance is further needed. Their reply would open to new fields of service, and, with their consent, we would leave the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The bay of Chesapeak would then be free, and that state might bend its whole force against its western frontiers.~{6}