It has been practically impossible to obtain a clear view of the eastern campaign, and consequently it is not to be wondered at that there has sprung up a general disposition to regard Russia as something of a disappointment. Ignorance of the conditions under which she is fighting caused impossible triumphs to be expected of her.
The best corrective for this distorted vision is to study the eastern war from the Russian point of view. It is that point of view that I have endeavoured to set forth in these pages. No claim is made to any secret knowledge; in view of the extraordinary strict censorship in Russia, such a claim would be absurd. But it is possible to record and explain the events as they are known and understood by representative opinion in Russia. Moreover, sufficient of the earlier stages of the campaign have emerged from the fog of war to enable the period within these pages to be analysed in the light of subsequent events. In the circumstances, it can be confidently claimed that the views generally held by men of moderate opinion in Russia provide a reliable if somewhat sketchy history of the campaign. Some details may be meagre, others faulty; that is only to be expected when for descriptions of the actual fighting it is necessary to rely to a very large extent upon the stories of the wounded. But the general outlines and deductions are undoubtedly correct, and the study of them will enable the man in the west to understand and appreciate the many difficulties connected with the war in the east.
CHAPTER I
The Nation and the War
The war that the nation fights is already half won. Tzars, Kaisers, Kings and Governments may spend millions on perfecting their fighting machines, they may hurl those machines at one another, but unless they have behind them the united will of their subjects, their efforts are bereft of more than half their force. The victorious army is the one which enjoys the whole-hearted support of a people prepared to face any sacrifice for the sake of its cause. The moral factor is as important as the material or the ethical. History is full of instances of wars being won against heavy odds by the sheer enthusiasm of a people determined to win at all costs. For a modern example it is only necessary to glance at the Austro-Serbian campaign.
The Kaiser knew very well how essential it is for a nation to present a united front to the foe. Ever of a religious disposition, he realised how true was the text that a house divided against itself falls to the ground. And so he chose his moment carefully. Britain was on the verge of civil war over the Irish crisis; France was torn asunder with political passions; both would obviously prove easy victims. And Russia? Unfortunately for the Imperial plans Russia was in a contented state. But the defect could soon be remedied! Russia has a reputation for strikes and revolutions, two of the most valuable allies an invading army can have. And so it happened that July saw the renewal of labour troubles in Petrograd, Moscow and other large towns.
The first sign that trouble was brewing came from the famous Putilov works, the Russian armament factory. For some time past Germany has been evincing a very keen interest in the factory, and not so long ago an insolent attempt was made to get the control of the works into the hands of German Jew financiers. Of course the attempt failed and Germany had to content herself with filling the place with her spies. There is little doubt that the German Secret Service was primarily responsible for the strikes of 1914. For no particular reason beyond vague references to the “rights of labour” and “the glorious revolution,” some thousands of Putilov workmen went on strike. Thanks to a vigorous campaign throughout the country by real and imitation labour agitators, their example was extensively followed. Workers in mills, factories and railways answered the call. Hundreds of thousands were on strike although there was still no formulated demands on the part of their leaders. The strikers were fed on the stock phrases and generalities of the demagogue’s programme. Soon rioting took place. The military had to be called out, and on several occasions at Petrograd the Cossacks came into serious conflict with the strikers.
Then suddenly the war clouds gathered. Russia appeared to have been caught at the most inopportune moment possible. The war danger arose at the very time when the strike movement seemed to be at its height. There is no doubt that Russia’s advice to Serbia in regard to the latter’s reply to Austria’s Note was to a large extent dictated by the unfortunate internal condition of the country.
But the nation rose to the occasion in a manner which even Russia’s warmest friend would hardly have dared to predict. The national danger forged a united people. The rioting and other disturbances ceased. The military remained in their barracks; there was no work for them in the streets. Then, as the international situation grew graver the strikers realised how insignificant, yet how dangerous, were their own squabbles, and they began to troop back to work of their own accord. Throughout that period of agonising suspense the Russian statesmen received no more inspiring news than this. It was the only ray of light that pierced the gathering gloom.