Kuchik Khan bars the road—Turk and Russian movements—Kuchik Khan's force broken up—Bicherakoff reaches Baku—British armoured car crews in Russian uniforms—Fighting around Baku—Baku abandoned—Captain Crossing charges six-inch guns.

In a previous chapter I pointed out that Kuchik Khan was in military possession of the Manjil-Resht road, and that the Russians under Bicherakoff were concentrating at Kasvin preparatory to trying conclusions with this amiable bandit—the cat's-paw of Turkish-German intrigue—who was barring Bicherakoff's route to the Caspian and to Russia.

At the end of May, in order to bring about a more effectual co-operation between his own force and that of the Russian commander, General Dunsterville transferred his headquarters from Hamadan to Kasvin.

The original purpose of the Dunsterville Mission, it will be recollected, was to fight Bolshevism by the organizing of Armenians and Georgians and, if possible, Tartars, in the Southern Caucasus. This had now become difficult of realization, owing to the series of bewildering and kaleidoscopic changes in Transcaucasia which had profoundly affected the entire political and military situation. For example, the virus of Bolshevism had infected the Russian troops in Baku; the Germans had landed at Batum and, by making peace with the Georgians, were placed in possession of Tiflis. The Turks had arranged a peace pact with the Armenians which left their armies free to invade north-west Persia, prosecute a vigorous campaign against the Nestorians of Urumia, and, finally, overrun the Caucasus as a preliminary to co-operating with the Germans in their contemplated advance on Baku. Now the Bolshevik leaders in Baku refused to recognize the right of either of the rival belligerent groups—the Central Powers or the Entente—to spoil the flavour of their military hotch-potch in any way. It suited the blasé Russian palate, and that should be sufficient. The Bolsheviks, at all events, were consistent to the extent that, while they opposed the advance of the Germans and Turks towards Baku, they more than once resolutely refused to accept the proposed aid of British troops to help them in overcoming the forces of the Central Powers.

DRILLING ARMENIANS AT BAKU.

Negotiations with Kuchik Khan had ended abortively. The leader of the Jungalis was quite prepared to permit Russian troops to withdraw from Persia if they wished, and to pass through his "occupied territory" to their port of embarkation on the Caspian. But British, "No!" They had no business in Persia at all, he argued, and if they were desirous of going to Russia, they would have to find some other road.

The haughty tone of this communication angered the Russian General, and he sent Kuchik Khan an ultimatum, calling upon him to evacuate the Manjil position with all his followers, or be prepared to take the consequences. As Kuchik ignored this, a combined Russian-British force was sent against him on June 12th. Two of the British armoured cars which the year previously had formed part of the Locker-Lampson unit in Russia proper, were present at the attack. After a brief bombardment, a white flag was hoisted on the Manjil bridge position, and two German officers issued from the trenches to parley. They offered, on behalf of Kuchik Khan, to come to terms with the Russians and allow them to pass, provided a similar concession was not demanded by the British. Bicherakoff's reply was to dismiss the impudent parliamentaires, and to intimate that Kuchik Khan and his whole force could have fifteen minutes in which to lay down their arms and surrender. Nothing happened, so at the end of the stipulated period the advance was ordered, and the Russians and British stormed the enemy trenches and speedily disposed of the Jungalis holding them. Kuchik and a portion of his army, with his two German military advisers, escaped for the time; but, after another drubbing had been administered to him, the crestfallen Jungali leader was glad to make peace, dismiss his German staff officers and drill instructors and release McLaren and Oakshott, two Englishmen, who had spent months in captivity.

The road to Resht and Enzeli was open at last, and Bicherakoff moved to the Caspian without delay and set about embarking his command for Baku. As a leader, Bicherakoff was popular amongst his men; and in the Caucasus he enjoyed deserved prestige as a soldier. He was pro-Russian—that is to say, anti-Bolshevik; and it was felt that his own personal influence, no less than the presence of his troops at Baku, would serve as a powerful antidote to Bolshevik activity in Southern Caucasia.