I am persuaded no lawyer will contradict what I have here said, as to secular affairs, and I see no reason why the same measure should not be dealt forth in causes ecclesiastical and spiritual. I mean, that no lawyer will contradict the principle, that because a certain argument or line of defence has not been taken into consideration, or not admitted as conclusive upon the side on which it is advanced in any given instance, it should be looked upon as judicially condemned, or not be used again if occasion should arise. If even the reasons of a court of law on which it founds its sentence are really no formal part of the judgment, much less can the mere overlooking or ignoring a particular line of argument, disable or disfranchise that line of argument, so as to render it for ever unavailable.
[71] Eccles. Polity, book viii. ch. ii. § 17, vol. iii. pp. 447–8, Keble’s Edit. See also Appendix G.
[75] Coke’s 4th Inst. p. 323.
[76] 25 Henry VIII. c. 19, § 7.
[78a] This, however, in the particular case, is an almost impossible supposition, because it was from the petition of the clergy themselves, however obtained, that the scheme emanated, and in accordance with its prayer that this board of two-and-thirty persons was to be appointed. 25 Henry VIII. c. 19, s. 1. See also Gladstone’s Letter to the Bishop of London, p. 9.
[78b] Gladstone, p. 9.
[78c] Ibid. p. 62.
[82] Badeley, p. 99.
[87] See p. 19.
[89] Second Letter, p. 42.