The unsatisfactory result of the fighting in Trones Wood affected disastrously the plans of the Corps for an attack on the enemy’s second system of defences. Every day gained by the enemy added to his strength. On the 7th July the Division had received instructions for operations to be undertaken against Longueval and Delville Wood on the 10th, but the original scheme presupposed the capture of Trones Wood, consequently the date had to be postponed and the arrangements modified. The task of the XIII. Corps was probably the toughest on the whole front. It was to secure the ridge running from Waterlot Farm to Bazentin-le-Grand, and the key of this ridge, Longueval and Delville Wood, fell to the lot of the Ninth. The flanks of its attack were to be protected on the left by the Third Division and on the right by the Eighteenth, which was to clear Trones Wood. The great difficulty lay in the fact that the position of the XIII. Corps was already a salient, and that success would intensify it. The ground, moreover, was vital to the enemy, and he held it with seasoned troops.[39] The operation was of first-rate importance, since the possession of the high ground near Longueval was the pivot of Sir Douglas Haig’s immediate plans; it facilitated an attack on High Wood in the north, and it was an essential preliminary to an advance on Ginchy and Guillemont.
General Furse had foreseen the task that he would be called upon to perform. From Bernafay Wood the ground rose up to the height on which stood Longueval. The southern position of the village stood open to the view, but the northern part, intersected by numerous orchards, baffled scrutiny by disappearing into the shelter of Delville Wood.
Longueval lay along three roads whose junctions formed the centre or main square of the village. From this point one road ran north to meet the path midway between High Wood and Flers; the second[40] ran south-west, skirting the western margin of Bernafay Wood; and the third led in a south-easterly direction into Guillemont. The northern road was marked on our maps as North Street. From the square a street branched off westwards towards Bazentin-le-Grand, which was known as Clarges Street; on the eastern side where it ran into a grassy ride, practically bisecting Delville Wood, it was named Princes Street. Parallel to Clarges Street, and about 300 yards north of it, lay Duke Street. These, bounded on the west by Pont Street and on the east by Piccadilly, formed a rectangle. Between Piccadilly and North Street clustered the orchards of Longueval. The enemy’s front trenches ran along the south of the village, and then turned off towards the south-east, past Waterlot Farm along the western outskirts of Guillemont. His rear defences lay in the hamlet and beyond the northern perimeter of the wood.
Ever since the Ninth Division had been in the line, the whole area in front of the German trenches had been constantly patrolled. The brigadiers had been warned of what was to take place, and the whole Division was ready for the battle, so that when the final instructions were issued by the Corps on the 12th July only details required attention.
At 3.30 P.M. on the same afternoon the G.O.C. met his brigadiers and explained his plans. The attack was to be carried out by the 26th Brigade on the right, and the 27th on the left, and for each there were three objectives. The first for both was the capture of the enemy’s front and support trenches near Longueval. The second task of the Highlanders was to secure the village south of the line Clarges Street-Princes Street, and the western edge of Delville Wood south of Princes Street; that of the 27th Brigade to take the greater part of Longueval lying north of Clarges Street. Then the 26th, in order to safeguard the right flank, was to secure the German system of defences between the village and Waterlot Farm inclusive, while the 27th was to clear the northern outskirts of Longueval and the western margin of Delville Wood adjoining that portion of the village. If these objectives were taken easily, both brigades were to go on and occupy the whole of the wood.
It was realised that the Germans were expecting an attack. To keep them in uncertainty as to the exact time of the onslaught, their lines were heavily shelled every morning by the artillery, and to gain the full advantage of surprise, what was virtually a night attack was planned. The British Army might be unimaginative and unenterprising in strategy, but it was bold and audacious in the use of tactical expedients. A night attack demands the most careful arrangements by the Staff and a high standard of discipline on the part of the troops engaged. Zero was 3.25 A.M. on the morning of the 14th July. This early hour made the question of assembly one of more than ordinary difficulty, but the G.O.C. had his scheme prepared. The ground in front of our lines had been thoroughly reconnoitred by patrols, and during the night a strong line of scouts was to go up the crest of the rise in front of the enemy’s trenches. These men were to be supported by Lewis Gun detachments, and the exposed right wing was to be protected against an attack from Trones Wood by a chain of posts, which the Highland Brigade was to establish in 9·2-inch shell-holes, previously made for this purpose by the artillery along the crest line of the spur running from Longueval to Bernafay Wood. Under cover of this force the attacking brigades were to form up their leading battalions in their waves of attack on the south-west slopes of the plateau. The whole assembly was to be completed half an hour before zero.
On receipt of their instructions Brig.-General Ritchie and Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins arranged their dispositions. The former decided to attack with the Black Watch and Argylls in front, the Seaforths in support, and three companies of the Camerons in reserve. The Black Watch and the Argylls were to be on a two-company front, each company being in open column of platoons with 70 yards between platoons. Thus each battalion was to be in eight waves. The supporting battalion had the same formation, and the fourth company of the Camerons was to carry[41] for the brigade. Two sections of the 26th Machine-Gun Company were to follow the 7th Seaforths, the rest of the company being in brigade reserve. One section of the L.T.M.B. was to follow the two attacking battalions, the remainder being under the control of the brigade. The Black Watch and the Argylls were to secure the first and second objectives, and the Seaforths the third.
Brig.-General Scrase-Dickins had the 11th Royal Scots and the 9th Scottish Rifles in front, and the 12th Royal Scots in support. The 6th K.O.S.B. carried for the brigade. Both attacking battalions had four companies in the front line, each company being in column of platoons with the requisite 70 yards’ distance between platoons; thus each battalion was in four waves. The supporting battalion was in the same formation. Two Vickers machine-guns were to accompany each of the leading battalions, one section followed the 12th Royal Scots, and two sections were in brigade reserve. The first objective was to be taken by the leading battalions, the second by the 12th and 11th Royal Scots, and the third by the 12th Royal Scots.
The reliefs necessitated by these arrangements were carried out on the night of the 12th/13th. The 55th Brigade of the Eighteenth Division relieved the South African Brigade in the portion of Bernafay Wood lying south of the Carnoy-Guillemont railway. The 27th relieved the 76th Brigade of the Third Division in Montauban Alley from the Montauban-Longueval road to the Montauban-Bazentin-le-Grand road (exclusive). On the right of the Ninth the Thirtieth Division was relieved by the Eighteenth.
The artillery arrangements employed for the attack on Longueval had exceptional interest; for they were destined to give the Ninth a distinctive place among the divisions of the British Army. Brig.-General Tudor’s main problem was created by Delville Wood. As our experience of Bernafay had already demonstrated, shrapnel shells, by hitting the branches and trunks of trees burst prematurely, and were as dangerous to our own infantry as to the enemy. The C.R.A. now resolved to carry out a plan that he had long borne in mind. The artillery bombardment preparatory for the attack was to commence five minutes before zero; the customary shrapnel was used, but after three minutes H.E. shell only. This was a notable change from the ordinary method. The H.E. had delay action, so that even if a tree was hit by it the shell would complete its trajectory before bursting.