In another respect, the Ninth resolved to adopt a method commonly used by the French and already employed by several British divisions, on the 1st July. Up to this battle all the attacks of the British Army had been preceded by a violent preliminary bombardment, and before the infantry advanced the artillery lifted well behind the enemy’s trenches. The device known as the “creeping barrage”[42] was a logical development in the work of the artillery, since successive lines of defence had to be accounted for. The gunners were to support the infantry throughout the advance by shelling each successive portion of the enemy’s line just in front of the oncoming troops. This would give the Germans less time to have their machine-guns ready and would enable the attackers to get to grips with them before their guns could be brought into action. For the attack on the 14th July, the rate of the barrage was to be 50 yards every one and a half minutes, and sheltered by this advancing wall of fire the infantry were to carry on the assault.

The full artillery programme consisted of eight separate barrages.[43] The first five continued from five minutes before zero until two hours after it, by which time the whole of Longueval was expected to be in our hands. All this time the defences round Waterlot Farm were to be kept under fire, and the attack on the farm was to be made under cover of the sixth barrage, which was to open two hours after zero. The remaining barrages were intended to cover the assault on Delville Wood.

CHAPTER VI
LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD
July 1916

Not the least anxious part of the forthcoming battle was the assembly of the troops during the night of the 13th/14th July, for it was an audacious enterprise to form up in the darkness a large body of men within easy distance of the German lines, since the least suspicion of the manœuvre by the enemy was bound to lead to a dreadful catastrophe. The deepest silence was essential, and the operation was partly cloaked by the artillery, which throughout the night bombarded the village and the wood. The assembly was a great triumph of organisation for the Staff of the two brigades, and a proof of the high discipline of the men. The arrangements of the brigades differed slightly, but were equally successful in their results.

The 26th Brigade assembled on the northern slopes of Caterpillar Valley, with its left resting on the path leading from Montauban to Longueval. After the covering party, consisting of four platoons with two Lewis Guns, had taken post on the crest of the plateau, the brigade major, Major Drew, with the adjutants of the Black Watch and Argylls and forty markers, went out to mark off the ground. The plan was to work from the left of each battalion. The left markers of the Black Watch moved up the Bernafay-Longueval road, and the left of the Argylls up the Montauban-Longueval path. Sixteen markers of the former, commencing from the rear, were posted in pairs at 70 yards’ distance along the first of these roads. When this was accomplished, the front couple had reached a point about 500 yards from the enemy’s front line. As each pair was posted, one man moved off at right angles with a tape about 150 yards long, and thus fixed the right of his wave or platoon. In the same fashion those of the Argylls were placed in position. Then at 12.25 A.M. the battalions, by companies in single file, moved out to line up on the markers, and as each platoon reached its left marker it wheeled to the right and fixed bayonets. The assembly of the brigade was effected without sound or hitch by 3 A.M. While the markers were being posted there was considerable shelling of the assembly area, but fortunately it died down before the arrival of the battalions. Owing to shelling, however, and sniping from Trones Wood it was found necessary slightly to contract the right of the Black Watch.

DELVILLE WOOD

The assembly area of the 27th Brigade was on the immediate left of that of the 26th. About 10 P.M. the platoon that formed the covering party pushed forward to the northern slopes of Caterpillar Valley, and an hour later Major Teacher, the brigade major, with one officer and two N.C.Os. of the 90th Field Coy. R.E. moved out to place the tapes for the battalions. In this case the plan was to work from the centre. On a compass-bearing, previously taken by Major Teacher, the first tape, 50 yards long, was laid, and others were placed in prolongation of the first. When completed the centre tape extended to a distance of 1000 yards, the work having taken forty-five minutes. Then the front tape was laid off at right angles, the flanks of each battalion being thus fixed. This was checked by an officer from each of the attacking battalions, who paced for 1000 yards along the roads that marked the flanks of the brigade. When the tapes were in position, the right and left markers for each unit were posted.

The battalions assembled in the southern portion of the valley at 12.30 A.M., each being in mass, in single rank, on a front of 225 yards. At 1.45 A.M. the 11th Royal Scots moved along the centre tape to their final position, and were followed by the 9th Scottish Rifles and the 12th Royal Scots. Though there was intermittent shelling, there were only five casualties, but these included Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Budge of the 12th Royal Scots, who was killed by a shell fragment as his battalion was passing through the west side of Montauban; the command of the battalion was then taken over by Captain J. E. MacPherson. The assembly was completed at 2.45 A.M.