On the left the attack was carried on by the 11th and 12th Royal Scots[77] and the “Rifles,” the K.O.S.B. being in reserve. The advance of the brigade began at 4.25 P.M., and with incredible coolness the infantry pressed through the enemy’s barrage and reached the line held by the Fourth Division a few minutes before zero. At 5 P.M. our barrage opened and was excellent, but our men were checked almost at the start by very heavy machine-gun fire. In these circumstances nothing could be gained by throwing the 26th Brigade into the battle and the forward troops were accordingly withdrawn. The collection and evacuation of the wounded proved a difficult and harassing job, but this was accomplished before dawn through the untiring and unselfish efforts of the infantry and R.A.M.C.
Little can be said in defence of this battle, which the Division fought with great reluctance. The preparations and arrangements were hurried to a culpable degree, and though the basis of the action was understood to be the bombardment of hostile machine-gun emplacements by the Corps’ heavy artillery, the heavies might as well have remained silent for all the assistance they gave. Apart from the fact that the time for reconnoitring the enemy’s position, particularly by the artillery,[78] was miserably inadequate, defeat was practically inevitable when the 27th Brigade had to be formed up in full view of the enemy and at a distance of more than 1000 yards from the barrage line. Much of the haste was undoubtedly caused by D.H.Q.[79] being too far back, the time necessary for the issue of orders and the arrangement of preparations being thus unduly extended. The only possibility of success lay in the Ninth taking over the front line from the Fourth Division on the night of the 11th, but this was not done, because it was considered expedient to let the worn-out men have a good night’s rest.
After the battle the Ninth was withdrawn from the line and was concentrated in billets near Hermaville. The high spirits of the men, which had been at fever-pitch on the 9th, had been somewhat damped by the events of the 12th, but a short rest served to illustrate once more the amazing recuperative capacity of the British soldier. The South African and 27th Brigades had been hardest hit. The weakness of the former occasioned grave concern as its losses exceeded its drafts, and it was clear that, if its identity was to be preserved, it could not be available for immediate action.[80] More drafts were forthcoming for the 27th Brigade, which by the end of the month was ready for the field.
In the latter part of April strenuous fighting took place near Roeux and the Chemical Works, both of which, though we gained a good deal of ground, remained in the hands of the enemy. While the South Africans were employed on work at Arras, the other brigades relieved the Thirty-seventh Division on the nights of the 28th/29th and 29th/30th April. On the last day of April the Division lost Colonel F. A. Symons, the popular and efficient A.D.M.S., who was killed by a shell near Athies; Colonel Elsner of the 27th Field Ambulance was appointed his successor. There was now a welcome change in the weather, brilliant sunshine and warm breezes giving promise of a glorious summer. On the 2nd May instructions were issued for an operation on the 3rd. This was to be undertaken with the Fourth Division on the right, the Ninth in the centre, and the Thirty-first on the left, and the First and Fifth Armies were also to attack. It was believed to be of unusual importance, for on the evening of the 2nd the Division received a message that the battle was to be the biggest in which the British armies had yet taken part.
The 26th Brigade, with the Camerons and Black Watch in front, the Argylls in support, and the Seaforths in reserve, was on the right; and on the left was the 27th, with the “Rifles” and K.O.S.B. in front, and the 11th and 12th Royal Scots in support and reserve. In place of the South Africans the Division was supported by the 52nd Brigade, which was located at the Blue Line. The objectives were the line of trenches Weed-Weak and the Biache-Gavrelle road. The attack was to be under the customary creeping barrage, which was to open 200 yards east of our front line and, after a pause of four minutes, was to move forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes, while a machine-gun barrage was to keep 400 yards in advance of it. The time of zero, 3.45 A.M., was made known to the Division only a few hours before the battle.
The position held by the enemy lay on the western slopes of Greenland Hill and consisted of shell-holes and stretches of trenches hastily excavated after his defeat on the 9th April. His trenches therefore were not of the same elaborate and formidable nature as those he occupied on that date, but owing to their comparative indefiniteness they offered neither a clear target for the artillery nor an easily recognisable landmark for the infantry.
The night of the 2nd May was clear, with no hint of dawn when the hour of zero approached, though by the mellow sheen of the stars and the setting moon one could see about 50 yards along a path. At 3.45 A.M. the air reverberated with the crash of thousands of guns, their flashes forming an almost solid glow. On striking the dry earth the shells threw up a thick curtain of smoke and dust, which, owing to a north-east wind, drifted back towards our lines. At the same time, the Germans sent up showers of coloured lights and rockets in a wild appeal to their artillery for assistance.
As a result of the darkness, intensified by dust clouds, the attacking troops lost direction almost at the beginning. The Germans replied immediately with heavy machine-gun fire from trenches and organised shell-holes, which were closer to our front line than we expected and had escaped our barrage. The Camerons, misled by hostile lights sent up from short entrenched lines echeloned in depth, swung so much to the right that they crossed the front of the 2nd Essex Regiment (Fourth Division), who fired on them. The Black Watch also lost cohesion and only a few groups managed to reach the enemy’s front trench. The Argylls in support, who became heavily involved in the fighting, suffered serious casualties when they moved forward, and were subjected to persistent bombing attacks from the vicinity of the Gavrelle-Plouvain road. Most of them were compelled to take cover in shell-holes, from which they gradually worked their way back to our line. One company of this battalion, maintaining direction throughout, went straight to the first objective, but being unsupported and cut off only a few survivors managed to return. This effort was really a brilliant performance. In a second attempt the Black Watch succeeded in expelling the enemy from Charlie and Cuthbert Trenches, but they were unable to remain there owing to accurate machine-gun fire from the Railway embankment and the Chemical Works. When the 26th Brigade was reorganising in its original line, German aeroplanes displayed great audacity; three of them hovered persistently over our front until one was brought down by machine-gun fire.
The task of the 27th Brigade was complicated by the fact that the left battalion, the K.O.S.B., occupied a position beyond the “Rifles.” Before advancing, the former had therefore to wait for five minutes until the latter came into line, and as a guide to the “Rifles” a lamp was shown on the right flank of the K.O.S.B. When at zero the “Rifles” left their trenches they failed to pick up the lamp, which was to guide their left, and in spite of compass-bearings the two assaulting companies swerved to the right, with the result that the right flank reached Cuthbert Trench earlier than was intended. This trench, which had been scarcely damaged, was strongly manned, and here a stern hand-to-hand contest was waged. Some of the “Rifles” succeeded in pressing forward, but practically none of the two leading companies returned, the great majority being killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. When the supporting companies attempted to advance they came under heavy machine-gun fire and dug themselves in 200 yards beyond the front trench. The 11th Royal Scots, unable to see what was happening, pushed up two companies, which joined with the supporting companies of the “Rifles,” and dug in along with them.