The K.O.S.B. after waiting five minutes for the arrival of the “Rifles,” went on without them, according to orders. Three companies crossed the enemy’s front trench and passed on towards the objective. Lieut.-Colonel Smyth,[81] with a view to protecting his exposed right flank, sent out a platoon from the remaining company to block the south end of Wit Trench, but it was practically annihilated on leaving the parapet, though the Lewis Gun was brought back owing to the splendid coolness of Sergeant C. Hawthorn. A serious disaster had occurred, and Lieut.-Colonel Smyth, who was badly wounded in the shoulder, was unable to do anything to help the three forward companies; for the front of the 27th Brigade was swept from both flanks, and the position here was almost hopeless unless the 26th Brigade and the Thirty-first Division could clear the enemy in front of them. Later Lieut.-Colonel Fulton, commanding the “Rifles,” and Major Hamilton of the 90th R.E., ignorant of the check experienced by the rear companies of the “Rifles,” went up to the right of the K.O.S.B. in Wish Trench, and observing a party of 50 Germans, whom they took to be prisoners entering Wit Trench, sent an officer and two men to bring them in. These were fired at and hit. It was thus manifest that the enemy had reoccupied Wit Trench and that he now interposed between us and the three companies of the K.O.S.B. Some of these penetrated as far as Square Wood, but their plight was beyond hope and most of them were killed though a few were taken prisoner.
The only tidings to reach D.H.Q. were those of failure. Oppy on the north defied all assault, and the Thirty-first Division was driven back and counter-attacked by the Germans, who gained a footing in the outskirts of Gavrelle. Accordingly at 8.39 A.M. instructions were issued that the general onset was not to be pressed. Brig.-General Maxwell asked for artillery-fire to be directed on the portion of Wit Trench opposite his front, in the hope of clearing out the Germans, and so opening a way of retreat for the men who had been cut off. Unwilling to leave troops who had managed to advance, unsupported and cut off, he decided to attack Wit Trench with the object of holding it during the night to allow the K.O.S.B. to return under cover of darkness. Accordingly one and a half companies of the 12th Royal Scots were ordered to undertake this operation at 8 P.M., while the light was still good; they were to be covered on each flank by a barrage of artillery and machine-gun fire. These men, 150 in all, made a most determined charge, but though a few reached Wit the attack was broken by machine-gun fire. Only 30 of them returned, but their noble sacrifice enabled a considerable number of K.O.S.B., mostly from the right company, to come in.
The battle of the 3rd May showed up the training, especially of officers, in a bad light. The customary gallantry and keenness were exhibited in full measure, but the high degree of training essential for efficient leadership was absent. The difficulties of keeping direction were undoubtedly enormous, and had they been foreseen, would have given well-trained officers the opportunity of overcoming them by the application of knowledge and intelligence. But these difficulties had to be faced by officers and N.C.Os. without adequate warning. Word of the sudden decision of G.H.Q. on the 2nd May to launch the attack before instead of during daylight, as originally planned, was received by the Division only a few hours before the time of assault, when it was impossible to make the necessary arrangements for maintaining direction in the dark, and this ill-advised eleventh hour change was largely responsible for the failure of the attack. The battle also revealed a lamentable decline in initiative, largely due to the excessive dependence of the infantry on the artillery, fostered by the method of the limited objective and months of trench warfare. After the initial check the barrage was lost, and the men in general remained where they lay without making any serious effort to push on. This was strongly commented on by Brig.-General Kennedy in his notes on the battle. In the old Regular Army the men had been accustomed to help themselves and others to make headway by the skilful use of their rifles and by taking full advantage of folds in the ground, and it was now clear that subsequent training should be directed towards the recapture of this lost standard.
These remarks about the Division have a similar application as regards the attack generally. At a prodigious sacrifice the only places of importance carried were Fresnoy, Chérisy, and Roeux, and of these the two latter were regained by the enemy during the day. There was no doubt that the action cost the assailants many times more lives than it did the defenders. The short summary in Sir Douglas Haig’s despatches somewhat disguises the seriousness of the defeat, for the 3rd May was assuredly a black day for the British Army.
The action however was fought under constraint. The far-reaching designs of General Nivelle had fallen short of accomplishment, and the primary function of the British forces was to ease the pressure on the front of their allies. The surest method of effecting this was by means of an operation, and similar subsidiary enterprises had been undertaken in connection with the Battles of Loos and the Somme. But this method, while gaining its end, has the drawback of involving a sacrifice of men, and it is possible that the British Army, now that it was adequately equipped with guns and munitions, could have secured its object by the employment of artillery battle preparations without an infantry assault. In face of a vast concentration of guns and men, an enemy, who had the hardihood to hold his defences thinly, would expose himself to a deadly stab, but so profound was the dejection caused in France by the disappointment of her hopes that it would have been folly to take risks. The restoration of the nerve of France was worth a big sacrifice.
The Ninth remained in the line until it was relieved by the Seventeenth Division on the nights of the 9th/10th and 10th/11th May, and was employed during this period in improving trenches and communications. The 27th Brigade was assisted by a composite battalion of South Africans under Major Webber. On relief, the Division proceeded to billets near Ruellecourt, where it rested, drilled, and was reorganised. The training area at Monchy Breton was visited on the 26th May by General Allenby, who presented ribbons and decorations to officers and men.
At the end of May and beginning of June the Ninth once more returned to the line in relief of the Fifty-first Division. Those scenes of fierce encounters, Roeux and the Chemical Works, were now in our hands, and Arras was rapidly assuming a more settled and less minatory aspect, for many of the bigger emplacements were now empty and others showed preparations for removal. At this time the activity and boldness of the German aeroplanes were very marked. The bombing of Arras and its environs, which had been occasional, was now a regular practice; and after dusk the dovetailed planes of the enemy flying low over our hinterland dropped light bombs and fired machine-guns on our infantry and transport lines. In such enterprises our airmen had been the pioneers, but the Germans were quick to imitate them. At first, the men regarded these new disturbances as an amusing entertainment, but as the raiders became more proficient and expert, they realised that a fresh and deadly terror had been added to modern warfare, and the “purr” of the “Albatross” became a signal to rush for shelter. Anti-aircraft mountings for Lewis Guns were issued, and they enabled the infantry to keep the enemy’s machines at a respectable height.
We still retained the ascendancy in artillery, but the enemy was alert and pugnacious, and his retaliation came almost as the echo of our practice barrages. On the 5th June a minor operation was carried out by the 27th Brigade and the Thirty-fourth Division on its left. The object of the former was to advance its line up the western slopes of Greenland Hill on a front of 850 yards. It was in trenches north and south of the Arras-Douai Railway, which divided its front into two equal parts. Cupid Trench was to be taken north of the Railway, and south of it the line of the sunken road (leading from Roeux), while outposts were to be established on a more or less undefined shell-hole line occupied by the enemy some 200 to 250 yards beyond the objective in each case. The advance was to be covered by a creeping barrage, moving at the rate of 50 yards a minute, supplemented by a machine-gun barrage and a Stokes mortar bombardment.
The battalions detailed for the operation were the 11th and 12th[82] Royal Scots. The assembly was very difficult; entry into the front system could be effected only by night, on account of the almost continuous artillery-fire by day between it and the rear system, and because the traffic in the trenches, which were poor, was visible to the field-grey observers. As the attack was timed for 8 P.M., not only had the units, additional to the ordinary garrison, to be brought up to the front line on the night of the 4th/5th, but they had to remain crowded in its limited accommodation throughout a scorching day, and hidden as far as possible from the view of hostile air patrols. The question of concealment was of first-rate importance, since any shelling of the congested trenches must have caused heavy loss and would have rendered any operation difficult, if not impossible. To provide cover for the extra men, scoops were made in the parapets and wooden shelters were installed; fish-net screens were then hung in front of each hole, and the troops were allowed to emerge one at a time in turn from 4 A.M. till five minutes before zero, when they turned out in full strength.
To deceive the enemy, they waited for twenty seconds before going over the parapet. This raid ruse was eminently successful, since the enemy, seeing no infantry move with the barrage, took it to be a “Chinese Attack” and lay low. The men accordingly crossed “No-Man’s-Land” without a casualty, though subsequently there was brisk fighting, during which some gaps in our ranks were made by the more spirited of the defenders.