Our Cavalry

by Michael Frederic Rimington

Having, it is hoped, to the reader’s satisfaction, demonstrated that cavalry with horse artillery have a great rôle on the battlefield against infantry, if (i.) the conditions are favourable, (ii.) the attack is à propos, and (iii.) properly supported by horse artillery and machine-gun fire, we turn to the form which the attack against infantry should take. Cavalry Training indicates that it should be made in a succession of lines; and it may be added that it is of the highest importance that these attacks should not be made without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance on the part of the cavalry leader accompanied by the commander of his artillery, and that subsequently the action of the infantry should be decided upon in conjunction with the infantry commander in that portion of the field.

That the infantry should not stand open-mouthed, but should press in at the right moment, is of the highest importance. As far as the troops are concerned, the formation is a simple one; but there are two points which demand forethought and arrangement. The first is the best position for the supporting fire; the second is the rallying-point. In these circumstances it appears best to have in one’s mind an ideal, as a guide, and endeavour in the actual fight to approximate to it—and we may turn to the memoirs of Napoleon for the solution. He says: “A flanking battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely is capable of deciding victory in itself.”

The ideal then appears to be: “A,” when the fire effect is delivered at right angles to the direction of the successive lines of cavalry; and “B,” when the rallying-point is fixed on the flank away from the general engagement and under cover from the enemy’s fire; “C,” when we utilize surprise. It is usually in the return from such enterprises after rallying that nine-tenths of the loss takes place. A good instance is that of Michel’s brigade at the battle of Woerth; see page 203, Maude’s Cavalry: Its Past and Future.

Suddenly the wreck of the ten squadrons of Michel’s Brigade, now making the best of their way back at full speed, but still preserving some attempt at formation, appeared right in rear of the Prussians. The latter at once wheeled troops about and charged at full gallop from the halt. Owing to the suddenness of the attack there was no time to deploy, though the outer troops attempted to gallop up into line; but the shock was sufficient to discomfort the French. There was a short mêlée, and then the Prussians, promptly rallying, swept up the debris of the French, and brought in some sixty prisoners and many riderless horses. The prompt resolution to attack and the rapid rally both deserve very high commendation.

Many writers of recent date, and especially those who are impressed with an exaggerated idea of the accuracy of rifle fire, those, in fact, of the De Bloch School, are under the impression that cavalry will not charge infantry. It is probable that, never having ridden in a force of cavalry passing through a fire-swept zone, they are unaware how much simpler it is than the attack on cavalry or artillery, and how much less resolution is needed.

In the case of cavalry there is the apparently inevitable concussion which is seen to be nearing; in the former a few men or horses drop almost unnoticed by their comrades, but most of them “carry on” for a long way after being hit. As the enemy are reached, the desire for slaughter overrides all other thoughts; cavalry should then be taught to go straight on, taking with the point what comes to them and riding their horses at speed in the direction of the rallying-point.

An example of the “counter-attack by a cavalry division on hostile infantry in order to gain time for reserves to come up” is given in General Sir D. Haig’s 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, p. 40:

The problem here presented is one of considerably more danger and difficulty than that of completing the rout of beaten troops and reaping the fruits of victory. The enemy’s infantry, far from having lost their moral, are pressing victoriously to the attack, and, though the leading echelons may have sustained heavy losses from the fire of the defence, there are troops in reserve and support which retain their cohesion and steadiness. The responsibility for ordering an attack of this nature ... rests with the commander-in-chief. Against such an objective it is useless to send regiments at the gallop. It is necessary to (1) prepare the attack, concentrate the means for it, and bring a converging fire of guns, machine guns, and infantry upon the objective; (2) make a definite plan. This must be based on what can be seen of the enemy and his position, the use of ground, the most opportune moment; (3) dispose the troops methodically by the execution of the plan, and assign to them, if possible, their objectives; (4) give the signal for the attack at the right moment.

In the Manual of Infantry Training, 1905, under “Formations Applicable to Savage Warfare,” is found S. No. 118, which contains an instruction for “Meeting an Attack by Cavalry or Swordsmen.”

When a battalion in line is threatened by cavalry or swordsmen in force, it may sometimes be desirable to dress back the threatened flank and to dress up the unmenaced flank, the battalion commander giving the command, “Back, No. ——, up, No. ——.”