Such a formation if adopted in ordinary warfare against cavalry would favour the fire of artillery and machine guns, if the latter are placed at right angles to the attack as indicated above.
May, writing in 1896, Guns and Cavalry, says:
True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and horse artillery moving rapidly, even during the progress of a great battle, may anticipate the foe at some decisive point, and may make or prevent a telling flank movement. But for such occasions special arrangements could no doubt be made as the exigencies of the moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for them beforehand.
It is evident from the German regulations quoted above that they have no intention of trusting to the “Special arrangements” for “Exigencies.”
Their reasons no doubt are somewhat as follows:
1st. Horse artillery is an integral part of the cavalry.
2nd. Attacks on unshaken infantry depend upon horse artillery for such a preparation as will speedily reduce infantry to shaken infantry.
3rd. In order to get freedom of manœuvre for our squadrons to a flank, cavalry are bound to meet an enemy’s cavalry force, possibly belonging to an enemy whose cavalry does not leave its horse artillery behind with the corps artillery in a great general engagement.
On which side wins will depend the subsequent course of events on that flank.
4th. A cavalry force of three regiments and one battery of horse artillery is quite equal, or more than equal, to one of four regiments without horse artillery.