Nothing had been effected.
Rennenkampf’s reconnaissance on the 9th May to Kuan-tien-cheng. Force at his disposal one battalion, ten sotnias, and eight guns. We read that, making “two very trying marches,” he reaches Kuan-tien-cheng with six sotnias. “The remainder of the detachment had been left behind at various points on the line of communication, partly on account of the exhaustion of the men and horses, partly to secure its line of retreat. As the march had been carried out without any regard to the pace of the various arms, the detachment was completely scattered.” A Japanese force of 400 infantry left the town, but shortly returned reinforced by a battalion, which unexpectedly attacked and drove the Russians away. The result of the reconnaissance was nil. And so on.... Rennenkampf was indefatigable. But the work “though so fruitless had exhausted the sotnias, which were now considerably under strength, and most of the horses had sore backs,” and so it will always be. Those who have seen the state of men and horses after four, three, or even two nights in the saddle will not need assurance on this subject.
Von Pelet Narbonne puts down the general failure of Russian raids to the small value of the Cossacks, who were not trained in offensive dismounted action, nor possessed with a keen desire to use the sword. He then compares the method of the Japanese, whose tactics were more suited in his opinion to the intricate and mountainous nature of the country. They sent infantry with their cavalry, who carried out the unavoidable reconnaissance combat. This method certainly economized the cavalry, an arm in which the Japanese were very deficient. Again, the Japanese cavalry frequently met the Russian cavalry by dismounted fire from the mud walls of villages, and were mistaken by them for infantry.
What, then, are the general conclusions at which we arrive?—
1st. That big raids seldom have results which justify the loss and wear and tear of the horses and men.
2nd. That a raid must not be entered upon except with a special and adequate purpose and as a result of careful reconnaissance by spies and others.
3rd. That once entered upon, the leader must devote himself to carrying out his mission and not allow himself to be turned aside on any account whatever.
4th. That a small, swift, well-hidden raid on a line of communication made at a favourable moment may cause the detachment of a large number of troops, whose absence will be felt in the decisive battle.
5th. That raids against which the enemy has made preparations are purposeless, but are nevertheless often made by cavalry leaders, lest they should incur the reproach of having done nothing.
6th. That the first raids in a war are often successful.