[33] The use of the pompom, as a hint to a flank guard not to spend too long in a specially attractive farmhouse, is an extremist’s view of this question.
[34] Cf. Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars. Speaking of the battle of Colenso, he says: “The cavalry received no orders, and did nothing. In the whole day’s fighting the cavalry brigade (six squadrons) lost two men altogether.” May not this want of direction have been due in some degree to the well-known prejudice of the generalissimo against the cavalry arm?
[35] Cf. p. 206, Von der Goltz, Nation in Arms: “It is not sufficient to have good cavalry, it must also be well handled by the superior authorities. These latter are really responsible for many mistakes unfairly laid at the door of the cavalry. Cavalry divisions must be allowed a proper liberty of action, without entirely slipping out of the hands of the commander-in-chief; whilst the masses of cavalry were formerly kept back to be employed in reserves or in the pursuit, the tendency now exists to send them forward at once, on the first day, to a great distance in a certain direction. This, again, may produce the inconvenience of cavalry being wanting one day when most urgently required. The despatch of squadrons to the front, and the choice of the direction in which they are to proceed, must also be in accordance with a definite plan. Moreover, the commander-in-chief must not only be clear as to his real intentions, but must also communicate them with perfect clearness to the cavalry.”
German Cavalry Regulations, 1909, para. 395: “Attempts on the more distant hostile communication may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a zest for victory must be the watchword for every formation, whether great or small.” See also section 104, para. 4, section 110, para. 4, of the British F.S.R.
[36] German Cavalry Regulations, 1909, para. 393: “During the battle decisive intervention, whether to support or ward off the hostile attack, is possible only by throwing in large masses of cavalry.”
Also see p. 33 of the Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, by General Sir D. Haig, where the co-operation of a cavalry division in ground to some extent obstructed by obstacles is described, and attention is drawn to the historical instances of Salamanca and Austerlitz, in which the co-operation of cavalry was a special feature.
[37] See Langlois, Lessons from Two Recent Wars, where the greatest stress is laid throughout on the depth of modern dispositions of troops on the battlefield.
[38] [This battle will be found well described by Colonel Lonsdale Hale, vol. liv., March 1910, Journal of R.U.S.I.]
It was afternoon on this occasion before the twenty-four guns rightly belonging to the cavalry mass were released from employment alongside the batteries of the general defence and allocated to work with the cavalry.
[39] There are few more striking instances of this than the episode at Vionville, where General Frossard, who had desired General de Preuil to make a charge, replied to the latter when he pointed out that the charge was sure to result in failure, “Attack at once, or we are all lost.”