[40] The cavalry attack en route to the relief of Kimberley and several other occasions, when General French galvanized the squadrons into action, afford us certain proof that energetic action on the part of one combatant compels the other to take similar action or, as happened in these cases, decamp.
[41] “The greatest error that the Russians made before even the outbreak of hostilities, and which continued throughout the course of the campaign, was, notoriously, the underrating of their opponents. It is said that the most influential authorities could not bring themselves, and did not deem it necessary, to detail a sufficient proportion of the good regular cavalry present in European Russia—guards and dragoons—for the theatre of war in Asia. Only three regiments were sent out, of which it may be added the 51st and 52nd Dragoons only reached their destination in the 17th Army Corps area at the end of July 1904. How blameworthy the action of the army leaders was in not devoting more attention to the employment of their best-trained and most reliable cavalry was most conclusively proved by both these regiments of dragoons. For they succeeded, in what the Cossacks up till then had had extremely limited success, namely, in thoroughly clearing up the situation as regards their opponents,...” etc., etc.—Supplement No. 86, Internationale Revue über die gesammten Armeen und Flotten.
[42] Von Bernardi, Cavalry in Future Wars, p. 81: “The cavalry should be forward and sideward to the line of battle.”
[43] General Sir D. Haig’s Report on 2nd Cavalry Staff Ride, p. 33: “The main lessons are that the cavalry leader must be in close communication with the commander-in-chief, that the staff and all leaders must be carefully prepared for this kind of work, and the troops trained to take advantage of ground.”
[44] Ardant du Picq gives an account of how two parties of infantry, suddenly meeting each other as they advanced over a hill-crest, both turned and ran away.
[45] Ney, “the bravest of the brave,” found riding alone in rear of the retreating French army, was asked, “Where is the rearguard?” “I am the rearguard,” was the reply.
[46] After the action at the bridge of El Rey, St. Cyr sent his cavalry in pursuit of the Spanish forces who were making for the defiles of Montserrat. The French cavalry, gaining ground at a gallop on the left flank of the column of fugitives, took up a position at the entrance to the defile, and captured the whole of the enemy’s supplies and baggage as well as 10,000 prisoners and twenty-five guns.
[47] “Casse cou,” a rare plant, and much smothered in Great Britain in the twenty-five years previous to the South African War with the inevitable effect.
[48] Un corps de réserve de cavalerie qui devait, à la fois, éclairer, couvrir et seconder l’armée.—Picard, vol. i. p. 257.
[49] In the campaign of Jena, 1806, the Prussian cavalry still maintained the Ziethen and Seydlitz tradition; they were well horsed, well trained, and extraordinarily exact in their evolutions; but the squadrons were mixed up with infantry divisions by groups of ten squadrons, and commanded by the aged lieutenants of the Great Frederick, still living on the traditions of their youthful successes. Direction was entirely wanting in the disposition of the cavalry, though it is said that at no time was military literature in a more flourishing condition than in the years following the death of Frederick the Great, and mathematical science was especially held in honour.