“The one hundred and sixty talesmen who were peremptorily challenged by defendants were first challenged for cause, and the challenges for cause were overruled by the trial court. It is claimed that, inasmuch as the defendants exhausted all their peremptory challenges before the panel was finally completed, the action of the court in regard to these particular jurors will be considered, and, if erroneous, such action is good ground of reversal. We think it must be made to appear that an objectionable juror was put upon the defendants after they had exhausted their peremptory challenges. ‘Unless objection is shown to one or more of the jury who tried the case, the antecedent rulings of the court upon the competency or incompetency of jurors who have been challenged and stood aside will not be inquired into in this court.’ Holt vs. State, 9 Texas Ct. App. 571.
“We cannot reverse this judgment for errors committed in the lower court in overruling challenges for cause to jurors, even though defendants exhausted their peremptory challenges, unless it is further shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon them and sat upon the case after they had exhausted their peremptory challenges. This doctrine is ably discussed in Loggins vs. State, 12 Texas Ct. App. 65. We think the reasoning in that case is sound and answers the objection here made.
“In addition to this reason, we have carefully considered the examinations of the several jurors challenged by the defendants peremptorily, and while we cannot approve all that was said by the trial judge in respect to some of them, we find no such error in the rulings of the court in overruling the challenges for cause as to any of them as would justify a reversal of the cause. The examinations, as they appear in the record, of the forty-three talesmen who were challenged peremptorily after the eleventh juror was accepted, show that many of the forty-three challenges were exercised arbitrarily and without any apparent cause. Such challenges were not compelled by any demonstrated unfitness of the jurors, but seem to have been used up for no other purpose than to force the selection of one juror after the forty-three challenges were exhausted.
“The only question, then, which we deem it material to consider, is: Did the trial court err in overruling the challenge for cause of Sandford, the twelfth juror? or, in other words, Was he a competent juror?
“The following is the material portion of his examination:
“Have you an opinion as to whether or not there was an offense committed at the Haymarket meeting by the throwing of a bomb? A. Yes. Q. Now, from all that you have read and all that you have heard, have you an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of any of the eight defendants of the throwing of that bomb? A. Yes. Q. You have an opinion upon that question also? A. I have.... Q. Now, if you should be selected as a juror in this case to try and determine it, do you believe that you could exercise legally the duties of a juror, that you could listen to the testimony and all of the testimony and the charge of the court, and after deliberation return a verdict which would be right and fair as between the defendants and the People of the State of Illinois? A. Yes, sir. Q. You believe that you could do that? A. Yes, sir. Q. You could fairly and impartially listen to the testimony that is introduced here? A. Yes. Q. And the charge of the court, and render an impartial verdict, you believe? A. Yes. Q. Have you any knowledge of the principles contended for by Socialists, Communists and Anarchists? A. Nothing except what I read in the papers. Q. Just general reading? A. Yes. Q. You are not a Socialist, I presume, or a Communist? A. No, sir. Q. Have you a prejudice against them from what you have read in the papers? A. Decided. Q. Do you believe that that would influence your verdict in this case or would you try the real issue which is here as to whether the defendants were guilty of the murder of Mr. Degan or not, or would you try the question of Socialism and Anarchism, which really has nothing to do with the case? A. Well, as I know so little about it in reality at present, it is a pretty hard question to answer. Q. You would undertake, you would attempt of course to try the case upon the evidence introduced here, upon the issue which is presented here? A. Yes, sir.... Q. Well, then, so far as that is concerned, I do not care very much what your opinion may be now, for your opinion now is made up of random conversations and from newspaper reading, as I understand? A. Yes. Q. That is nothing reliable. You do not regard that as being in the nature of sworn testimony at all, do you? A. No. Q. Now, when the testimony is introduced here and the witnesses are examined, you see them and look into their countenances, judge who are worthy of belief and who are not worthy of belief, don’t you think then you would be able to determine the question? A. Yes. Q. Regardless of any impression that you might have or any opinion? A. Yes. Q. Have you any opposition to the organization by laboring men of associations or societies or unions so far as they have reference to their own advancement and protection and are not in violation of law? A. No, sir. Q. Do you know any of the members of the police force of the city of Chicago? A. Not one by name. Q. You are not acquainted with any one that was either injured or killed, I suppose, at the Haymarket meeting? A. No.... Q. If you should be selected as a juror in this case, do you believe that, regardless of all prejudice or opinion which you now have, you could listen to the legitimate testimony introduced in court, and upon that, and that alone, render and return a fair and impartial, unprejudiced and unbiased verdict? A. Yes.
The foregoing examination was by the defense. The following was by the State:
“Q. Upon what is your opinion founded—upon newspaper reports? A. Well, it is founded on the general theory and what I read in the newspapers. Q. And what you read in the papers? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have you ever talked with any one that was present at the Haymarket at the time the bomb was thrown? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever talked with any one who professed of his own knowledge to know anything about the connection of the defendants with the throwing of that bomb? A. No. Q. Have you ever said to any one whether or not you believed the statement of facts in the newspapers to be true? A. I have never expressed it exactly in that way, but still I have no reason to think they were false. Q. Well, the question is not what your opinion of that was. The question simply is—it is a question made necessary by our statute, perhaps. A. Well, I don’t recall whether I have or not. Q. So far as you know then, you never have? A. No, sir. Q. Do you believe that, if taken as a juror, you can try this case fairly and impartially and render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence? A. Yes.
“It is objected that Sandford had formed such an opinion as disqualified him from sitting upon the jury.
“It is apparent from the foregoing examination that the opinion of the juror was based upon rumor or newspaper statements, and that he had expressed no opinion as to the truth of such rumors or statements. He stated upon oath that he believed he could fairly and impartially render a verdict in the case in accordance with the law and the evidence. That the trial court was satisfied of the truth of his statement would appear from the fact that the challenge for cause was overruled.