“Therefore, the examination of the juror shows a state of facts which brings his case exactly within the scope and meaning of the third proviso of the 14th section of chapter 78, entitled ‘Jurors,’ of our Revised Statutes. That proviso is as follows: ‘And provided further, that, in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression, based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall, upon oath, state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement.’
“In Wilson vs. The People, 94 Ill. 299, one William Gray was examined touching his qualifications as a juror and said: ‘I have read newspaper accounts of the commission of the crime with which the defendant is charged and have also conversed with several persons in regard to it since coming to Carthage and during my attendance upon this term of court; do not know whether they are witnesses in the case or not; do not know who the witnesses in the case are. From accounts I have read and from conversations I have had, I have formed an opinion in the case; would have an opinion now if the facts should turn out as I heard them, and I think it would take some evidence to remove that opinion; would be governed by the evidence in the case and can give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence.’ Gray was challenged for cause and the challenge overruled by the trial court. We held that all objection to Gray’s competency was clearly removed by the proviso above quoted. We also there said: ‘The opinion formed seems not to have been decided, but one of a light and transient character which at no time would have disqualified the juror from serving.’
“The expressions of Sandford in the case at bar as to the opinion formed by him are not so strong as those used by Gray in the Wilson case in regard to his opinion. Sandford’s impressions were not such as would refuse to yield to the testimony that might be offered, nor were they such as to close his mind to a fair consideration of the testimony. They were not ‘strong and deep impressions,’ such as are referred to by Chief Justice Marshall when he said upon the trial of Aaron Burr for treason: ‘Those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony which may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection’ to a juror. (1 Burr’s Trial, 416.)
“Counsel for the defense seem to claim in their argument that the proviso above quoted is unconstitutional in that it violates section 9 of article 2 of the present Constitution of this State, which guarantees to the accused party in every criminal prosecution ‘a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.’ We do not think that the proviso is unconstitutional for the reason stated. The rule which it lays down, when wisely applied, does not lead to the selection of partial jurors. On the contrary, it tends to secure intelligence in the jury-box and to exclude from it that dense ignorance which has often subjected the jury system to just criticism. A statute upon this subject, similar to ours and attacked as unconstitutional for the same reason here indicated, was held to be constitutional by the Court of Appeals in the State of New York in Stokes vs. The People, 53 N. Y. 171.
“The juror Sandford further stated that he had a prejudice against Socialists, Communists and Anarchists. This did not disqualify him from sitting as a juror. If the theories of the Anarchists should be carried into practical effect, they would involve the destruction of all law and government. Law and government cannot be abolished without revolution, bloodshed and murder. The Socialist or Communist, if he attempted to put into practical operation his doctrine of a community of property, would destroy individual rights in property. Practically considered, the idea of taking a man’s property from him without his consent, for the purpose of putting it into a common fund for the benefit of the community at large, involves the commission of theft and robbery. Therefore, the prejudice which the ordinary citizen, who looks at things from a practical standpoint, would have against Anarchism and Communism, would be nothing more than a prejudice against crime.
“In Winnesheik Insurance Co. vs. Schueller, 60 Ill. 465, we said: ‘A man may have a prejudice against crime, against a mean action, against dishonesty, and still be a competent juror. This is proper, and such prejudice will never force a jury to prejudge an innocent and honest man.’ In Robinson et al. vs. Randall, supra, we again said: ‘The mere fact, therefore that a juror may have a prejudice against crime does not disqualify him as a juror. A juror may be prejudiced against larceny, or burglary, or murder, and yet such fact would not in the least disqualify him from sitting upon a jury to try some person who might be charged with one of these crimes.’
“Sandford stated that he would ‘attempt to try the case upon the evidence introduced here upon the issue which is presented here.’ The issue presented was whether the defendants were guilty or not guilty of the murder of Mathias J. Degan. Any prejudice against Communism or Anarchism would not render a juror incapable of trying that issue fairly and impartially.
“We cannot see that the trial court erred in overruling the challenge for cause of the twelfth juror. This being so, it does not appear that the defendants were injured, or that their rights were in any way prejudiced by his selection as a juryman.
“On the motion for a new trial the defendants read three affidavits for the purpose of showing that, shortly after May 4, 1886, two of the jurors had given utterance to expressions showing prejudice against the defendants. The two jurors made counter-affidavits denying that they had used the expressions attributed to them.
“We do not think that the affidavits satisfactorily proved previously expressed opinions on the part of the two jurors referred to. It was a dangerous practice to allow verdicts to be set aside upon ex parte affidavits as to what jurors are claimed to have said before they were summoned to act as jurymen. The parties making such affidavits submit to no cross-examination, and the correctness of their statements is subjected to no test whatever. We adhere to the views which we have recently expressed upon this subject in the case of Hughes vs. The People, 116 Ill. 330.