Anarchy and Anarchists / A History of the Red Terror and the Social Revolution in America and Europe; Communism, Socialism, and Nihilism in Doctrine and in Deed; The Chicago Haymarket Conspiracy and the Detection and Trial of the Conspirators

by Michael J. Schaack

“The defendants claim that, although they were entitled to one hundred and sixty peremptory challenges, yet the State was entitled to only twenty, and they charge it as error that the State was allowed to peremptorily challenge more than twenty talesmen. The statute says: ‘The attorney prosecuting on behalf of the people shall be admitted to a peremptory challenge of the same number of jurors that the accused is entitled to.’ (Rev. Stat. chap. 38, sec. 432.) We cannot conceive how language can be plainer than that here used. It explains itself and requires no further remark. The defendants also claim that the trial court erred in refusing a separate trial, from the other defendants, to the defendants Spies, Schwab, Fielden, Neebe and Parsons. Error cannot be assigned upon the refusal to grant separate trials where several are jointly indicted. It was a matter of discretion with the court below. We so decided in Maton et al. vs. The People, 15 Ill. 536. We are unable to see any abuse of the discretion in this case.

“Defendants also take exceptions to the conduct of the special bailiff.[ The regular panel having been exhausted and the defendants having objected ‘to the Sheriff summoning a sufficient number of persons to fill the panel’ of jurors, the court appointed a special bailiff named Ryce to summon such persons under section 13, chapter 78, of the Revised Statutes. On the motion for new trial, defendants read the affidavit of one Stevens, in which Stevens swore that he had heard one Favor say that he, Favor, had heard Ryce say that he, Ryce, was summoning as jurors such men as the defense would be compelled to challenge peremptorily, etc. The defendants then made a motion, based upon this affidavit, that Favor be compelled to come into court and testify to what Ryce had said to him. The refusal of the court to grant the application is complained of as error.

“The statements in the affidavit were mere hearsay and were too indefinite and remote to base any motion upon. Moreover, if Ryce did make the remark in question to Favor, it does not appear that defendants were harmed by it. There is nothing to show that Ryce made any remarks of any kind, proper or improper, to the jurors whom he summoned. In addition to this, it is not shown that the defendants served Favor with a subpœna so as to lay a foundation for compelling his attendance.

“We think that the course pursued on the trial in regard to the manner of impaneling the jury was correct and in accordance with the plain meaning of section 21, chapter 78, of the Revised Statutes. That section says ‘that the jury shall be passed upon and accepted in panels of four by the parties, commencing with the plaintiff.’ The State is not called upon to tender the defendants a second panel before the defendants tender it back four.

“We can not see that the remarks of the State’s Attorney in his argument to the jury were marked by any such improprieties as require a reversal of the judgment. Wilson vs. The People, supra, and Garrity vs. The People, 107 Ill. 162.

“In their lengthy argument counsel for the defense make some other points of minor importance, which are not here noticed. As to these, it is sufficient to say that we have considered them and do not regard them as well taken.

“The judgment of the Criminal Court of Cook County is affirmed.”

After the reading of the decision, Justice Mulkey stated that it had been his intention, if health had permitted, to file a separate opinion. He said:

“While I concur in the conclusion reached, and also in the general view presented in the opinion filed, I do not wish to be understood as holding that the record is free from error, for I do not think it is. I am nevertheless of opinion that none of the errors complained of are of so serious a character as to require a reversal of the judgment.

“In view of the number of defendants on trial, the great length of time it was in progress, the vast amount of testimony offered and passed upon by the court, and the almost numberless rulings the court was required to make, the wonder with me is, that the errors were not more numerous and more serious than they are.