THE FIRST FORT DEARBORN 1803-1812
From the model owned by the Chicago Historical Society, after Captain Whistler's drawing of January 25, 1808
The expedition proceeded up the Illinois River as far as Lake Peoria.[250] Here, the river having frozen, it was found necessary to leave the boats behind and continue the journey on foot. It was midwinter, and before the Spaniards lay three hundred miles of wilderness infested with savages, who might at any moment fall upon them. At the end of their march lay the prospect of a hostile force surrounded by savages friendly to it and hostile to them, with their base of supplies, and their refuge in case of defeat, four hundred miles away. Naturally our only knowledge of the experiences of the party on the march comes from the Spaniards themselves. We may well believe, however, that they suffered "the greatest inconveniences from cold and hunger,"[251] not to mention the labor of carrying through the trackless wilderness provisions for themselves and a supply of goods to be used in placating the Indians.
[250] Missouri Historical Review, V, 216.
[251] Madrid Gazette, March 12, 1782, quoted in Missouri Historical Review, II, 195. For further details of the march see Teggart, op. cit.
Three weeks were consumed in the march from Lake Peoria to St. Joseph. On February 11 at nightfall the party was within two leagues of its destination. It had had the good fortune to secure the assistance of Louis Chevalier, who was intimately acquainted with the St. Joseph Indians, his father having been the principal trader and resident of St. Joseph for many years, until his arrest and removal by Sinclair's order in the summer of 1781.[252] While the party halted an emissary was sent on to the Indians at the post, and by promises of sharing the booty with them a pledge of neutrality on their part was secured. Early the next morning, February 12, the Spaniards crossed the river on the ice and made themselves masters of the post without a blow being struck. De Quindre was absent at the time, and all circumstances conspired to render the traders an easy prey to the invaders. The goods were divided between the St. Joseph Indians and those accompanying the expedition, and a supply of corn, gathered in expectation of the coming attack upon St. Louis, was destroyed. The party remained at St. Joseph only twenty-four hours, but during this time the Spanish flag was kept flying and formal possession was taken of the country in the name of the king of Spain. A hasty retreat was then begun, and the party arrived at St. Louis early in March without the loss of a man. On the day after its departure from St. Joseph De Quindre returned to that place. He sought to rouse the Indians, as he had done on the former occasion, to pursue the invaders, but this time without success. Their zeal for such exploits had evaporated, and they insisted on being led in the opposite direction to Detroit, to make their excuses to De Peyster for having allowed their traders to be carried off.
[252] For the elder Chevalier see Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 372.
The importance which later came to be attached to this expedition was due to its bearing upon the political rather than upon the military situation. It has generally been supposed by historians that the expedition was inspired by the Spanish Court to furnish the basis for laying claim in the peace negotiations to the British Northwest. The latest student of the subject rejects this supposition,[253] as also the further one that when the news of the successful termination of the exploit became known in Spain the Court proceeded to turn it to political advantage by founding extravagant claims upon it. That Vergennes, the French minister, and Aranda, the representative of Spain in the negotiations for the treaty, made such use of it is admitted. In 1780, the year before the expedition against St. Joseph occurred, the French minister, Luzerne, announced to Congress the view of the Spanish king that the territory east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio belonged to Great Britain and was a proper object of Spanish conquest. Two years later, in the summer of 1782, in discussing with Jay the boundary between the possessions of Spain and the United States, the Spanish representative argued that the western country had belonged to Great Britain until by conquest during the Revolution it came into the possession of Spain. The contention was not established, but the evident design of France and Spain to advance the interests of the latter in America at the expense of the United States induced the American negotiators to conclude a separate treaty with England, in violation not only of their instructions but also of the treaty of alliance between the United States and France in 1778.
[253] Teggart, in Missouri Historical Review, V, 220-23.
The remainder of the story of the Revolution in the Northwest can quickly be told. Clark still dreamed of an expedition against Detroit, and both Jefferson, governor of Virginia, and General Washington looked with favor upon the project and held out promises of the necessary assistance.[254] For the year 1781 a force of two thousand men was promised Clark, and Colonel Brodhead at Fort Pitt was ordered by Washington to assist him with troops and supplies. But Clark was doomed again to disappointment. Jefferson resigned the gubernatorial office, and Washington was engrossed in his contest with Clinton and Cornwallis which was to end in the capture of the latter at York town. The British on their part manifested great activity during 1781 in raiding the settlements along the Ohio River. The harassed settlers, less far-sighted than Clark, were little disposed to engage in a distant expedition; a force of over one hundred men descending the Ohio to join Clark was cut to pieces in August by a combined British and Indian force sent out from Detroit by De Peyster, every man being killed or captured. The victors even considered the project of attacking Clark, who was now in his stockade fort at the Falls of the Ohio, impatiently awaiting the assembling of the forces for his projected expedition. By order of the Virginia Assembly this was again postponed. Clark's disappointment was keen, for as far as any positive action was concerned, his projects for the year had completely failed. From another point of view, however, the prospect was less dismal. If he had failed to take Detroit, the failure of the British plans for ousting the Americans from the Northwest had been no less signal. And the sequel proved that Clark's stubborn retention of the grip on this region, which he had gained in 1779, was the principal factor in securing it to the United States in the negotiations which resulted in the treaty of 1783.