[254] Winsor, Westward Movement, chap, xi; James, "George Rogers Clark and Detroit, 1780-1781," in Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Proceedings, III, 291 ff.
CHAPTER V
THE FIGHT FOR THE NORTHWEST
Long before the issue of the military struggle a contest of another sort for the possession of the Northwest had begun. France and Spain had entered into the conflict between Great Britain and her American colonies from no love of the latter, but rather from a desire on the one hand to humble Great Britain, on the other to advance their own interests. With the opening of the peace negotiations, therefore, an effort was made by these countries to limit the boundary of the new nation on the west to the Allegheny Mountains, and to give the dominant influence over the vast territory stretching thence to the Mississippi, together with the exclusive navigation of that stream, to Spain. That the project failed, and the Mississippi was made the western boundary of the new nation, was due in part to the shrewdness and persistence of the American diplomats, in part to the complaisance of Great Britain herself. Her representatives did not hesitate to reject the temptation offered of an alliance with the two continental monarchies for the purpose of advancing their own projects at the expense of her former colonies, in favor of such a settlement with the latter as would, by making possible their future development, secure their friendship and good will. By the terms of the treaty, therefore, the Northwest was secured to the United States, its boundaries being a middle line through the Great Lakes, and on the west the Mississippi River.
The prospect thus opened for an early reconciliation between the mother country and her revolted colonies did not, unfortunately, materialize. The war had left Great Britain burdened with a vast debt, her dominion curtailed by more than a million square miles of her finest territory, her prestige no less seriously damaged, and her ancient foe across the Channel glorying in the humiliation which had overtaken her. It was, perhaps, too much to expect, in view of all these things, that the mother country should at once receive the disobedient daughter to her bosom, without attempting in any way to manifest her resentment for the humiliation she had suffered.
Furthermore, conditions in America at the close of the war were such as to breed irritation and hostility between the two countries. The Revolution had been in a very real sense a civil war. Upward of one-third of the American colonists had sided with the British, and in their ranks were to be found the major portion of the colonists who were endowed with wealth, good birth, and education. Between these loyalists, or "Tories," and the "patriots," whose cause had now triumphed, the most intense feeling of bitterness existed. Even as wise and conservative a man as Franklin shared the general feeling of resentment toward the loyalists and was ready to justify the confiscation of their estates. Yet they had risked their all for the sake of the mother country, and Great Britain's honor was involved in securing them against being punished for their loyalty and devotion to her interests. A futile attempt was made during the peace negotiations to insure their protection, and its total failure, while natural enough in view of the circumstances, furnished one of the elements making for discord later on between the two countries.
There were other causes of discord and, in fact, neither the United States nor Great Britain honestly tried to fulfil all the obligations they had entered into. One of the leading sources of trouble pertained to the situation in the Northwest. Great Britain had agreed to withdraw her armies from all places in the United States "with all convenient speed." This obligation was kept elsewhere, but it was calmly and deliberately broken as far as the northwestern posts were concerned.[255] The demands of the American government for evacuation were met by evasion and, later, by open refusal, and even an explanation of the reasons for this course was long withheld. Finally the pretense was urged that the posts were being held as a guaranty of the fulfilment by the Americans of their own treaty obligations. That we were justly chargeable with failure in this respect is clear; but it is equally clear that the British determination to retain the posts antedated our infractions of the treaty, and that the claim that they were being held because of American violations of the treaty was a mere afterthought, put forward by way of excuse for a policy in itself indefensible.
[255] The standard study of this subject is McLaughlin's "Western Posts and the British Debts," in American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1894, 413 ff. See also Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. IV.
The real reasons for the British policy with reference to the Northwest were the desire to retain control of the fur trade and of the Indian tribes of that region. In one sense these two reasons coalesce, but to some extent they may be distinguished. The fur trade constituted Canada's chief commercial asset, and the Canadians had looked upon the concessions contained in the treaty of 1783 as needlessly generous to the Americans and fatal to their own prosperity. To retain this trade the Americans must be shut out of the Northwest, and to this end the posts must be retained. Further than this, it was an obvious fact that in time of war the Indian would side with the party with whom he traded in time of peace. By her control of the Indian trade and the exclusion of the Americans from the Northwest Great Britain assured herself that in case of a future war with America or Spain the tomahawk and scalping knife might once more be called into requisition against her enemy.[256]
[256] McLaughlin, op. cit., 430.
To these considerations was joined another, which proved potent to fill the Northwest with strife and bloodshed for a dozen years after the close of the Revolution. It shortly became the aim of Great Britain to secure to the powerful tribes in western New York and in the territory west and north of the Ohio River the retention of their lands. They would thus serve the purpose of a buffer state between the United States and Canada, and would, by proper management of the Indians, render permanent the grip which the Canadian merchants had on the fur trade. To secure these ends the British sought to keep the Indians united and to influence them not to yield too readily to the blandishments or threats of the Americans. The attempt was made to establish a sort of guardianship over the Indian tribes and to require that interviews between them and the Americans be held in the presence of Canadian officials or in places where the British influence might be made manifest. In all this the home government refrained from instigating the Indians to war upon the Americans, and steadily instructed its representatives to encourage them to keep the peace. But it is none the less true that its attitude toward them was productive of a state of affairs and an attitude of mind on the part of the Indians which made war with the Americans inevitable.[257] At last the British officials lost their earlier solicitude for the preservation of peace, and in the period immediately preceding Wayne's victory of 1794 they openly encouraged the Indians to make war on the Americans, and supplied them with the guns, ammunition, and other provisions which made their long resistance possible.[258]