By Franklin L. Riley, Ph. D.
October 16, 1795,[1] Thomas Pinckney, in behalf of the United States and the Prince of Peace, representing His Catholic Majesty, signed at San Lorenzo el Real, a treaty which contained among other things, the following stipulations:
"The southern boundary of the United States, which divides their territory from the Spanish colonies of East and West Florida, shall be designated by a line beginning on the River Mississippi at the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the River Apalachicola," etc.
"If there should be any troops, garrisons or settlements of either party in the territory of the other according to the above-mentioned boundaries, they shall be withdrawn from the said territory within the term of six months after the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible."
"One Commissioner and one Surveyor shall be appointed by each of the contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez on the left side of the River Mississippi before the expiration of six months from the ratification of this convention and they shall proceed to run and mark this boundary according to the stipulations."
"The navigation of the said (Mississippi) River, in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean shall be free only to his (Catholic Majesty) subjects and the citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the subjects of other Powers by special convention."
"The two high contracting parties shall____maintain peace and harmony among the several Indian nations who inhabit the country adjacent to____the boundaries of the two Floridas." "No treaty of alliance or other whatever (except treaties of peace) shall be made by either party with the Indians living within the boundary of the other."
These terms, so favorable to the United States and so destructive of Spanish interests, had long been the rock upon which all plans for an adjustment of the differences between the two powers had been stranded.[2] Nor were they finally extorted from Spain until a concurrence of unfavorable events had precipitated a diplomatic crisis. Even then his Catholic Majesty seemed to consider such stipulations as only a temporary expedient, the fulfillment of which he hoped eventually to be able to evade. The Prince of Peace himself admits that political circumstances forced Spain to consent to the treaty and intimates further that he would have made even greater concessions if they had been demanded by the United States. In writing of these negotiations, he says:
"I had taken to heart the treaty (Jay's), which unknown to us the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America; this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner and without risk, in her distant possessions.
"I endeavored to conclude another treaty with the same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that nation of Republicans."
Subsequent events proved, however, that Godoy had overestimated the probabilities of a consolidation of interests between the United States and Great Britain, and that Spain had also failed to gain that ascendency over the affairs of this "nation of republicans," which she hoped to do through this treaty.[3] She was therefore no longer interested in fulfilling its stipulations. These facts are substantiated by a letter which Stoddard[4] claims was written by Governor Gayoso in June, 1796, to a confidential friend, and which came to light several years afterward. In this communication Gayoso claims that:
"The object of Great Britain in her treaty with the United States about this period, was to attach them to her interests, and even render them dependent on her, and, therefore, the Spanish treaty of limits was made to counterbalance it; but as Great Britain had totally failed in her object it was not the policy of Spain to regard her stipulations."[5]
In order to evade the treaty, she now returned to a line of policy which she had adopted several years previous[6] and which had also been tried by more than one foreign power[7] since the combined efforts of England, France and Spain to "coop up" the United States between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic, at the close of the Revolutionary War.[8] This was nothing less than a dismemberment of the United States. But the accomplishment of this bold project required time. She, therefore, resorted to her historic policy of procrastination, hoping ultimately to evade the treaty and thus regain what had been wrested from her in diplomacy. She was fully aware of the dissatisfaction the western states had expressed over the tardiness and at times the apparent indifference of the United States to the navigation of the Mississippi[9] and she also realized that the publication of the treaty "would bring her project of dismemberment to a crisis and in a manner to compel the western people to make a decided election to adhere to the Atlantic states or to embrace the splendid advantages held out to them on the Mississippi."[10] Hence, upon the announcement of the treaty in New Orleans, a Spanish emissary was immediately dispatched from that place to Tennessee and Kentucky, with authority to engage the services of the principal inhabitants in a scheme to disaffect the people towards the United States by the free use of money and promises of independence and free trade.[11] In Gayoso's letter of June, 1796, referred to above, the assertion was made that,