"It was expected that several states would separate from the union, which would absolve Spain from her engagements; because, as her contract was made with the union, it would be no longer obligatory than while the union lasted. That Spain, contrary to her expectations, was not likely to derive any advantages from the treaty, and that her views and policy would be changed, particularly if an alteration took place in the political existence of the United States. He therefore concluded, that all things considered, nothing more would result from the treaty than the free navigation of the Mississippi."[12]
A second line of policy for evading the treaty was then opened up. This was to postpone an execution of its stipulations awaiting the development of certain international complications which seemed to be inevitable. There had been a rupture in the diplomatic relation of the United States and France and hostilities between these two countries seemed to be near at hand. Mr. Pickering, who was Secretary of State from 1795 to 1800, considered this the real cause for delay on the part of Spain, after contending that the other reasons given by the Spanish authorities were "merely ostensible," he says:
"The true reason is doubtless developed by the Baron (de Corondelet)[13] in his proclamation of the 31st of May (1797). The expectation of an immediate rupture between France, the intimate ally of Spain, and the United States."[14]
By making common cause with France, in case of such a rupture, Spain evidently thought that she could recover some of the concessions she had made in the treaty, if compliance with its stipulations should not be too far effected.
In order to find time for the operation of these schemes, the Spanish officials produced, from time to time, such excuses as either the treaty or the circumstances rendered plausible. After months of fruitless delay, they determined to rest their final action upon the results of another effort to detach the western states from the Union. An emissary was again sent to Tennessee and Kentucky to confer with certain men who were former correspondents of the governors of Louisiana. He found, however, that the people were less disposed towards a change than they were ten years previous, especially since they were likely to secure the navigation of the Mississippi,—the real cause of their former disaffection—without resorting to a hazardous enterprise. After an eventful sojourn in this region, he returned to New Orleans in January, 1798, bearing the unwelcome report which convinced the Governor General that Spain had lost all hope of political prestige in the territory north of the 31st degree and east of the Mississippi.[15] Arrangements were then perfected for the execution of the treaty.
In the light of the Spanish policy as presented above, local events may be easily interpreted. As time was an indispensable condition upon which the success of this policy depended, it was gained by various pretexts. Don Yrujo, the Spanish minister, intrigued at Philadelphia, and his efforts were ably seconded by Carondelet, Gayoso[16] and a host of subordinate officials on the Mississippi.
In accordance with a stipulation of the treaty, President Washington appointed the Honorable Andrew Ellicott[17] as Commissioner to run the boundary line in behalf of the United States. He left Philadelphia for Natchez by way of the Ohio and the Mississippi, September 16, 1796. But his descent of the Mississippi had been anticipated by the Spaniards, who had prepared obstructive measures in advance of his coming. So that whenever he came in contact with Spanish officials they evinced a disposition to hinder his descent of the river, if not prevent it altogether.[18] Some of them affected ignorance of the treaty, others appeared embarrassed at the presence of the Americans, while none of them had made or were making, so far as the Commissioner could observe, any preparations to evacuate the posts according to the terms of the treaty.